From patchwork Tue Jan 24 02:27:28 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ammar Faizi X-Patchwork-Id: 13113352 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 88A46C05027 for ; Tue, 24 Jan 2023 02:27:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231588AbjAXC15 (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Jan 2023 21:27:57 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:48964 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229603AbjAXC15 (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Jan 2023 21:27:57 -0500 Received: from gnuweeb.org (gnuweeb.org [51.81.211.47]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D4225BB92; Mon, 23 Jan 2023 18:27:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [182.253.88.152]) by gnuweeb.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5BFCA82EF1; Tue, 24 Jan 2023 02:27:49 +0000 (UTC) X-GW-Data: lPqxHiMPbJw1wb7CM9QUryAGzr0yq5atzVDdxTR0iA== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gnuweeb.org; s=default; t=1674527275; bh=AMxhIY8F9NcOm9hGLru6XuDWA/BDaiwDAsw8iN0V4UA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Y6AboJmoR0/2xDYJv0kzk8/pfJs0XiA4DWEt6/0b87elQZLijlMAXdBykamo4VmS9 zG4B/9ZxVsP3wXM+8GPdZCDbedtKlc8ySTudAQBphLQ2D46XPXJsfCwd5hYFyfBUg/ DrmVo1PAm2sTehuw7xwmMxkeVn9ZjHsleNujtqCO4lg0R8/9vLlrrgi0TnGOsbBhsW 4P1Of+2nYkdLht0IIHgzO6XX9kkFzymewIL4KamCkpUi8zsIeNq5riBjITQWglwPHX WrlGk8+r5XElF+gVH30c9EUG16H0pp7FBQT4cYUMQ6BF+o0rmrYpMqyzRIaaiJ7RL2 O9GKwZ5RFCxCg== From: Ammar Faizi To: "H. Peter Anvin" , x86 Mailing List Cc: Ammar Faizi , Dave Hansen , Dave Hansen , Xin Li , Thomas Gleixner , Andrew Cooper , Brian Gerst , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Peter Zijlstra , Shuah Khan , Ingo Molnar , Andy Lutomirski , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Linux Kselftest Mailing List , Linux Kernel Mailing List Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 1/2] selftests/x86: sysret_rip: Handle syscall in a FRED system Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 09:27:28 +0700 Message-Id: <20230124022729.596997-2-ammarfaizi2@gnuweeb.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20230124022729.596997-1-ammarfaizi2@gnuweeb.org> References: <5d4ad3e3-034f-c7da-d141-9c001c2343af@intel.com> <18B5DB6D-AEBD-4A67-A7B3-CE64940819B7@zytor.com> <25b96960-a07e-a952-5c23-786b55054126@zytor.com> <6cd0db14-c9e2-3598-fd10-4b473d78c373@citrix.com> <5ecc383c-621b-57d9-7f6d-d63496fca3b3@zytor.com> <20230124022729.596997-1-ammarfaizi2@gnuweeb.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Ammar Faizi The current selftest asserts %r11 == %rflags after the 'syscall' returns to user. Such an assertion doesn't apply to a FRED system because in a FRED system the 'syscall' instruction does not set %r11=%rflags and %rcx=%rip. Handle the FRED case. Now, test that: - "syscall" in a FRED system doesn't clobber %rcx and %r11. - "syscall" in a non-FRED system sets %rcx=%rip and %r11=%rflags. The 'raise()' function from libc can't be used to control those registers. Therefore, create a syscall wrapper in inline Assembly to fully control them. Fixes: 660602140103 ("selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SYSRET to noncanonical addresses") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/25b96960-a07e-a952-5c23-786b55054126@zytor.com Reported-by: Xin Li Co-developed-by: "H. Peter Anvin" Signed-off-by: Ammar Faizi Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) --- Need hpa's sign off. ## Changelog v2: - Use "+r"(rsp) as the right way to avoid redzone problems per Andrew's comment (hpa). (Ref: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/8f5c24df-514d-5d89-f58f-ec8c3eb1e049@zytor.com ) tools/testing/selftests/x86/sysret_rip.c | 96 +++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 95 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/sysret_rip.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/sysret_rip.c index 84d74be1d90207ab..550bc4e69ac46997 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/sysret_rip.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/sysret_rip.c @@ -39,6 +39,95 @@ asm ( extern const char test_page[]; static void const *current_test_page_addr = test_page; +/* Arbitrary values */ +static const unsigned long r11_sentinel = 0xfeedfacedeadbeef; +static const unsigned long rcx_sentinel = 0x5ca1ab1e0b57ac1e; + +/* An arbitrary *valid* RFLAGS value */ +static const unsigned long rflags_sentinel = 0x200a93; + +enum regs_ok { + REGS_ERROR = -1, /* Invalid register contents */ + REGS_SAVED = 0, /* Registers properly preserved */ + REGS_SYSRET = 1 /* Registers match syscall/sysret */ +}; + +/* + * Returns: + * 0 = %rcx and %r11 preserved. + * 1 = %rcx and %r11 set to %rflags and %rip. + * -1 = %rcx and/or %r11 set to any other values. + * + * Note that check_regs_syscall() sets %rbx to the syscall return %rip. + */ +static enum regs_ok check_regs_result(unsigned long r11, unsigned long rcx, + unsigned long rbx) +{ + if (r11 == r11_sentinel && rcx == rcx_sentinel) { + return REGS_SAVED; + } else if (r11 == rflags_sentinel && rcx == rbx) { + return REGS_SYSRET; + } else { + printf("[FAIL] check_regs_result\n"); + printf(" r11_sentinel = %#lx; %%r11 = %#lx;\n", r11_sentinel, r11); + printf(" rcx_sentinel = %#lx; %%rcx = %#lx;\n", rcx_sentinel, rcx); + printf(" rflags_sentinel = %#lx\n", rflags_sentinel); + return REGS_ERROR; + } +} + +static long do_syscall(long nr_syscall, unsigned long arg1, unsigned long arg2, + unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, + unsigned long arg5, unsigned long arg6) +{ + register unsigned long r11 asm("%r11"); + register unsigned long r10 asm("%r10"); + register unsigned long r8 asm("%r8"); + register unsigned long r9 asm("%r9"); + register void *rsp asm("%rsp"); + unsigned long rcx, rbx; + + r11 = r11_sentinel; + rcx = rcx_sentinel; + r10 = arg4; + r8 = arg5; + r9 = arg6; + + asm volatile ( + "pushq %[rflags_sentinel]\n\t" + "popf\n\t" + "leaq 1f(%%rip), %[rbx]\n\t" + "syscall\n" + "1:" + + : "+a" (nr_syscall), + "+r" (r11), + "+c" (rcx), + [rbx] "=b" (rbx), + "+r" (rsp) /* Clobber the redzone */ + + : [rflags_sentinel] "g" (rflags_sentinel), + "D" (arg1), /* %rdi */ + "S" (arg2), /* %rsi */ + "d" (arg3), /* %rdx */ + "r" (r10), + "r" (r8), + "r" (r9) + + : "memory" + ); + + /* + * Test that: + * + * - "syscall" in a FRED system doesn't clobber %rcx and %r11. + * - "syscall" in a non-FRED system sets %rcx=%rip and %r11=%rflags. + * + */ + assert(check_regs_result(r11, rcx, rbx) != REGS_ERROR); + return nr_syscall; +} + static void sethandler(int sig, void (*handler)(int, siginfo_t *, void *), int flags) { @@ -101,11 +190,16 @@ static void sigusr1(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *ctx_void) return; } +static void __raise(int sig) +{ + do_syscall(__NR_kill, getpid(), sig, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + static void test_sigreturn_to(unsigned long ip) { rip = ip; printf("[RUN]\tsigreturn to 0x%lx\n", ip); - raise(SIGUSR1); + __raise(SIGUSR1); } static jmp_buf jmpbuf;