From patchwork Mon Feb 20 03:02:42 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ammar Faizi X-Patchwork-Id: 13146039 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A4CD5C61DA4 for ; Mon, 20 Feb 2023 03:03:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229955AbjBTDDg (ORCPT ); Sun, 19 Feb 2023 22:03:36 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:51484 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229809AbjBTDDg (ORCPT ); Sun, 19 Feb 2023 22:03:36 -0500 Received: from gnuweeb.org (gnuweeb.org [51.81.211.47]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id ABF79E075; Sun, 19 Feb 2023 19:03:27 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [182.253.183.169]) by gnuweeb.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 6C37E8313A; Mon, 20 Feb 2023 03:03:20 +0000 (UTC) X-GW-Data: lPqxHiMPbJw1wb7CM9QUryAGzr0yq5atzVDdxTR0iA== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gnuweeb.org; s=default; t=1676862207; bh=Qk7N/yCYGwUwnYVbbMe3gs22DUs6Sr0x8uxQAHDneuQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=IuKsoVXYGbDJ72YXbhVTj1d+HJIpBuWIrQ7xLt2XkM+O/N1Q4YDXAb6OI817+zejz DcEWH6gc1VmG/Cb9aEyOM1D950g1tHOhmJsB6BWYUb7EgTjQhj2RpdRYa+40tLVvo9 VeZZuWpgXD0cZtJvfSJXu0YjVEhE4cj9U7izkzZ7VwpIFBECtXGuxP9mdsWUK6byG4 cFmz3gVfmJKmwJ2q7kGWXWO7kChpAM/bKxOWWHBdparqtBywvZpNYmz/qHBgO2Hy8B HwMmNNuwvt+1q+hpTlqeuPXTz64XnQt/IwZseDbkS27kTf0ma1ZgL1ozSVO89bPNYZ btB3J8z+bLTxw== From: Ammar Faizi To: Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Dave Hansen , Xin Li Cc: Ammar Faizi , Andrew Cooper , Andy Lutomirski , Borislav Petkov , Thomas Gleixner , Dave Hansen , Peter Zijlstra , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , x86 Mailing List , Linux x86-64 Mailing List , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Linux Kselftest Mailing List , GNU/Weeb Mailing List Subject: [RFC PATCH v8 1/3] selftests/x86: sysret_rip: Handle syscall on the Intel FRED architecture Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2023 10:02:42 +0700 Message-Id: <20230220030244.115808-2-ammarfaizi2@gnuweeb.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20230220030244.115808-1-ammarfaizi2@gnuweeb.org> References: <20230220030244.115808-1-ammarfaizi2@gnuweeb.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org The current selftest asserts %r11 == %rflags after the 'syscall' returns to userspace. However, such an assertion doesn't apply to the Intel FRED system because, in that system, the 'syscall' instruction does not set %r11=%rflags and %rcx=%rip. Handle the FRED system case. Now, test that: A) 'syscall' in a FRED system preserves %rcx and %r11. B) 'syscall' in a non-FRED system sets %rcx=%rip and %r11=%rflags. Note for the '__raise()' helper: Those tests must manipulate registers before the 'syscall' instruction is invoked. However, the current 'raise()' function from libc cannot accomplish it. Therefore, create a syscall wrapper in inline Assembly to control them. Fixes: 660602140103 ("selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SYSRET to noncanonical addresses") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/25b96960-a07e-a952-5c23-786b55054126@zytor.com Reported-by: Xin Li Co-developed-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) Signed-off-by: Ammar Faizi --- tools/testing/selftests/x86/sysret_rip.c | 122 +++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 115 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/sysret_rip.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/sysret_rip.c index 84d74be1d90207ab..300104900192d396 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/sysret_rip.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/sysret_rip.c @@ -39,6 +39,112 @@ asm ( extern const char test_page[]; static void const *current_test_page_addr = test_page; +/* + * Arbitrary values. + */ +static const unsigned long r11_sentinel = 0xfeedfacedeadbeef; +static const unsigned long rcx_sentinel = 0x5ca1ab1e0b57ac1e; + +/* + * An arbitrary *valid* RFLAGS value. + */ +static const unsigned long rflags_sentinel = 0x200a93; + +enum regs_ok { + REGS_UNDEFINED = -1, + REGS_SAVED = 0, /* Registers properly preserved (Intel FRED). */ + REGS_SYSRET = 1 /* Registers match syscall/sysret. */ +}; + +/* + * @rbx should be set to the syscall return %rip. + */ +static void check_regs_result(unsigned long r11, unsigned long rcx, + unsigned long rbx) +{ + static enum regs_ok regs_ok_state = REGS_UNDEFINED; + enum regs_ok ret; + + if (r11 == r11_sentinel && rcx == rcx_sentinel) { + ret = REGS_SAVED; + } else if (r11 == rflags_sentinel && rcx == rbx) { + ret = REGS_SYSRET; + } else { + printf("[FAIL] check_regs_result\n"); + printf(" r11_sentinel = %#lx; %%r11 = %#lx;\n", r11_sentinel, r11); + printf(" rcx_sentinel = %#lx; %%rcx = %#lx;\n", rcx_sentinel, rcx); + printf(" rflags_sentinel = %#lx\n", rflags_sentinel); + exit(1); + } + + + /* + * Test that we don't get a mix of REGS_SAVED and REGS_SYSRET. + * It needs at least calling check_regs_result() twice to assert. + */ + if (regs_ok_state == REGS_UNDEFINED) { + /* + * First time calling check_regs_result(). + */ + regs_ok_state = ret; + } else { + assert(regs_ok_state == ret); + } +} + +/* + * There are two cases: + * + * A) 'syscall' in a FRED system preserves %rcx and %r11. + * B) 'syscall' in a non-FRED system sets %rcx=%rip and %r11=%rflags. + * + * When the do_syscall() function is called for the first time, + * check_regs_result() will memorize the behavior, either (A) or (B). + * Then, the next do_syscall() call will verify that the 'syscall' + * behavior is the same. + * + * This function needs to be called at least twice to assert. + */ +static long do_syscall(long nr_syscall, unsigned long arg1, unsigned long arg2, + unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, + unsigned long arg5, unsigned long arg6) +{ + unsigned long rbx; + unsigned long rcx = rcx_sentinel; + register unsigned long r11 __asm__("%r11") = r11_sentinel; + register unsigned long r10 __asm__("%r10") = arg4; + register unsigned long r8 __asm__("%r8") = arg5; + register unsigned long r9 __asm__("%r9") = arg6; + + __asm__ volatile ( + "movq -8(%%rsp), %%r12\n\t" // Do not clobber the red zone. + "pushq %[rflags_sentinel]\n\t" + "popfq\n\t" + "movq %%r12, -8(%%rsp)\n\t" + "leaq 1f(%%rip), %[rbx]\n\t" + "syscall\n" + "1:" + + : "+a" (nr_syscall), + "+r" (r11), + "+c" (rcx), + [rbx] "=b" (rbx) + + : [rflags_sentinel] "g" (rflags_sentinel), + "D" (arg1), /* %rdi */ + "S" (arg2), /* %rsi */ + "d" (arg3), /* %rdx */ + "r" (r10), + "r" (r8), + "r" (r9) + + : "r12", "memory" + ); + + check_regs_result(r11, rcx, rbx); + return nr_syscall; +} + static void sethandler(int sig, void (*handler)(int, siginfo_t *, void *), int flags) { @@ -88,24 +194,26 @@ static void sigusr1(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *ctx_void) memcpy(&initial_regs, &ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs, sizeof(gregset_t)); + check_regs_result(ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_R11], + ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RCX], + ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RBX]); + /* Set IP and CX to match so that SYSRET can happen. */ ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RIP] = rip; ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RCX] = rip; - - /* R11 and EFLAGS should already match. */ - assert(ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_EFL] == - ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_R11]); - sethandler(SIGSEGV, sigsegv_for_sigreturn_test, SA_RESETHAND); +} - return; +static void __raise(int sig) +{ + do_syscall(__NR_kill, getpid(), sig, 0, 0, 0, 0); } static void test_sigreturn_to(unsigned long ip) { rip = ip; printf("[RUN]\tsigreturn to 0x%lx\n", ip); - raise(SIGUSR1); + __raise(SIGUSR1); } static jmp_buf jmpbuf;