From patchwork Mon Sep 30 18:33:12 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Aleksa Sarai X-Patchwork-Id: 11167519 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B4F511902 for ; Mon, 30 Sep 2019 21:03:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9DFB0224EF for ; Mon, 30 Sep 2019 21:03:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732428AbfI3VDl (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Sep 2019 17:03:41 -0400 Received: from mx2.mailbox.org ([80.241.60.215]:17064 "EHLO mx2.mailbox.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732108AbfI3VDY (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Sep 2019 17:03:24 -0400 Received: from smtp2.mailbox.org (smtp1.mailbox.org [IPv6:2001:67c:2050:105:465:1:1:0]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx2.mailbox.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E26AFA1889; Mon, 30 Sep 2019 20:36:14 +0200 (CEST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at heinlein-support.de Received: from smtp2.mailbox.org ([80.241.60.240]) by spamfilter02.heinlein-hosting.de (spamfilter02.heinlein-hosting.de [80.241.56.116]) (amavisd-new, port 10030) with ESMTP id MmwYvW0_-1k4; Mon, 30 Sep 2019 20:36:10 +0200 (CEST) From: Aleksa Sarai To: Al Viro , Jeff Layton , "J. Bruce Fields" , Arnd Bergmann , David Howells , Shuah Khan , Shuah Khan , Ingo Molnar , Peter Zijlstra Cc: Aleksa Sarai , Eric Biederman , Andy Lutomirski , Andrew Morton , Alexei Starovoitov , Kees Cook , Jann Horn , Tycho Andersen , David Drysdale , Chanho Min , Oleg Nesterov , Rasmus Villemoes , Alexander Shishkin , Jiri Olsa , Namhyung Kim , Christian Brauner , Aleksa Sarai , Linus Torvalds , containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, libc-alpha@sourceware.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v13 5/9] namei: LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: chroot-like path resolution Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2019 04:33:12 +1000 Message-Id: <20190930183316.10190-6-cyphar@cyphar.com> In-Reply-To: <20190930183316.10190-1-cyphar@cyphar.com> References: <20190930183316.10190-1-cyphar@cyphar.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-mips-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org The primary motivation for the need for this flag is container runtimes which have to interact with malicious root filesystems in the host namespaces. One of the first requirements for a container runtime to be secure against a malicious rootfs is that they correctly scope symlinks (that is, they should be scoped as though they are chroot(2)ed into the container's rootfs) and ".."-style paths[*]. The already-existing LOOKUP_NO_XDEV and LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS help defend against other potential attacks in a malicious rootfs scenario. Currently most container runtimes try to do this resolution in userspace[1], causing many potential race conditions. In addition, the "obvious" alternative (actually performing a {ch,pivot_}root(2)) requires a fork+exec (for some runtimes) which is *very* costly if necessary for every filesystem operation involving a container. [*] At the moment, ".." and magic-link jumping are disallowed for the same reason it is disabled for LOOKUP_BENEATH -- currently it is not safe to allow it. Future patches may enable it unconditionally once we have resolved the possible races (for "..") and semantics (for magic-link jumping). The most significant *at(2) semantic change with LOOKUP_IN_ROOT is that absolute pathnames no longer cause the dirfd to be ignored completely. The rationale is that LOOKUP_IN_ROOT must necessarily chroot-scope symlinks with absolute paths to dirfd, and so doing it for the base path seems to be the most consistent behaviour (and also avoids foot-gunning users who want to scope paths that are absolute). [1]: https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai --- fs/namei.c | 5 +++++ include/linux/namei.h | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index b80efc0ae0f3..efed62c6136e 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -2274,6 +2274,11 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags) nd->m_seq = read_seqbegin(&mount_lock); + /* LOOKUP_IN_ROOT treats absolute paths as being relative-to-dirfd. */ + if (flags & LOOKUP_IN_ROOT) + while (*s == '/') + s++; + /* Figure out the starting path and root (if needed). */ if (*s == '/') { error = nd_jump_root(nd); diff --git a/include/linux/namei.h b/include/linux/namei.h index 88b610ca4d83..1ace31052237 100644 --- a/include/linux/namei.h +++ b/include/linux/namei.h @@ -48,8 +48,9 @@ enum {LAST_NORM, LAST_ROOT, LAST_DOT, LAST_DOTDOT, LAST_BIND}; #define LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS 0x080000 /* No /proc/$pid/fd/ "symlink" crossing. */ #define LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS 0x100000 /* No symlink crossing *at all*. Implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS. */ +#define LOOKUP_IN_ROOT 0x200000 /* Treat dirfd as %current->fs->root. */ /* LOOKUP_* flags which do scope-related checks based on the dirfd. */ -#define LOOKUP_DIRFD_SCOPE_FLAGS LOOKUP_BENEATH +#define LOOKUP_DIRFD_SCOPE_FLAGS (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_IN_ROOT) extern int path_pts(struct path *path);