diff mbox series

[1/3] bpf: Add BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM to require signature verification on map values

Message ID 20220525132115.896698-2-roberto.sassu@huawei.com (mailing list archive)
State New
Headers show
Series bpf: Add support for maps with authenticated values | expand

Commit Message

Roberto Sassu May 25, 2022, 1:21 p.m. UTC
In some cases, it is desirable to ensure that a map contains data from
authenticated sources, for example if map data are used for making security
decisions.

Such restriction is achieved by verifying the signature of map values, at
the time those values are added to the map with the bpf() system call (more
specifically, when the commands passed to bpf() are BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM or
BPF_MAP_UPDATE_BATCH). Mmappable maps are not allowed in this case.

Signature verification is initially done with keys in the primary and
secondary kernel keyrings, similarly to kernel modules. This allows system
owners to enforce a system-wide policy based on the keys they trust.
Support for additional keyrings could be added later, based on use case
needs.

Signature verification is done only for those maps for which the new map
flag BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM is set. When the flag is set, the kernel expects map
values to be in the following format:

+-------------------------------+---------------+-----+-----------------+
| verified data+sig size (be32) | verified data | sig | unverified data |
+-------------------------------+---------------+-----+-----------------+

where sig is a module-style appended signature as generated by the
sign-file tool. The verified data+sig size (in big endian) must be
explicitly provided (it is not generated by sign-file), as it cannot be
determined in other ways (currently, the map value size is fixed). It can
be obtained from the size of the file created by sign-file.

Introduce the new map flag BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM, and additionally call the new
function bpf_map_verify_value_sig() from bpf_map_update_value() if the flag
is set. bpf_map_verify_value_sig(), declared as global for a new helper, is
basically equivalent to mod_verify_sig(). It additionally does the marker
check, that for kernel modules is done in module_sig_check(), and the
parsing of the verified data+sig size.

Currently, enable the usage of the flag only for the array map. Support for
more map types can be added later.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
---
 include/linux/bpf.h            |  7 ++++
 include/uapi/linux/bpf.h       |  3 ++
 kernel/bpf/arraymap.c          |  2 +-
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c           | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h |  3 ++
 5 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Comments

kernel test robot May 25, 2022, 4:51 p.m. UTC | #1
Hi Roberto,

Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:

[auto build test ERROR on bpf-next/master]
[also build test ERROR on bpf/master horms-ipvs/master net/master net-next/master v5.18 next-20220525]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Roberto-Sassu/bpf-Add-support-for-maps-with-authenticated-values/20220525-212552
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next.git master
config: x86_64-kexec (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220526/202205260057.t4Lmg5Gb-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-11 (Debian 11.3.0-1) 11.3.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
        # https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/196e68e5ddfa50f40efaf20c8df37f3420e38b72
        git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
        git fetch --no-tags linux-review Roberto-Sassu/bpf-Add-support-for-maps-with-authenticated-values/20220525-212552
        git checkout 196e68e5ddfa50f40efaf20c8df37f3420e38b72
        # save the config file
        mkdir build_dir && cp config build_dir/.config
        make W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=x86_64 SHELL=/bin/bash

If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag where applicable
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>

All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):

   ld: kernel/bpf/syscall.o: in function `bpf_map_verify_value_sig':
>> syscall.c:(.text+0x4ff): undefined reference to `mod_check_sig'
kernel test robot May 25, 2022, 6:50 p.m. UTC | #2
Hi Roberto,

Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:

[auto build test ERROR on bpf-next/master]
[also build test ERROR on bpf/master horms-ipvs/master net/master net-next/master v5.18 next-20220525]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Roberto-Sassu/bpf-Add-support-for-maps-with-authenticated-values/20220525-212552
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next.git master
config: m68k-defconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220526/202205260201.H6HGWRhl-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: m68k-linux-gcc (GCC) 11.3.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
        wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
        chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
        # https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/196e68e5ddfa50f40efaf20c8df37f3420e38b72
        git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
        git fetch --no-tags linux-review Roberto-Sassu/bpf-Add-support-for-maps-with-authenticated-values/20220525-212552
        git checkout 196e68e5ddfa50f40efaf20c8df37f3420e38b72
        # save the config file
        mkdir build_dir && cp config build_dir/.config
        COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-11.3.0 make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=m68k SHELL=/bin/bash

If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag where applicable
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>

All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):

   kernel/bpf/syscall.c: In function 'bpf_map_verify_value_sig':
>> kernel/bpf/syscall.c:1415:23: error: implicit declaration of function 'verify_pkcs7_signature' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
    1415 |                 ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
         |                       ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
   kernel/bpf/syscall.c: At top level:
   kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5271:13: warning: no previous prototype for 'unpriv_ebpf_notify' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
    5271 | void __weak unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state)
         |             ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
   cc1: some warnings being treated as errors


vim +/verify_pkcs7_signature +1415 kernel/bpf/syscall.c

  1369	
  1370	int bpf_map_verify_value_sig(const void *mod, size_t modlen, bool verify)
  1371	{
  1372		const size_t marker_len = strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING);
  1373		struct module_signature ms;
  1374		size_t sig_len;
  1375		u32 _modlen;
  1376		int ret;
  1377	
  1378		/*
  1379		 * Format of mod:
  1380		 *
  1381		 * verified data+sig size (be32), verified data, sig, unverified data
  1382		 */
  1383		if (modlen <= sizeof(u32))
  1384			return -ENOENT;
  1385	
  1386		_modlen = be32_to_cpu(*(u32 *)(mod));
  1387	
  1388		if (_modlen > modlen - sizeof(u32))
  1389			return -EINVAL;
  1390	
  1391		modlen = _modlen;
  1392		mod += sizeof(u32);
  1393	
  1394		if (modlen <= marker_len)
  1395			return -ENOENT;
  1396	
  1397		if (memcmp(mod + modlen - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING, marker_len))
  1398			return -ENOENT;
  1399	
  1400		modlen -= marker_len;
  1401	
  1402		if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
  1403			return -EBADMSG;
  1404	
  1405		memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
  1406	
  1407		ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "bpf_map_value");
  1408		if (ret)
  1409			return ret;
  1410	
  1411		sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
  1412		modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
  1413	
  1414		if (verify) {
> 1415			ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
  1416						     VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
  1417						     VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
  1418						     NULL, NULL);
  1419			if (ret < 0)
  1420				return ret;
  1421		}
  1422	
  1423		return modlen;
  1424	}
  1425	EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_map_verify_value_sig);
  1426
kernel test robot May 25, 2022, 10:53 p.m. UTC | #3
Hi Roberto,

Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:

[auto build test WARNING on bpf-next/master]
[also build test WARNING on bpf/master horms-ipvs/master net/master net-next/master v5.18 next-20220525]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Roberto-Sassu/bpf-Add-support-for-maps-with-authenticated-values/20220525-212552
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next.git master
config: x86_64-rhel-8.3-kselftests (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220526/202205260606.VXzztn2R-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-11 (Debian 11.3.0-1) 11.3.0
reproduce:
        # apt-get install sparse
        # sparse version: v0.6.4-14-g5a0004b5-dirty
        # https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/196e68e5ddfa50f40efaf20c8df37f3420e38b72
        git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
        git fetch --no-tags linux-review Roberto-Sassu/bpf-Add-support-for-maps-with-authenticated-values/20220525-212552
        git checkout 196e68e5ddfa50f40efaf20c8df37f3420e38b72
        # save the config file
        mkdir build_dir && cp config build_dir/.config
        make W=1 C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' O=build_dir ARCH=x86_64 SHELL=/bin/bash kernel/bpf/

If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag where applicable
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>


sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
   kernel/bpf/syscall.c:590:25: sparse: sparse: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
>> kernel/bpf/syscall.c:1386:19: sparse: sparse: cast to restricted __be32
   kernel/bpf/syscall.c: note: in included file (through include/linux/bpf.h):
   include/linux/bpfptr.h:52:47: sparse: sparse: cast to non-scalar
   include/linux/bpfptr.h:52:47: sparse: sparse: cast from non-scalar
   include/linux/bpfptr.h:52:47: sparse: sparse: cast to non-scalar
   include/linux/bpfptr.h:52:47: sparse: sparse: cast from non-scalar
   include/linux/bpfptr.h:81:43: sparse: sparse: cast to non-scalar
   include/linux/bpfptr.h:81:43: sparse: sparse: cast from non-scalar
   include/linux/bpfptr.h:52:47: sparse: sparse: cast to non-scalar
   include/linux/bpfptr.h:52:47: sparse: sparse: cast from non-scalar
   include/linux/bpfptr.h:52:47: sparse: sparse: cast to non-scalar
   include/linux/bpfptr.h:52:47: sparse: sparse: cast from non-scalar

vim +1386 kernel/bpf/syscall.c

  1369	
  1370	int bpf_map_verify_value_sig(const void *mod, size_t modlen, bool verify)
  1371	{
  1372		const size_t marker_len = strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING);
  1373		struct module_signature ms;
  1374		size_t sig_len;
  1375		u32 _modlen;
  1376		int ret;
  1377	
  1378		/*
  1379		 * Format of mod:
  1380		 *
  1381		 * verified data+sig size (be32), verified data, sig, unverified data
  1382		 */
  1383		if (modlen <= sizeof(u32))
  1384			return -ENOENT;
  1385	
> 1386		_modlen = be32_to_cpu(*(u32 *)(mod));
  1387	
  1388		if (_modlen > modlen - sizeof(u32))
  1389			return -EINVAL;
  1390	
  1391		modlen = _modlen;
  1392		mod += sizeof(u32);
  1393	
  1394		if (modlen <= marker_len)
  1395			return -ENOENT;
  1396	
  1397		if (memcmp(mod + modlen - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING, marker_len))
  1398			return -ENOENT;
  1399	
  1400		modlen -= marker_len;
  1401	
  1402		if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
  1403			return -EBADMSG;
  1404	
  1405		memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
  1406	
  1407		ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "bpf_map_value");
  1408		if (ret)
  1409			return ret;
  1410	
  1411		sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
  1412		modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
  1413	
  1414		if (verify) {
  1415			ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
  1416						     VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
  1417						     VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
  1418						     NULL, NULL);
  1419			if (ret < 0)
  1420				return ret;
  1421		}
  1422	
  1423		return modlen;
  1424	}
  1425	EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_map_verify_value_sig);
  1426
KP Singh June 3, 2022, 12:07 p.m. UTC | #4
On Wed, May 25, 2022 at 3:21 PM Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> wrote:
>
> In some cases, it is desirable to ensure that a map contains data from
> authenticated sources, for example if map data are used for making security
> decisions.

I am guessing this comes from the discussion we had about digilim.
I remember we discussed a BPF helper that could verify signatures.
Why would that approach not work?

>
>
> Such restriction is achieved by verifying the signature of map values, at
> the time those values are added to the map with the bpf() system call (more
> specifically, when the commands passed to bpf() are BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM or
> BPF_MAP_UPDATE_BATCH). Mmappable maps are not allowed in this case.
>
> Signature verification is initially done with keys in the primary and
> secondary kernel keyrings, similarly to kernel modules. This allows system
> owners to enforce a system-wide policy based on the keys they trust.
> Support for additional keyrings could be added later, based on use case
> needs.
>
> Signature verification is done only for those maps for which the new map
> flag BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM is set. When the flag is set, the kernel expects map
> values to be in the following format:
>
> +-------------------------------+---------------+-----+-----------------+
> | verified data+sig size (be32) | verified data | sig | unverified data |
> +-------------------------------+---------------+-----+-----------------+
>
> where sig is a module-style appended signature as generated by the
> sign-file tool. The verified data+sig size (in big endian) must be
> explicitly provided (it is not generated by sign-file), as it cannot be
> determined in other ways (currently, the map value size is fixed). It can
> be obtained from the size of the file created by sign-file.
>
> Introduce the new map flag BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM, and additionally call the new
> function bpf_map_verify_value_sig() from bpf_map_update_value() if the flag
> is set. bpf_map_verify_value_sig(), declared as global for a new helper, is
> basically equivalent to mod_verify_sig(). It additionally does the marker
> check, that for kernel modules is done in module_sig_check(), and the
> parsing of the verified data+sig size.
>
> Currently, enable the usage of the flag only for the array map. Support for
> more map types can be added later.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/bpf.h            |  7 ++++
>  include/uapi/linux/bpf.h       |  3 ++
>  kernel/bpf/arraymap.c          |  2 +-
>  kernel/bpf/syscall.c           | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h |  3 ++
>  5 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
> index a7080c86fa76..8f5c042e70a7 100644
> --- a/include/linux/bpf.h
> +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
> @@ -1825,6 +1825,8 @@ static inline bool unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void)
>         return !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled;
>  }
>
> +int bpf_map_verify_value_sig(const void *mod, size_t modlen, bool verify);
> +
>  #else /* !CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
>  static inline struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd)
>  {
> @@ -2034,6 +2036,11 @@ static inline bool unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void)
>         return false;
>  }
>
> +static inline int bpf_map_verify_value_sig(const void *mod, size_t modlen,
> +                                          bool verify)
> +{
> +       return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +}
>  #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
>
>  void __bpf_free_used_btfs(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux,
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> index f4009dbdf62d..a8e7803d2593 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> @@ -1226,6 +1226,9 @@ enum {
>
>  /* Create a map that is suitable to be an inner map with dynamic max entries */
>         BPF_F_INNER_MAP         = (1U << 12),
> +
> +/* Verify map value (fmt: ver data+sig size(be32), ver data, sig, unver data) */
> +       BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM       = (1U << 13)
>  };
>
>  /* Flags for BPF_PROG_QUERY. */
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
> index fe40d3b9458f..b430fdd0e892 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
> @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
>
>  #define ARRAY_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \
>         (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_MMAPABLE | BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK | \
> -        BPF_F_PRESERVE_ELEMS | BPF_F_INNER_MAP)
> +        BPF_F_PRESERVE_ELEMS | BPF_F_INNER_MAP | BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM)
>
>  static void bpf_array_free_percpu(struct bpf_array *array)
>  {
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> index 2b69306d3c6e..ca9e4a284120 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> @@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
>  #include <linux/rcupdate_trace.h>
>  #include <linux/memcontrol.h>
>  #include <linux/trace_events.h>
> +#include <linux/verification.h>
> +#include <linux/module_signature.h>
>
>  #define IS_FD_ARRAY(map) ((map)->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY || \
>                           (map)->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY || \
> @@ -180,6 +182,13 @@ static int bpf_map_update_value(struct bpf_map *map, struct fd f, void *key,
>  {
>         int err;
>
> +       if (map->map_flags & BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM) {
> +               err = bpf_map_verify_value_sig(value, bpf_map_value_size(map),
> +                                              true);
> +               if (err < 0)
> +                       return err;
> +       }
> +
>         /* Need to create a kthread, thus must support schedule */
>         if (bpf_map_is_dev_bound(map)) {
>                 return bpf_map_offload_update_elem(map, key, value, flags);
> @@ -1057,6 +1066,11 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
>         if (err)
>                 return -EINVAL;
>
> +       /* Allow signed data to go through update/push methods only. */
> +       if ((attr->map_flags & BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM) &&
> +           (attr->map_flags & BPF_F_MMAPABLE))
> +               return -EINVAL;
> +
>         if (attr->btf_vmlinux_value_type_id) {
>                 if (attr->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS ||
>                     attr->btf_key_type_id || attr->btf_value_type_id)
> @@ -1353,6 +1367,62 @@ static int map_lookup_elem(union bpf_attr *attr)
>         return err;
>  }
>
> +int bpf_map_verify_value_sig(const void *mod, size_t modlen, bool verify)
> +{
> +       const size_t marker_len = strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING);
> +       struct module_signature ms;
> +       size_t sig_len;
> +       u32 _modlen;
> +       int ret;
> +
> +       /*
> +        * Format of mod:
> +        *
> +        * verified data+sig size (be32), verified data, sig, unverified data
> +        */
> +       if (modlen <= sizeof(u32))
> +               return -ENOENT;
> +
> +       _modlen = be32_to_cpu(*(u32 *)(mod));
> +
> +       if (_modlen > modlen - sizeof(u32))
> +               return -EINVAL;
> +
> +       modlen = _modlen;
> +       mod += sizeof(u32);
> +
> +       if (modlen <= marker_len)
> +               return -ENOENT;
> +
> +       if (memcmp(mod + modlen - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING, marker_len))
> +               return -ENOENT;
> +
> +       modlen -= marker_len;
> +
> +       if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
> +               return -EBADMSG;
> +
> +       memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
> +
> +       ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "bpf_map_value");
> +       if (ret)
> +               return ret;
> +
> +       sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
> +       modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
> +
> +       if (verify) {
> +               ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
> +                                            VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
> +                                            VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
> +                                            NULL, NULL);
> +               if (ret < 0)
> +                       return ret;
> +       }
> +
> +       return modlen;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_map_verify_value_sig);
>
>  #define BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM_LAST_FIELD flags
>
> diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> index f4009dbdf62d..a8e7803d2593 100644
> --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> @@ -1226,6 +1226,9 @@ enum {
>
>  /* Create a map that is suitable to be an inner map with dynamic max entries */
>         BPF_F_INNER_MAP         = (1U << 12),
> +
> +/* Verify map value (fmt: ver data+sig size(be32), ver data, sig, unver data) */
> +       BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM       = (1U << 13)
>  };
>
>  /* Flags for BPF_PROG_QUERY. */
> --
> 2.25.1
>
Roberto Sassu June 3, 2022, 1:11 p.m. UTC | #5
> From: KP Singh [mailto:kpsingh@kernel.org]
> Sent: Friday, June 3, 2022 2:08 PM
> On Wed, May 25, 2022 at 3:21 PM Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > In some cases, it is desirable to ensure that a map contains data from
> > authenticated sources, for example if map data are used for making security
> > decisions.
> 
> I am guessing this comes from the discussion we had about digilim.
> I remember we discussed a BPF helper that could verify signatures.
> Why would that approach not work?

The main reason is that signature verification can be done also
for non-sleepable hooks. For example, one is fexit/array_map_update_elem.

Currently the helper in patch 2 just returns the size of verified data.
With an additional parameter, it could also be used as a helper for
signature verification by any eBPF programs.

To be honest, I like more the idea of a map flag, as it is more
clear that signature verification is being done. Otherwise,
we would need to infer it from the eBPF program code.

Thanks

Roberto

HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
Managing Director: Li Peng, Yang Xi, Li He

> > Such restriction is achieved by verifying the signature of map values, at
> > the time those values are added to the map with the bpf() system call (more
> > specifically, when the commands passed to bpf() are BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM
> or
> > BPF_MAP_UPDATE_BATCH). Mmappable maps are not allowed in this case.
> >
> > Signature verification is initially done with keys in the primary and
> > secondary kernel keyrings, similarly to kernel modules. This allows system
> > owners to enforce a system-wide policy based on the keys they trust.
> > Support for additional keyrings could be added later, based on use case
> > needs.
> >
> > Signature verification is done only for those maps for which the new map
> > flag BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM is set. When the flag is set, the kernel expects map
> > values to be in the following format:
> >
> > +-------------------------------+---------------+-----+-----------------+
> > | verified data+sig size (be32) | verified data | sig | unverified data |
> > +-------------------------------+---------------+-----+-----------------+
> >
> > where sig is a module-style appended signature as generated by the
> > sign-file tool. The verified data+sig size (in big endian) must be
> > explicitly provided (it is not generated by sign-file), as it cannot be
> > determined in other ways (currently, the map value size is fixed). It can
> > be obtained from the size of the file created by sign-file.
> >
> > Introduce the new map flag BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM, and additionally call the
> new
> > function bpf_map_verify_value_sig() from bpf_map_update_value() if the flag
> > is set. bpf_map_verify_value_sig(), declared as global for a new helper, is
> > basically equivalent to mod_verify_sig(). It additionally does the marker
> > check, that for kernel modules is done in module_sig_check(), and the
> > parsing of the verified data+sig size.
> >
> > Currently, enable the usage of the flag only for the array map. Support for
> > more map types can be added later.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> > ---
> >  include/linux/bpf.h            |  7 ++++
> >  include/uapi/linux/bpf.h       |  3 ++
> >  kernel/bpf/arraymap.c          |  2 +-
> >  kernel/bpf/syscall.c           | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h |  3 ++
> >  5 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
> > index a7080c86fa76..8f5c042e70a7 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/bpf.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
> > @@ -1825,6 +1825,8 @@ static inline bool unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void)
> >         return !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled;
> >  }
> >
> > +int bpf_map_verify_value_sig(const void *mod, size_t modlen, bool verify);
> > +
> >  #else /* !CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
> >  static inline struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd)
> >  {
> > @@ -2034,6 +2036,11 @@ static inline bool unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void)
> >         return false;
> >  }
> >
> > +static inline int bpf_map_verify_value_sig(const void *mod, size_t modlen,
> > +                                          bool verify)
> > +{
> > +       return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > +}
> >  #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
> >
> >  void __bpf_free_used_btfs(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux,
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > index f4009dbdf62d..a8e7803d2593 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > @@ -1226,6 +1226,9 @@ enum {
> >
> >  /* Create a map that is suitable to be an inner map with dynamic max entries
> */
> >         BPF_F_INNER_MAP         = (1U << 12),
> > +
> > +/* Verify map value (fmt: ver data+sig size(be32), ver data, sig, unver data) */
> > +       BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM       = (1U << 13)
> >  };
> >
> >  /* Flags for BPF_PROG_QUERY. */
> > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
> > index fe40d3b9458f..b430fdd0e892 100644
> > --- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
> > +++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
> > @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
> >
> >  #define ARRAY_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \
> >         (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_MMAPABLE | BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK | \
> > -        BPF_F_PRESERVE_ELEMS | BPF_F_INNER_MAP)
> > +        BPF_F_PRESERVE_ELEMS | BPF_F_INNER_MAP | BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM)
> >
> >  static void bpf_array_free_percpu(struct bpf_array *array)
> >  {
> > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> > index 2b69306d3c6e..ca9e4a284120 100644
> > --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> > +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> > @@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
> >  #include <linux/rcupdate_trace.h>
> >  #include <linux/memcontrol.h>
> >  #include <linux/trace_events.h>
> > +#include <linux/verification.h>
> > +#include <linux/module_signature.h>
> >
> >  #define IS_FD_ARRAY(map) ((map)->map_type ==
> BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY || \
> >                           (map)->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY || \
> > @@ -180,6 +182,13 @@ static int bpf_map_update_value(struct bpf_map
> *map, struct fd f, void *key,
> >  {
> >         int err;
> >
> > +       if (map->map_flags & BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM) {
> > +               err = bpf_map_verify_value_sig(value, bpf_map_value_size(map),
> > +                                              true);
> > +               if (err < 0)
> > +                       return err;
> > +       }
> > +
> >         /* Need to create a kthread, thus must support schedule */
> >         if (bpf_map_is_dev_bound(map)) {
> >                 return bpf_map_offload_update_elem(map, key, value, flags);
> > @@ -1057,6 +1066,11 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
> >         if (err)
> >                 return -EINVAL;
> >
> > +       /* Allow signed data to go through update/push methods only. */
> > +       if ((attr->map_flags & BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM) &&
> > +           (attr->map_flags & BPF_F_MMAPABLE))
> > +               return -EINVAL;
> > +
> >         if (attr->btf_vmlinux_value_type_id) {
> >                 if (attr->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS ||
> >                     attr->btf_key_type_id || attr->btf_value_type_id)
> > @@ -1353,6 +1367,62 @@ static int map_lookup_elem(union bpf_attr *attr)
> >         return err;
> >  }
> >
> > +int bpf_map_verify_value_sig(const void *mod, size_t modlen, bool verify)
> > +{
> > +       const size_t marker_len = strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING);
> > +       struct module_signature ms;
> > +       size_t sig_len;
> > +       u32 _modlen;
> > +       int ret;
> > +
> > +       /*
> > +        * Format of mod:
> > +        *
> > +        * verified data+sig size (be32), verified data, sig, unverified data
> > +        */
> > +       if (modlen <= sizeof(u32))
> > +               return -ENOENT;
> > +
> > +       _modlen = be32_to_cpu(*(u32 *)(mod));
> > +
> > +       if (_modlen > modlen - sizeof(u32))
> > +               return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +       modlen = _modlen;
> > +       mod += sizeof(u32);
> > +
> > +       if (modlen <= marker_len)
> > +               return -ENOENT;
> > +
> > +       if (memcmp(mod + modlen - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
> marker_len))
> > +               return -ENOENT;
> > +
> > +       modlen -= marker_len;
> > +
> > +       if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
> > +               return -EBADMSG;
> > +
> > +       memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
> > +
> > +       ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "bpf_map_value");
> > +       if (ret)
> > +               return ret;
> > +
> > +       sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
> > +       modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
> > +
> > +       if (verify) {
> > +               ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
> > +                                            VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
> > +                                            VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
> > +                                            NULL, NULL);
> > +               if (ret < 0)
> > +                       return ret;
> > +       }
> > +
> > +       return modlen;
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_map_verify_value_sig);
> >
> >  #define BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM_LAST_FIELD flags
> >
> > diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > index f4009dbdf62d..a8e7803d2593 100644
> > --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > @@ -1226,6 +1226,9 @@ enum {
> >
> >  /* Create a map that is suitable to be an inner map with dynamic max entries
> */
> >         BPF_F_INNER_MAP         = (1U << 12),
> > +
> > +/* Verify map value (fmt: ver data+sig size(be32), ver data, sig, unver data) */
> > +       BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM       = (1U << 13)
> >  };
> >
> >  /* Flags for BPF_PROG_QUERY. */
> > --
> > 2.25.1
> >
KP Singh June 3, 2022, 3:17 p.m. UTC | #6
On Fri, Jun 3, 2022 at 3:11 PM Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> wrote:
>
> > From: KP Singh [mailto:kpsingh@kernel.org]
> > Sent: Friday, June 3, 2022 2:08 PM
> > On Wed, May 25, 2022 at 3:21 PM Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > In some cases, it is desirable to ensure that a map contains data from
> > > authenticated sources, for example if map data are used for making security
> > > decisions.
> >
> > I am guessing this comes from the discussion we had about digilim.
> > I remember we discussed a BPF helper that could verify signatures.
> > Why would that approach not work?
>
> The main reason is that signature verification can be done also
> for non-sleepable hooks. For example, one is fexit/array_map_update_elem.

For your use-case, why is it not possible to hook the LSM hook "bpf"
i.e security_bpf and then check if there is a MAP_UPDATE_ELEM operation?

>
> Currently the helper in patch 2 just returns the size of verified data.
> With an additional parameter, it could also be used as a helper for
> signature verification by any eBPF programs.
>

Your bpf_map_verify_value_sig hard codes the type of signature
(bpf_map_verify_value_sig as verify_pkcs7_signature)
its implementation. This is not extensible.

What we discussed was an extensible helper that can be used for
different signature types.

> To be honest, I like more the idea of a map flag, as it is more
> clear that signature verification is being done. Otherwise,
> we would need to infer it from the eBPF program code.
>
> Thanks
>
> Roberto
>
> HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
> Managing Director: Li Peng, Yang Xi, Li He
>
> > > Such restriction is achieved by verifying the signature of map values, at
> > > the time those values are added to the map with the bpf() system call (more
> > > specifically, when the commands passed to bpf() are BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM
> > or
> > > BPF_MAP_UPDATE_BATCH). Mmappable maps are not allowed in this case.
> > >
> > > Signature verification is initially done with keys in the primary and
> > > secondary kernel keyrings, similarly to kernel modules. This allows system
> > > owners to enforce a system-wide policy based on the keys they trust.
> > > Support for additional keyrings could be added later, based on use case
> > > needs.
> > >
> > > Signature verification is done only for those maps for which the new map
> > > flag BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM is set. When the flag is set, the kernel expects map
> > > values to be in the following format:
> > >
> > > +-------------------------------+---------------+-----+-----------------+
> > > | verified data+sig size (be32) | verified data | sig | unverified data |
> > > +-------------------------------+---------------+-----+-----------------+
> > >
> > > where sig is a module-style appended signature as generated by the
> > > sign-file tool. The verified data+sig size (in big endian) must be
> > > explicitly provided (it is not generated by sign-file), as it cannot be
> > > determined in other ways (currently, the map value size is fixed). It can
> > > be obtained from the size of the file created by sign-file.
> > >
> > > Introduce the new map flag BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM, and additionally call the
> > new
> > > function bpf_map_verify_value_sig() from bpf_map_update_value() if the flag
> > > is set. bpf_map_verify_value_sig(), declared as global for a new helper, is
> > > basically equivalent to mod_verify_sig(). It additionally does the marker
> > > check, that for kernel modules is done in module_sig_check(), and the
> > > parsing of the verified data+sig size.
> > >
> > > Currently, enable the usage of the flag only for the array map. Support for
> > > more map types can be added later.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> > > ---

[...]

> > > +                                            NULL, NULL);
> > > +               if (ret < 0)
> > > +                       return ret;
> > > +       }
> > > +
> > > +       return modlen;
> > > +}
> > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_map_verify_value_sig);
> > >
> > >  #define BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM_LAST_FIELD flags
> > >
> > > diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > > index f4009dbdf62d..a8e7803d2593 100644
> > > --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > > +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > > @@ -1226,6 +1226,9 @@ enum {
> > >
> > >  /* Create a map that is suitable to be an inner map with dynamic max entries
> > */
> > >         BPF_F_INNER_MAP         = (1U << 12),
> > > +
> > > +/* Verify map value (fmt: ver data+sig size(be32), ver data, sig, unver data) */
> > > +       BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM       = (1U << 13)
> > >  };
> > >
> > >  /* Flags for BPF_PROG_QUERY. */
> > > --
> > > 2.25.1
> > >
Roberto Sassu June 3, 2022, 3:43 p.m. UTC | #7
> From: KP Singh [mailto:kpsingh@kernel.org]
> Sent: Friday, June 3, 2022 5:18 PM
> On Fri, Jun 3, 2022 at 3:11 PM Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > From: KP Singh [mailto:kpsingh@kernel.org]
> > > Sent: Friday, June 3, 2022 2:08 PM
> > > On Wed, May 25, 2022 at 3:21 PM Roberto Sassu
> <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > In some cases, it is desirable to ensure that a map contains data from
> > > > authenticated sources, for example if map data are used for making
> security
> > > > decisions.
> > >
> > > I am guessing this comes from the discussion we had about digilim.
> > > I remember we discussed a BPF helper that could verify signatures.
> > > Why would that approach not work?
> >
> > The main reason is that signature verification can be done also
> > for non-sleepable hooks. For example, one is fexit/array_map_update_elem.
> 
> For your use-case, why is it not possible to hook the LSM hook "bpf"
> i.e security_bpf and then check if there is a MAP_UPDATE_ELEM operation?

It would require the following: a new helper to compare the user space
fd with the address of the map in the eBPF program; copy data from
user space to kernel space (verify_pkcs7_signatureI() expects kernel
memory). That copy would happen twice.

> > Currently the helper in patch 2 just returns the size of verified data.
> > With an additional parameter, it could also be used as a helper for
> > signature verification by any eBPF programs.
> >
> 
> Your bpf_map_verify_value_sig hard codes the type of signature
> (bpf_map_verify_value_sig as verify_pkcs7_signature)
> its implementation. This is not extensible.

It is hardcoded now, but it wouldn't if there are more verification
functions. For example, if 'id_type' of module_signature is set
to PKEY_ID_PGP, bpf_map_verify_value_sig() would call
verify_pgp_signature() (assuming that support for PGP keys and
signatures is added to the kernel).

Roberto

HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
Managing Director: Li Peng, Yang Xi, Li He

> What we discussed was an extensible helper that can be used for
> different signature types.
> 
> > To be honest, I like more the idea of a map flag, as it is more
> > clear that signature verification is being done. Otherwise,
> > we would need to infer it from the eBPF program code.
> >
> > Thanks
> >
> > Roberto
> >
> > HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
> > Managing Director: Li Peng, Yang Xi, Li He
> >
> > > > Such restriction is achieved by verifying the signature of map values, at
> > > > the time those values are added to the map with the bpf() system call
> (more
> > > > specifically, when the commands passed to bpf() are
> BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM
> > > or
> > > > BPF_MAP_UPDATE_BATCH). Mmappable maps are not allowed in this
> case.
> > > >
> > > > Signature verification is initially done with keys in the primary and
> > > > secondary kernel keyrings, similarly to kernel modules. This allows system
> > > > owners to enforce a system-wide policy based on the keys they trust.
> > > > Support for additional keyrings could be added later, based on use case
> > > > needs.
> > > >
> > > > Signature verification is done only for those maps for which the new map
> > > > flag BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM is set. When the flag is set, the kernel expects
> map
> > > > values to be in the following format:
> > > >
> > > > +-------------------------------+---------------+-----+-----------------+
> > > > | verified data+sig size (be32) | verified data | sig | unverified data |
> > > > +-------------------------------+---------------+-----+-----------------+
> > > >
> > > > where sig is a module-style appended signature as generated by the
> > > > sign-file tool. The verified data+sig size (in big endian) must be
> > > > explicitly provided (it is not generated by sign-file), as it cannot be
> > > > determined in other ways (currently, the map value size is fixed). It can
> > > > be obtained from the size of the file created by sign-file.
> > > >
> > > > Introduce the new map flag BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM, and additionally call the
> > > new
> > > > function bpf_map_verify_value_sig() from bpf_map_update_value() if the
> flag
> > > > is set. bpf_map_verify_value_sig(), declared as global for a new helper, is
> > > > basically equivalent to mod_verify_sig(). It additionally does the marker
> > > > check, that for kernel modules is done in module_sig_check(), and the
> > > > parsing of the verified data+sig size.
> > > >
> > > > Currently, enable the usage of the flag only for the array map. Support for
> > > > more map types can be added later.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> > > > ---
> 
> [...]
> 
> > > > +                                            NULL, NULL);
> > > > +               if (ret < 0)
> > > > +                       return ret;
> > > > +       }
> > > > +
> > > > +       return modlen;
> > > > +}
> > > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_map_verify_value_sig);
> > > >
> > > >  #define BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM_LAST_FIELD flags
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > > > index f4009dbdf62d..a8e7803d2593 100644
> > > > --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > > > +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> > > > @@ -1226,6 +1226,9 @@ enum {
> > > >
> > > >  /* Create a map that is suitable to be an inner map with dynamic max
> entries
> > > */
> > > >         BPF_F_INNER_MAP         = (1U << 12),
> > > > +
> > > > +/* Verify map value (fmt: ver data+sig size(be32), ver data, sig, unver
> data) */
> > > > +       BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM       = (1U << 13)
> > > >  };
> > > >
> > > >  /* Flags for BPF_PROG_QUERY. */
> > > > --
> > > > 2.25.1
> > > >
Alexei Starovoitov June 4, 2022, 9:32 a.m. UTC | #8
On Fri, Jun 3, 2022 at 5:44 PM Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> wrote:
> >
> > Your bpf_map_verify_value_sig hard codes the type of signature
> > (bpf_map_verify_value_sig as verify_pkcs7_signature)
> > its implementation. This is not extensible.
>
> It is hardcoded now, but it wouldn't if there are more verification
> functions. For example, if 'id_type' of module_signature is set
> to PKEY_ID_PGP, bpf_map_verify_value_sig() would call
> verify_pgp_signature() (assuming that support for PGP keys and
> signatures is added to the kernel).

I agree with KP. All hard coded things are hurting extensibility.
we just need a helper that calls verify_pkcs7_signature
where prog will specify len, keyring, etc.
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index a7080c86fa76..8f5c042e70a7 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -1825,6 +1825,8 @@  static inline bool unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void)
 	return !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled;
 }
 
+int bpf_map_verify_value_sig(const void *mod, size_t modlen, bool verify);
+
 #else /* !CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
 static inline struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd)
 {
@@ -2034,6 +2036,11 @@  static inline bool unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void)
 	return false;
 }
 
+static inline int bpf_map_verify_value_sig(const void *mod, size_t modlen,
+					   bool verify)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
 
 void __bpf_free_used_btfs(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux,
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index f4009dbdf62d..a8e7803d2593 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -1226,6 +1226,9 @@  enum {
 
 /* Create a map that is suitable to be an inner map with dynamic max entries */
 	BPF_F_INNER_MAP		= (1U << 12),
+
+/* Verify map value (fmt: ver data+sig size(be32), ver data, sig, unver data) */
+	BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM	= (1U << 13)
 };
 
 /* Flags for BPF_PROG_QUERY. */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
index fe40d3b9458f..b430fdd0e892 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ 
 
 #define ARRAY_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \
 	(BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_MMAPABLE | BPF_F_ACCESS_MASK | \
-	 BPF_F_PRESERVE_ELEMS | BPF_F_INNER_MAP)
+	 BPF_F_PRESERVE_ELEMS | BPF_F_INNER_MAP | BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM)
 
 static void bpf_array_free_percpu(struct bpf_array *array)
 {
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 2b69306d3c6e..ca9e4a284120 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ 
 #include <linux/rcupdate_trace.h>
 #include <linux/memcontrol.h>
 #include <linux/trace_events.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 
 #define IS_FD_ARRAY(map) ((map)->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY || \
 			  (map)->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY || \
@@ -180,6 +182,13 @@  static int bpf_map_update_value(struct bpf_map *map, struct fd f, void *key,
 {
 	int err;
 
+	if (map->map_flags & BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM) {
+		err = bpf_map_verify_value_sig(value, bpf_map_value_size(map),
+					       true);
+		if (err < 0)
+			return err;
+	}
+
 	/* Need to create a kthread, thus must support schedule */
 	if (bpf_map_is_dev_bound(map)) {
 		return bpf_map_offload_update_elem(map, key, value, flags);
@@ -1057,6 +1066,11 @@  static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	if (err)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* Allow signed data to go through update/push methods only. */
+	if ((attr->map_flags & BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM) &&
+	    (attr->map_flags & BPF_F_MMAPABLE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (attr->btf_vmlinux_value_type_id) {
 		if (attr->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS ||
 		    attr->btf_key_type_id || attr->btf_value_type_id)
@@ -1353,6 +1367,62 @@  static int map_lookup_elem(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	return err;
 }
 
+int bpf_map_verify_value_sig(const void *mod, size_t modlen, bool verify)
+{
+	const size_t marker_len = strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING);
+	struct module_signature ms;
+	size_t sig_len;
+	u32 _modlen;
+	int ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * Format of mod:
+	 *
+	 * verified data+sig size (be32), verified data, sig, unverified data
+	 */
+	if (modlen <= sizeof(u32))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	_modlen = be32_to_cpu(*(u32 *)(mod));
+
+	if (_modlen > modlen - sizeof(u32))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	modlen = _modlen;
+	mod += sizeof(u32);
+
+	if (modlen <= marker_len)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (memcmp(mod + modlen - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING, marker_len))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	modlen -= marker_len;
+
+	if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
+
+	ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "bpf_map_value");
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
+	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
+
+	if (verify) {
+		ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
+					     VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+					     VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
+					     NULL, NULL);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	return modlen;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_map_verify_value_sig);
 
 #define BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM_LAST_FIELD flags
 
diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index f4009dbdf62d..a8e7803d2593 100644
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -1226,6 +1226,9 @@  enum {
 
 /* Create a map that is suitable to be an inner map with dynamic max entries */
 	BPF_F_INNER_MAP		= (1U << 12),
+
+/* Verify map value (fmt: ver data+sig size(be32), ver data, sig, unver data) */
+	BPF_F_VERIFY_ELEM	= (1U << 13)
 };
 
 /* Flags for BPF_PROG_QUERY. */