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[35.197.34.99]) by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id d2e1a72fcca58-71b26529d61sm1986540b3a.171.2024.09.27.11.52.19 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 27 Sep 2024 11:52:19 -0700 (PDT) From: jeffxu@chromium.org To: akpm@linux-foundation.org, keescook@chromium.org, corbet@lwn.net Cc: jeffxu@google.com, jorgelo@chromium.org, groeck@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, jannh@google.com, sroettger@google.com, pedro.falcato@gmail.com, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, willy@infradead.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, deraadt@openbsd.org, usama.anjum@collabora.com, surenb@google.com, merimus@google.com, rdunlap@infradead.org, lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com, Liam.Howlett@oracle.com, enh@google.com, Jeff Xu Subject: [PATCH v1 1/1] mseal: update mseal.rst Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2024 18:52:09 +0000 Message-ID: <20240927185211.729207-2-jeffxu@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.46.1.824.gd892dcdcdd-goog In-Reply-To: <20240927185211.729207-1-jeffxu@chromium.org> References: <20240927185211.729207-1-jeffxu@chromium.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Jeff Xu Update doc after in-loop change: mprotect/madvise can have partially updated and munmap is atomic. Fix indentation and clarify some sections to improve readability. Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu --- Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst | 290 ++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 136 insertions(+), 154 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst index 4132eec995a3..68986084e191 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst @@ -23,177 +23,159 @@ applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime. A similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT flag [1] and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall [2]. -User API -======== -mseal() ------------ -The mseal() syscall has the following signature: - -``int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)`` - -**addr/len**: virtual memory address range. - -The address range set by ``addr``/``len`` must meet: - - The start address must be in an allocated VMA. - - The start address must be page aligned. - - The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) must be in an allocated VMA. - - no gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address. - -The ``len`` will be paged aligned implicitly by the kernel. - -**flags**: reserved for future use. - -**return values**: - -- ``0``: Success. - -- ``-EINVAL``: - - Invalid input ``flags``. - - The start address (``addr``) is not page aligned. - - Address range (``addr`` + ``len``) overflow. - -- ``-ENOMEM``: - - The start address (``addr``) is not allocated. - - The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) is not allocated. - - A gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address. - -- ``-EPERM``: - - sealing is supported only on 64-bit CPUs, 32-bit is not supported. - -- For above error cases, users can expect the given memory range is - unmodified, i.e. no partial update. - -- There might be other internal errors/cases not listed here, e.g. - error during merging/splitting VMAs, or the process reaching the max - number of supported VMAs. In those cases, partial updates to the given - memory range could happen. However, those cases should be rare. - -**Blocked operations after sealing**: - Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size, - via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore - can be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes. - - Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location, - via mremap(). - - Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED). - - Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any - specific risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because - the use case is unclear. In any case, users can rely on - merging to expand a sealed VMA. - - mprotect() and pkey_mprotect(). - - Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) - for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the - memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, - effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory. - - Kernel will return -EPERM for blocked operations. - - For blocked operations, one can expect the given address is unmodified, - i.e. no partial update. Note, this is different from existing mm - system call behaviors, where partial updates are made till an error is - found and returned to userspace. To give an example: - - Assume following code sequence: - - - ptr = mmap(null, 8192, PROT_NONE); - - munmap(ptr + 4096, 4096); - - ret1 = mprotect(ptr, 8192, PROT_READ); - - mseal(ptr, 4096); - - ret2 = mprotect(ptr, 8192, PROT_NONE); - - ret1 will be -ENOMEM, the page from ptr is updated to PROT_READ. - - ret2 will be -EPERM, the page remains to be PROT_READ. - -**Note**: - -- mseal() only works on 64-bit CPUs, not 32-bit CPU. - -- users can call mseal() multiple times, mseal() on an already sealed memory - is a no-action (not error). - -- munseal() is not supported. +SYSCALL +======= +mseal syscall signature +----------------------- + **int** mseal(**void \*** addr, **size_t** len, **unsigned long** flags) + + **addr**/**len**: virtual memory address range. + The address range set by **addr**/**len** must meet: + - The start address must be in an allocated VMA. + - The start address must be page aligned. + - The end address (**addr** + **len**) must be in an allocated VMA. + - no gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address. + + The ``len`` will be paged aligned implicitly by the kernel. + + **flags**: reserved for future use. + + **Return values**: + - **0**: Success. + - **-EINVAL**: + * Invalid input ``flags``. + * The start address (``addr``) is not page aligned. + * Address range (``addr`` + ``len``) overflow. + - **-ENOMEM**: + * The start address (``addr``) is not allocated. + * The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) is not allocated. + * A gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address. + - **-EPERM**: + * sealing is supported only on 64-bit CPUs, 32-bit is not supported. + + **Note about error return**: + - For above error cases, users can expect the given memory range is + unmodified, i.e. no partial update. + - There might be other internal errors/cases not listed here, e.g. + error during merging/splitting VMAs, or the process reaching the max + number of supported VMAs. In those cases, partial updates to the given + memory range could happen. However, those cases should be rare. + + **Architecture support**: + mseal only works on 64-bit CPUs, not 32-bit CPU. + + **Idempotent**: + users can call mseal multiple times, mseal on an already sealed memory + is a no-action (not error). + + **no munseal** + Once mapping is sealed, it can't be unsealed. kernel should never + have munseal, this is consistent with other sealing feature, e.g. + F_SEAL_SEAL for file. + +Blocked mm syscall for sealed mapping +------------------------------------- + It might be imporant to note: **once the mapping is sealed, it will + stay in the process's memory till the process terminates**. + + Example:: + + *ptr = mmap(0, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, 0, 0); + rc = mseal(ptr, 4096, 0); + /* munmap will fail */ + rc = munmap(ptr, 4096); + assert(rc < 0); + + Blocked mm syscall: + - munmap + - mmap + - mremap + - mprotect and pkey_mprotect + - some destructive madvise behaviors: MADV_DONTNEED, MADV_FREE, + MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED, MADV_FREE, MADV_DONTFORK, MADV_WIPEONFORK + + The first set of syscall to block is munmap, mremap, mmap. They can + either leave an empty space in the address space, therefore allow + replacement with a new mapping with new set of attributes, or can + overwrite the existing mapping with another mapping. + + mprotect and pkey_mprotect are blocked because they changes the + protection bits (rwx) of the mapping. + + Some destructive madvice behaviors (MADV_DONTNEED, MADV_FREE, + MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED, MADV_FREE, MADV_DONTFORK, MADV_WIPEONFORK) + for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the + memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, + effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory. + + Kernel will return -EPERM for blocked syscalls. + + When blocked syscall return -EPERM due to sealing, the memory regions may or may not be changed, depends on the syscall being blocked: + - munmap: munmap is atomic. If one of VMAs in the given range is + sealed, none of VMAs are updated. + - mprotect, pkey_mprotect, madvise: partial update might happen, e.g. + when mprotect over multiple VMAs, mprotect might update the beginning + VMAs before reaching the sealed VMA and return -EPERM. + - mmap and mremap: undefined behavior. Use cases: ========== - glibc: The dynamic linker, during loading ELF executables, can apply sealing to - non-writable memory segments. + mapping segments. - Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data-structures. -Notes on which memory to seal: -============================== - -It might be important to note that sealing changes the lifetime of a mapping, -i.e. the sealed mapping won’t be unmapped till the process terminates or the -exec system call is invoked. Applications can apply sealing to any virtual -memory region from userspace, but it is crucial to thoroughly analyze the -mapping's lifetime prior to apply the sealing. +Don't use mseal on: +=================== +Applications can apply sealing to any virtual memory region from userspace, +but it is *crucial to thoroughly analyze the mapping's lifetime* prior to +apply the sealing. This is because the sealed mapping *won’t be unmapped* +till the process terminates or the exec system call is invoked. For example: + - aio/shm + aio/shm can call mmap and munmap on behalf of userspace, e.g. + ksys_shmdt() in shm.c. The lifetime of those mapping are not tied to + the lifetime of the process. If those memories are sealed from userspace, + then munmap will fail, causing leaks in VMA address space during the + lifetime of the process. + + - ptr allocated by malloc (heap) + Don't use mseal on the memory ptr return from malloc(). + malloc() is implemented by allocator, e.g. by glibc. Heap manager might + allocate a ptr from brk or mapping created by mmap. + If app calls mseal on ptr returned from malloc(), this can affect the heap + manager's ability to manage the mappings, the outcome is non-deterministic. + Example:: + + ptr = malloc(size); + /* don't call mseal on ptr return from malloc. */ + mseal(ptr, size); + /* free will success, allocator can't shrink heap lower than ptr */ + free(ptr); + +mseal doesn't block: +==================== +In a nutshell, mseal blocks certain mm syscall from modifying some of VMA's +attributes, such as protection bits (rwx). Sealed mappings doesn't mean the +memory is immutable. -- aio/shm - - aio/shm can call mmap()/munmap() on behalf of userspace, e.g. ksys_shmdt() in - shm.c. The lifetime of those mapping are not tied to the lifetime of the - process. If those memories are sealed from userspace, then munmap() will fail, - causing leaks in VMA address space during the lifetime of the process. - -- Brk (heap) - - Currently, userspace applications can seal parts of the heap by calling - malloc() and mseal(). - let's assume following calls from user space: - - - ptr = malloc(size); - - mprotect(ptr, size, RO); - - mseal(ptr, size); - - free(ptr); - - Technically, before mseal() is added, the user can change the protection of - the heap by calling mprotect(RO). As long as the user changes the protection - back to RW before free(), the memory range can be reused. - - Adding mseal() into the picture, however, the heap is then sealed partially, - the user can still free it, but the memory remains to be RO. If the address - is re-used by the heap manager for another malloc, the process might crash - soon after. Therefore, it is important not to apply sealing to any memory - that might get recycled. - - Furthermore, even if the application never calls the free() for the ptr, - the heap manager may invoke the brk system call to shrink the size of the - heap. In the kernel, the brk-shrink will call munmap(). Consequently, - depending on the location of the ptr, the outcome of brk-shrink is - nondeterministic. - - -Additional notes: -================= As Jann Horn pointed out in [3], there are still a few ways to write -to RO memory, which is, in a way, by design. Those cases are not covered -by mseal(). If applications want to block such cases, sandbox tools (such as -seccomp, LSM, etc) might be considered. +to RO memory, which is, in a way, by design. And those could be blocked +by different security measures. Those cases are: - -- Write to read-only memory through /proc/self/mem interface. -- Write to read-only memory through ptrace (such as PTRACE_POKETEXT). -- userfaultfd. + - Write to read-only memory through /proc/self/mem interface (FOLL_FORCE). + - Write to read-only memory through ptrace (such as PTRACE_POKETEXT). + - userfaultfd. The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in V8 CFI [4]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this API. Reference: ========== -[1] https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/1031c584a5e37aff177559b9f69dbd3c8c3fd30a/osfmk/mach/vm_statistics.h#L274 - -[2] https://man.openbsd.org/mimmutable.2 - -[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3ShUYey+ZAFsU2i1RpQn0a5eOs2hzQ426FkcgnfUGLvA@mail.gmail.com - -[4] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1O2jwK4dxI3nRcOJuPYkonhTkNQfbmwdvxQMyXgeaRHo/edit#heading=h.bvaojj9fu6hc +- [1] https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/1031c584a5e37aff177559b9f69dbd3c8c3fd30a/osfmk/mach/vm_statistics.h#L274 +- [2] https://man.openbsd.org/mimmutable.2 +- [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3ShUYey+ZAFsU2i1RpQn0a5eOs2hzQ426FkcgnfUGLvA@mail.gmail.com +- [4] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1O2jwK4dxI3nRcOJuPYkonhTkNQfbmwdvxQMyXgeaRHo/edit#heading=h.bvaojj9fu6hc