diff mbox series

mips: allow firmware to pass RNG seed to kernel

Message ID 20220930140138.575751-1-Jason@zx2c4.com (mailing list archive)
State Accepted
Commit 056a68cea01edfa78b3474af1bfa39cc6bcc7bee
Headers show
Series mips: allow firmware to pass RNG seed to kernel | expand

Commit Message

Jason A. Donenfeld Sept. 30, 2022, 2:01 p.m. UTC
Nearly all other firmware environments have some way of passing a RNG
seed to initialize the RNG: DTB's rng-seed, EFI's RNG protocol, m68k's
bootinfo block, x86's setup_data, and so forth. This adds something
similar for MIPS, which will allow various firmware environments,
bootloaders, and hypervisors to pass an RNG seed to initialize the
kernel's RNG.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
 arch/mips/kernel/setup.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

Comments

Thomas Bogendoerfer Oct. 1, 2022, 4:09 p.m. UTC | #1
On Fri, Sep 30, 2022 at 04:01:38PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Nearly all other firmware environments have some way of passing a RNG
> seed to initialize the RNG: DTB's rng-seed, EFI's RNG protocol, m68k's
> bootinfo block, x86's setup_data, and so forth. This adds something
> similar for MIPS, which will allow various firmware environments,
> bootloaders, and hypervisors to pass an RNG seed to initialize the
> kernel's RNG.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
> ---
>  arch/mips/kernel/setup.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

applied to mips-next.

Thomas.
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé Oct. 3, 2022, 10:07 p.m. UTC | #2
Hi Jason,

On Fri, Sep 30, 2022 at 4:05 PM Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> wrote:
>
> Nearly all other firmware environments have some way of passing a RNG
> seed to initialize the RNG: DTB's rng-seed, EFI's RNG protocol, m68k's
> bootinfo block, x86's setup_data, and so forth. This adds something
> similar for MIPS, which will allow various firmware environments,
> bootloaders, and hypervisors to pass an RNG seed to initialize the
> kernel's RNG.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
> ---
>  arch/mips/kernel/setup.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c b/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c
> index 2ca156a5b231..39c79f67c7a3 100644
> --- a/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c
> +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c
> @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
>  #include <asm/setup.h>
>  #include <asm/smp-ops.h>
>  #include <asm/prom.h>
> +#include <asm/fw/fw.h>
>
>  #ifdef CONFIG_MIPS_ELF_APPENDED_DTB
>  char __section(".appended_dtb") __appended_dtb[0x100000];
> @@ -756,6 +757,24 @@ static void __init prefill_possible_map(void)
>  static inline void prefill_possible_map(void) {}
>  #endif
>
> +static void __init setup_rng_seed(void)
> +{
> +       char *rng_seed_hex = fw_getenv("rngseed");
> +       u8 rng_seed[512];
> +       size_t len;
> +
> +       if (!rng_seed_hex)
> +               return;
> +

Assuming rngseed="x", ...

> +       len = min(sizeof(rng_seed), strlen(rng_seed_hex) / 2);

... len = 0 ...

> +       if (hex2bin(rng_seed, rng_seed_hex, len))
> +               return;

hex2bin(..., len=0) = 0

> +
> +       add_bootloader_randomness(rng_seed, len);

So we call char/random code with len=0. Is it safe?
Maybe simply safer to check len before calling hex2bin?

> +       memzero_explicit(rng_seed, len);
> +       memzero_explicit(rng_seed_hex, len * 2);
> +}
> +
>  void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
>  {
>         cpu_probe();
> @@ -786,6 +805,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
>         paging_init();
>
>         memblock_dump_all();
> +
> +       setup_rng_seed();
>  }
>
>  unsigned long kernelsp[NR_CPUS];
> --
> 2.37.3
>
Jason A. Donenfeld Oct. 3, 2022, 10:30 p.m. UTC | #3
Hi Philippe,

On Tue, Oct 4, 2022 at 12:07 AM Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org> wrote:
> > +       add_bootloader_randomness(rng_seed, len);
>
> So we call char/random code with len=0. Is it safe?
> Maybe simply safer to check len before calling hex2bin?

add_bootloader_randomness() is safe for all input sizes, and is
written to be callable with len=0 and have no effect. So this function
should be good as-is; there's no need to special case an unlikely
instance that's already handled by add_bootloader_randomness().

Jason
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé Oct. 6, 2022, 11:28 a.m. UTC | #4
On 4/10/22 00:30, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Hi Philippe,
> 
> On Tue, Oct 4, 2022 at 12:07 AM Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org> wrote:
>>> +       add_bootloader_randomness(rng_seed, len);
>>
>> So we call char/random code with len=0. Is it safe?
>> Maybe simply safer to check len before calling hex2bin?
> 
> add_bootloader_randomness() is safe for all input sizes, and is
> written to be callable with len=0 and have no effect. So this function
> should be good as-is; there's no need to special case an unlikely
> instance that's already handled by add_bootloader_randomness().

OK, thanks for the clarification.

Phil.
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c b/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c
index 2ca156a5b231..39c79f67c7a3 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ 
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 #include <asm/smp-ops.h>
 #include <asm/prom.h>
+#include <asm/fw/fw.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MIPS_ELF_APPENDED_DTB
 char __section(".appended_dtb") __appended_dtb[0x100000];
@@ -756,6 +757,24 @@  static void __init prefill_possible_map(void)
 static inline void prefill_possible_map(void) {}
 #endif
 
+static void __init setup_rng_seed(void)
+{
+	char *rng_seed_hex = fw_getenv("rngseed");
+	u8 rng_seed[512];
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (!rng_seed_hex)
+		return;
+
+	len = min(sizeof(rng_seed), strlen(rng_seed_hex) / 2);
+	if (hex2bin(rng_seed, rng_seed_hex, len))
+		return;
+
+	add_bootloader_randomness(rng_seed, len);
+	memzero_explicit(rng_seed, len);
+	memzero_explicit(rng_seed_hex, len * 2);
+}
+
 void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 {
 	cpu_probe();
@@ -786,6 +805,8 @@  void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 	paging_init();
 
 	memblock_dump_all();
+
+	setup_rng_seed();
 }
 
 unsigned long kernelsp[NR_CPUS];