From patchwork Fri Apr 1 22:08:32 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Daniel Verkamp X-Patchwork-Id: 12798820 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F185C433EF for ; Fri, 1 Apr 2022 22:08:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1353239AbiDAWKp (ORCPT ); Fri, 1 Apr 2022 18:10:45 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:48054 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1353231AbiDAWKo (ORCPT ); Fri, 1 Apr 2022 18:10:44 -0400 Received: from mail-pj1-x102f.google.com (mail-pj1-x102f.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::102f]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A244D36E07 for ; Fri, 1 Apr 2022 15:08:52 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pj1-x102f.google.com with SMTP id gp15-20020a17090adf0f00b001c7cd11b0b3so6409243pjb.3 for ; Fri, 01 Apr 2022 15:08:52 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=GGy12Ftw4loYyE/TAP1mAYq+WnfJrqLYyR2nxuIM2Fs=; b=SL+SlsZQoHtn/QL8/tkQm0FjSPuHuOxWUbuUxvj8p1fi5KcysZoVhJslgdNUIpCfdx xMaLuCHkzzhLEtjWry6xZ18Kd8ePrZ0yDFhYQrDIwtgMlcC0xLi8wlA+UmB3/v01zVJM 6kkF19DbqpacsUKj/Tf9vROFF0KI1KSVapvFw= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=GGy12Ftw4loYyE/TAP1mAYq+WnfJrqLYyR2nxuIM2Fs=; b=jRQO/4nyyKcRc0OkkozHi1r/DFdCjn8MAMU4jggQ6ASu3miLBHlqbnlq8F/gwYRJFh E73Wqsf7l0xIAzpj39FX39QwAqA5/zagCXtlYptLYg4csP81fdwlB30iS0ikCDCqZbf6 HUO6yG9yioRYE+2/djRrgY0d636jzB6U/Pg8QgXsf1Q2xWlEqXo7q2UVwS/AEgod4Z7P TjQ3lD7POY7mik+uRTYosSaI0+cloShtG/FMS82lX9l7e0yBqWDRTA2H/bM3QCNODVa7 Alx/tk7o2cQKT0m1zCSgnee6FECvrOkxWkIincheISc49kPXQ9kQWvPStBjhCATS+usU i2dg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531H5mGhKFOkdifynjWZ/qJ3wUH4tftHPVC/qfxRTmoOocN9Ny9A P0GqTakhqoQZBCicZ/ea7SPkuQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxNkBtR9kNWdwRtqqtUAaRI/gzMa1PZ+fRs6SHZlkmeP7URvCbay+i9SC3t8N/U0ppDaev6ew== X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:db0f:b0:154:665e:af75 with SMTP id m15-20020a170902db0f00b00154665eaf75mr48318074plx.147.1648850932149; Fri, 01 Apr 2022 15:08:52 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([2620:15c:202:201:72c9:527e:d936:c24b]) by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id k18-20020a056a00135200b004fb18fc6c78sm4219370pfu.31.2022.04.01.15.08.51 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 01 Apr 2022 15:08:51 -0700 (PDT) From: Daniel Verkamp To: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton , Hugh Dickins , Mattias Nissler , Dmitry Torokhov , Kees Cook , Daniel Verkamp Subject: [PATCH 2/4] mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC flag to memfd_create Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2022 15:08:32 -0700 Message-Id: <20220401220834.307660-3-dverkamp@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.1.1094.g7c7d902a7c-goog In-Reply-To: <20220401220834.307660-1-dverkamp@chromium.org> References: <20220401220834.307660-1-dverkamp@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org The new MFD_NOEXEC flag allows the creation of a permanently non-executable memfd. This is accomplished by creating it with a different set of file mode bits (0666) than the default (0777) and applying the F_SEAL_EXEC seal at creation time, so there is no window between memfd creation and seal application. Unfortunately, the default for memfd must remain executable, since changing this would be an API break, and some programs depend on being able to exec code from a memfd directly. However, this new flag will allow programs to create non-executable memfds, and a distribution may choose to enforce use of this flag in memfd_create calls via other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Daniel Verkamp --- include/uapi/linux/memfd.h | 1 + mm/memfd.c | 10 +++++++++- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h index 7a8a26751c23..140e125c9f65 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #define MFD_CLOEXEC 0x0001U #define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING 0x0002U #define MFD_HUGETLB 0x0004U +#define MFD_NOEXEC 0x0008U /* * Huge page size encoding when MFD_HUGETLB is specified, and a huge page diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c index 4ebeab94aa74..b841514eb0fd 100644 --- a/mm/memfd.c +++ b/mm/memfd.c @@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ long memfd_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) #define MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof(MFD_NAME_PREFIX) - 1) #define MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN (NAME_MAX - MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN) -#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB) +#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB | MFD_NOEXEC) SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, const char __user *, uname, @@ -333,6 +333,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, *file_seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL; } + if (flags & MFD_NOEXEC) { + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + + inode->i_mode &= ~0111; + file_seals = memfd_file_seals_ptr(file); + *file_seals |= F_SEAL_EXEC; + } + fd_install(fd, file); kfree(name); return fd;