From patchwork Fri Sep 23 20:28:21 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Kees Cook X-Patchwork-Id: 12987180 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D14D7C04A95 for ; Fri, 23 Sep 2022 20:40:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233230AbiIWUkr (ORCPT ); Fri, 23 Sep 2022 16:40:47 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:37916 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233192AbiIWUk0 (ORCPT ); Fri, 23 Sep 2022 16:40:26 -0400 Received: from mail-pj1-x1036.google.com (mail-pj1-x1036.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::1036]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id ECE9614F83B for ; Fri, 23 Sep 2022 13:35:37 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pj1-x1036.google.com with SMTP id g1-20020a17090a708100b00203c1c66ae3so1289969pjk.2 for ; Fri, 23 Sep 2022 13:35:37 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date; bh=KTqecIsN+rZ/r5vRTPXwhG2Fjp/tipSlLDdfMKYcgLM=; b=f94Wfd7xAB1tMy6calf6l5p3x+2in7DyzsV50yDKB7taURdsPaCM2OydY1fFaru/ZW GjJIt1JF0yieLkvcBlF4pMte8sdTYkDdvEAsIZ7RUdwd9PufKMe5RpGZe3MTKJDT6pI8 HpvD4dvO90+mj+6aFpo4NQqtgUTesDjf+bmbw= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date; bh=KTqecIsN+rZ/r5vRTPXwhG2Fjp/tipSlLDdfMKYcgLM=; b=EZZC8tXT1VIhgKbhHHho/wu7sOBGe6GTSAw94UzqhGxhlpIYC8oBJkDLgeR5HwtS+A xJBEqa37Lc0rq9e3sa5JVx6UaCaAe7NawLwRdpap8/jyHi3qpapnJuqyjB0ZFSIP6eT1 NFwndhO1rX7LLycX4w40bXQLCPdqfphuD5dy33yCfkgrCEx355O2DfJd96vQZ0b89pUd JLLnsJREVfZiX/8kRwLPxgcZeinIp102tq5K/VTn1ekVZFLmpmDveyIrJsvc+MUNKpfH MccPNEP86eSAhHQclnKGinqApNCwKSYwIn38YEW5Jhj4A4AE07/TaPpIsJweYFrdKSwa 4j5w== X-Gm-Message-State: ACrzQf3Kcfw3mipXf3RJk3VpgC1bo9ze/pU29QBMrSZPv5K2glVnMS8/ yOUlPuViX5hINHbh2npvnB3Etg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AMsMyM7vRbdvmLwAu4r0h4O20VFgjtnhlCkk0pZbrUyBGB40i196nKU6gbtNpTH2GFxoX0kIPq3SIA== X-Received: by 2002:a17:903:244d:b0:178:a0eb:d4bc with SMTP id l13-20020a170903244d00b00178a0ebd4bcmr10401235pls.33.1663965329543; Fri, 23 Sep 2022 13:35:29 -0700 (PDT) Received: from www.outflux.net (smtp.outflux.net. [198.145.64.163]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id n2-20020a170902d2c200b001715a939ac5sm6372093plc.295.2022.09.23.13.35.28 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 23 Sep 2022 13:35:28 -0700 (PDT) From: Kees Cook To: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Kees Cook , Christoph Lameter , Pekka Enberg , David Rientjes , Joonsoo Kim , Andrew Morton , Roman Gushchin , Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>, Andrey Ryabinin , Alexander Potapenko , Andrey Konovalov , Dmitry Vyukov , Vincenzo Frascino , linux-mm@kvack.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, "Ruhl, Michael J" , "David S. Miller" , Eric Dumazet , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Nick Desaulniers , Alex Elder , Josef Bacik , David Sterba , Sumit Semwal , =?utf-8?q?Christian_K=C3=B6nig?= , Jesse Brandeburg , Daniel Micay , Yonghong Song , Marco Elver , Miguel Ojeda , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-media@vger.kernel.org, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, linaro-mm-sig@lists.linaro.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, intel-wired-lan@lists.osuosl.org, dev@openvswitch.org, x86@kernel.org, llvm@lists.linux.dev, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2 15/16] mm: Make ksize() a reporting-only function Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2022 13:28:21 -0700 Message-Id: <20220923202822.2667581-16-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20220923202822.2667581-1-keescook@chromium.org> References: <20220923202822.2667581-1-keescook@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=4409; h=from:subject; bh=eTOvroLnBC5lEfD5J+pHwkaq4l0Z2pdeLmvVu9h6d+U=; b=owEBbQKS/ZANAwAKAYly9N/cbcAmAcsmYgBjLhbmYN/aRzOKQ1vH75NEteIR/Vhz22yGW0UEIcgR Yp367AqJAjMEAAEKAB0WIQSlw/aPIp3WD3I+bhOJcvTf3G3AJgUCYy4W5gAKCRCJcvTf3G3AJiNkD/ 92DJis5bkVWVuBFAf6aPfGIKZn18fqqWhgDNIB1gL3+/JoYlzCund6gFEcY8zTobmS/RbZGu3aZ6aG eGxVM7yZ+jxRPM4eiG3l1HwhmL3cHQjHtqkRmDgIyPZ9xwxYKivuUOcVZws84e+7hawBwlAhMt8li+ bgO93T234fS5FLzN/RobhSkg6ISNsI03S8QmlYHytLaSLXUZwSR0/mPUZnFFUrJZk61wAHwMxs68nu PInfWb4QkBwNwAwxJn7jG6OEI5/PSX0n80TMD9CEDNK8sroaMS2C4k5gxVvI8qQZGlT6YpdDGy5BFI oEYbO9baL9bYedtNrwWblW1L3ZmdrGVL1MbXkb3ToBxpDPvQrgQHkNTDqQsY4nttLsp3PP7SZolYSA EuyQgZv8SE2uzK0Y60dBBdrNDexKK0+R5g1mk0Fk/fCLG+1/b859Ulh7OdVyoMlBRQRnPMPCaAyju1 28AEPnC9DBu3Gim8BVHKN3GTgZ0QlUPONvmBGSbAWx359vzIQcmmHIqEMaug8yVrFqRB+cIVXcvtuT EI3ZSAAQpODVZpTsW0ZJatcd0IVMg0oWKcDLxZqolmsP3Ns+cC1eix7TMk2B/1g377zgGeJaByDfib tGymOAoaYv3yr/v92FdCHUFaW37DaZ7ARFElDKWqSBGJtj//OOcTik6X79dA== X-Developer-Key: i=keescook@chromium.org; a=openpgp; fpr=A5C3F68F229DD60F723E6E138972F4DFDC6DC026 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-media@vger.kernel.org With all "silently resizing" callers of ksize() refactored, remove the logic in ksize() that would allow it to be used to effectively change the size of an allocation (bypassing __alloc_size hints, etc). Users wanting this feature need to either use kmalloc_size_roundup() before an allocation, or call krealloc() directly. For kfree_sensitive(), move the unpoisoning logic inline. Replace the open-coded ksize() in __do_krealloc with ksize() now that it doesn't perform unpoisoning. Cc: Christoph Lameter Cc: Pekka Enberg Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Joonsoo Kim Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Vincenzo Frascino Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- mm/slab_common.c | 38 ++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c index d7420cf649f8..60b77bcdc2e3 100644 --- a/mm/slab_common.c +++ b/mm/slab_common.c @@ -1160,13 +1160,8 @@ __do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size, gfp_t flags) void *ret; size_t ks; - /* Don't use instrumented ksize to allow precise KASAN poisoning. */ - if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p))) { - if (!kasan_check_byte(p)) - return NULL; - ks = kfence_ksize(p) ?: __ksize(p); - } else - ks = 0; + /* How large is the allocation actually? */ + ks = ksize(p); /* If the object still fits, repoison it precisely. */ if (ks >= new_size) { @@ -1232,8 +1227,10 @@ void kfree_sensitive(const void *p) void *mem = (void *)p; ks = ksize(mem); - if (ks) + if (ks) { + kasan_unpoison_range(mem, ks); memzero_explicit(mem, ks); + } kfree(mem); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(kfree_sensitive); @@ -1242,10 +1239,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kfree_sensitive); * ksize - get the actual amount of memory allocated for a given object * @objp: Pointer to the object * - * kmalloc may internally round up allocations and return more memory + * kmalloc() may internally round up allocations and return more memory * than requested. ksize() can be used to determine the actual amount of - * memory allocated. The caller may use this additional memory, even though - * a smaller amount of memory was initially specified with the kmalloc call. + * allocated memory. The caller may NOT use this additional memory, unless + * it calls krealloc(). To avoid an alloc/realloc cycle, callers can use + * kmalloc_size_roundup() to find the size of the associated kmalloc bucket. * The caller must guarantee that objp points to a valid object previously * allocated with either kmalloc() or kmem_cache_alloc(). The object * must not be freed during the duration of the call. @@ -1254,13 +1252,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kfree_sensitive); */ size_t ksize(const void *objp) { - size_t size; - /* - * We need to first check that the pointer to the object is valid, and - * only then unpoison the memory. The report printed from ksize() is - * more useful, then when it's printed later when the behaviour could - * be undefined due to a potential use-after-free or double-free. + * We need to first check that the pointer to the object is valid. + * The KASAN report printed from ksize() is more useful, then when + * it's printed later when the behaviour could be undefined due to + * a potential use-after-free or double-free. * * We use kasan_check_byte(), which is supported for the hardware * tag-based KASAN mode, unlike kasan_check_read/write(). @@ -1274,13 +1270,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp) if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !kasan_check_byte(objp)) return 0; - size = kfence_ksize(objp) ?: __ksize(objp); - /* - * We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area, - * so we need to unpoison this area. - */ - kasan_unpoison_range(objp, size); - return size; + return kfence_ksize(objp) ?: __ksize(objp); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);