From patchwork Thu Mar 6 19:13:27 2025 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 14005246 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7DB2526FD8C; Thu, 6 Mar 2025 19:13:40 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1741288421; cv=none; b=j69Z0ZZCalcF+ryGdVDtkyFeh8+8ViIILXzUZx1E+21Njd2gsYr35hhTtop5L0kAh+J4zCD21EcVM/y77MwiLuDU+nRQSCVoM7eji0T7BYW+ZAsYtP9x6wFASTptW2385gMYp/goKRbqOScloeqyLZJfj6tNdbWl8q1bevhbKHY= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1741288421; c=relaxed/simple; bh=aSoRZEC9ihe1E97uZreVdlraRGF9Lh8i+uzdQMNL4wY=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version; b=Qk82crHXzqnVXgZ/2MH3vvOQcHTlb71seyc3i4EdeMyh/UUfcG1VGCOenYXa44heVOHWuY8QaJeQfv0pUrDESkbmYAroWBA9cBVA4qJcF7MPXnhGM2emuAaBNYB7XD71YCP9ROaE8+BT1RaRmgYCSZq9CHT96VlU7Aznu5UqY2U= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=VWxDp7q0; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="VWxDp7q0" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 489C3C4CEE0; Thu, 6 Mar 2025 19:13:38 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1741288419; bh=aSoRZEC9ihe1E97uZreVdlraRGF9Lh8i+uzdQMNL4wY=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:From; b=VWxDp7q0U+sVT3TUavg+ywSCX+7f/tcBP3OqsYp6OMdmLMqvIDvzdItOCV53cDHUV kjtORyheop+XOZ+ncioQmZZl2Sa65iC4iuxCmbqb/pkTZW0IudxCzps5g6/mgVc0Va 5yp/Pf6Q+KxA861W2bkZNbfIhwG84dCWlXcRiD0Vmg8/uZ5hARAnELbgCyAOZ66vkv aRfFNhH9objH92eue2FXwpHVNTkgbhkNQAB3oEl80rKL7+5bdeAJvLMWcL0PHYvbjz +T7YgTujmQmDyztcH0SmAGkGalZNIEtySjhIeHszKHJIijAwfXoK3wwhI7E8aaMoPn cHI+oHXE1tqyw== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Peter Huewe , Jarkko Sakkinen , Jason Gunthorpe , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH] tpm: Remove duplicate documentation Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2025 21:13:27 +0200 Message-ID: <20250306191328.28680-1-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.48.1 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 The functions already have documentation as defined in https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/kernel-doc-nano-HOWTO.txt Remove duplicate documentation in order to reduce maintainer overhead. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- This is posted mainly for transparency and will be picked to the next PR an all conditions. Ack are still welcome of course. drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 30 ------------------------------ 1 file changed, 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index b70165b588ec..e7d186637664 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 - /* * Copyright (C) 2018 James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com * @@ -37,35 +36,6 @@ * file and never needs to be seen even by the kernel internal user. To * the user there's an init function tpm2_sessions_init() that needs to * be called once per TPM which generates the NULL seed primary key. - * - * These are the usage functions: - * - * tpm2_start_auth_session() which allocates the opaque auth structure - * and gets a session from the TPM. This must be called before - * any of the following functions. The session is protected by a - * session_key which is derived from a random salt value - * encrypted to the NULL seed. - * tpm2_end_auth_session() kills the session and frees the resources. - * Under normal operation this function is done by - * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), so this is only to be used on - * error legs where the latter is not executed. - * tpm_buf_append_name() to add a handle to the buffer. This must be - * used in place of the usual tpm_buf_append_u32() for adding - * handles because handles have to be processed specially when - * calculating the HMAC. In particular, for NV, volatile and - * permanent objects you now need to provide the name. - * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() which appends the hmac session to the - * buf in the same way tpm_buf_append_auth does(). - * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() This calculates the correct hash and - * places it in the buffer. It must be called after the complete - * command buffer is finalized so it can fill in the correct HMAC - * based on the parameters. - * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() which checks the session response in - * the buffer and calculates what it should be. If there's a - * mismatch it will log a warning and return an error. If - * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() did not specify - * TPM_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION then the session will be closed (if it - * hasn't been consumed) and the auth structure freed. */ #include "tpm.h"