From patchwork Fri Aug 19 20:51:58 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Axel Rasmussen X-Patchwork-Id: 12949204 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DC747C32773 for ; Fri, 19 Aug 2022 20:53:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1351756AbiHSUxn (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Aug 2022 16:53:43 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:51108 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1352120AbiHSUwe (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Aug 2022 16:52:34 -0400 Received: from mail-yw1-x114a.google.com (mail-yw1-x114a.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::114a]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 71B6510B502 for ; Fri, 19 Aug 2022 13:52:15 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-yw1-x114a.google.com with SMTP id 00721157ae682-337ed9110c2so51031777b3.15 for ; Fri, 19 Aug 2022 13:52:15 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20210112; h=cc:to:from:subject:references:mime-version:message-id:in-reply-to :date:from:to:cc; bh=Idvj8+mYb4IUUixNLqVBka+slWZ3wfKGTMlkwxnvXbY=; b=RTR1sKOG3HS4oRmW+To22+xxQ9cPl1t5H7t3If9jYPgGFCxKjrjIRLLoyJf0Zqg9M3 A68g/+ubMGpKBNXnLo6zhHo/1eHFuYJrnYeyg/B+LL/j3oRRKJMIs5DFXTmcwbaJrwWd NTpoSvxhWDlytbbQ9xrbhKWMpDVCd3Oob9QI+i3wrCh1GopvhF7R6B0QLj/RqxrAs58J 8q4wfbQX1lJcncPCvsneCOALWmwYNq5jrsRjdSvOTXXOb4hM2qdEwiCb1k5qZQlSeHbc fbntD2eqsTowh9hXEYMRTZC2dYPzaKx7C0TBU1DmNY2A2XmhlIUs9xienW1M2adUTMDE j/lQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=cc:to:from:subject:references:mime-version:message-id:in-reply-to :date:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc; bh=Idvj8+mYb4IUUixNLqVBka+slWZ3wfKGTMlkwxnvXbY=; b=EDYGGAG+3uSOv9TZxTtRy0krGJaYPsi8Rln5393rkfJL/cqa5vQdRQOt/G0rXb530E mijwtRFBEAx4CHC/Xr/CNhqpzlibXxm1EJGuhPC0NVpsxwD8vWup6sQNrZA9bQnpCrEt q55S/2xaSUlv6WTtlmOg+88C8O0PLI0moNh2Pj5NJ3TUuOX5YjkKLTUnVk5FqIiCC8O9 k4Cgx7v4ONi1a+a0+lbdvxgZEpj8muafcv0fa/i+2X8NPw3MySUBK2EKjt399F2OGFYb OD03d79CElLCcjEgM9qC5Q4KnK/SacsV52uXteIpDWJiCZe87QQ3dqQYCKXww7zyQt7j 2bcQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo1vfHUIMQ7qAGPlnFEpqnutxYmmNsTy6LikKNppQrltRvXMrbdW NjVwxCo6mbNbjVhaRdge1nwApj1iq7L2jQrFlDeo X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR6EvZXCKnp/iA4CQcQxWJXCi/R8jfuoo5HJrCckmL50W1T2bKUISNLxRbusQZ/m1ZhpIN+ZdYhFaJ8pMV/EVH6B X-Received: from ajr0.svl.corp.google.com ([2620:15c:2d4:203:baf:4c5:18b:2c4b]) (user=axelrasmussen job=sendgmr) by 2002:a81:1117:0:b0:336:45a1:221b with SMTP id 23-20020a811117000000b0033645a1221bmr9778987ywr.229.1660942335151; Fri, 19 Aug 2022 13:52:15 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2022 13:51:58 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20220819205201.658693-1-axelrasmussen@google.com> Message-Id: <20220819205201.658693-3-axelrasmussen@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20220819205201.658693-1-axelrasmussen@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.37.1.595.g718a3a8f04-goog Subject: [PATCH v7 2/5] userfaultfd: add /dev/userfaultfd for fine grained access control From: Axel Rasmussen To: Alexander Viro , Andrew Morton , Dave Hansen , "Dmitry V . Levin" , Gleb Fotengauer-Malinovskiy , Hugh Dickins , Jan Kara , Jonathan Corbet , Mel Gorman , Mike Kravetz , Mike Rapoport , Nadav Amit , Peter Xu , Shuah Khan , Suren Baghdasaryan , Vlastimil Babka , zhangyi Cc: Axel Rasmussen , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Mike Rapoport Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Historically, it has been shown that intercepting kernel faults with userfaultfd (thereby forcing the kernel to wait for an arbitrary amount of time) can be exploited, or at least can make some kinds of exploits easier. So, in 37cd0575b8 "userfaultfd: add UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY" we changed things so, in order for kernel faults to be handled by userfaultfd, either the process needs CAP_SYS_PTRACE, or this sysctl must be configured so that any unprivileged user can do it. In a typical implementation of a hypervisor with live migration (take QEMU/KVM as one such example), we do indeed need to be able to handle kernel faults. But, both options above are less than ideal: - Toggling the sysctl increases attack surface by allowing any unprivileged user to do it. - Granting the live migration process CAP_SYS_PTRACE gives it this ability, but *also* the ability to "observe and control the execution of another process [...], and examine and change [its] memory and registers" (from ptrace(2)). This isn't something we need or want to be able to do, so granting this permission violates the "principle of least privilege". This is all a long winded way to say: we want a more fine-grained way to grant access to userfaultfd, without granting other additional permissions at the same time. To achieve this, add a /dev/userfaultfd misc device. This device provides an alternative to the userfaultfd(2) syscall for the creation of new userfaultfds. The idea is, any userfaultfds created this way will be able to handle kernel faults, without the caller having any special capabilities. Access to this mechanism is instead restricted using e.g. standard filesystem permissions. Acked-by: Mike Rapoport Acked-by: Nadav Amit Acked-by: Peter Xu Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen --- fs/userfaultfd.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------- include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h | 4 ++ 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c index 1c44bf75f916..03ba23e144ec 100644 --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include int sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd __read_mostly; @@ -415,13 +416,8 @@ vm_fault_t handle_userfault(struct vm_fault *vmf, unsigned long reason) if (ctx->features & UFFD_FEATURE_SIGBUS) goto out; - if ((vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_USER) == 0 && - ctx->flags & UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY) { - printk_once(KERN_WARNING "uffd: Set unprivileged_userfaultfd " - "sysctl knob to 1 if kernel faults must be handled " - "without obtaining CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability\n"); + if (!(vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_USER) && (ctx->flags & UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY)) goto out; - } /* * If it's already released don't get it. This avoids to loop @@ -2052,20 +2048,11 @@ static void init_once_userfaultfd_ctx(void *mem) seqcount_spinlock_init(&ctx->refile_seq, &ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock); } -SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags) +static int new_userfaultfd(int flags) { struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx; int fd; - if (!sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd && - (flags & UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY) == 0 && - !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) { - printk_once(KERN_WARNING "uffd: Set unprivileged_userfaultfd " - "sysctl knob to 1 if kernel faults must be handled " - "without obtaining CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability\n"); - return -EPERM; - } - BUG_ON(!current->mm); /* Check the UFFD_* constants for consistency. */ @@ -2098,8 +2085,60 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags) return fd; } +static inline bool userfaultfd_syscall_allowed(int flags) +{ + /* Userspace-only page faults are always allowed */ + if (flags & UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY) + return true; + + /* + * The user is requesting a userfaultfd which can handle kernel faults. + * Privileged users are always allowed to do this. + */ + if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + return true; + + /* Otherwise, access to kernel fault handling is sysctl controlled. */ + return sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd; +} + +SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags) +{ + if (!userfaultfd_syscall_allowed(flags)) + return -EPERM; + + return new_userfaultfd(flags); +} + +static long userfaultfd_dev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long flags) +{ + if (cmd != USERFAULTFD_IOC_NEW) + return -EINVAL; + + return new_userfaultfd(flags); +} + +static const struct file_operations userfaultfd_dev_fops = { + .unlocked_ioctl = userfaultfd_dev_ioctl, + .compat_ioctl = userfaultfd_dev_ioctl, + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .llseek = noop_llseek, +}; + +static struct miscdevice userfaultfd_misc = { + .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR, + .name = "userfaultfd", + .fops = &userfaultfd_dev_fops +}; + static int __init userfaultfd_init(void) { + int ret; + + ret = misc_register(&userfaultfd_misc); + if (ret) + return ret; + userfaultfd_ctx_cachep = kmem_cache_create("userfaultfd_ctx_cache", sizeof(struct userfaultfd_ctx), 0, diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h index 7d32b1e797fb..005e5e306266 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h @@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ #include +/* ioctls for /dev/userfaultfd */ +#define USERFAULTFD_IOC 0xAA +#define USERFAULTFD_IOC_NEW _IO(USERFAULTFD_IOC, 0x00) + /* * If the UFFDIO_API is upgraded someday, the UFFDIO_UNREGISTER and * UFFDIO_WAKE ioctls should be defined as _IOW and not as _IOR. In