From patchwork Tue Aug 4 09:50:29 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 11700111 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 120F0138C for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2020 09:50:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: from kanga.kvack.org (kanga.kvack.org [205.233.56.17]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0461022B40 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2020 09:50:52 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="RmFywTyR" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 0461022B40 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) id CE6548D0146; Tue, 4 Aug 2020 05:50:50 -0400 (EDT) Delivered-To: linux-mm-outgoing@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 40) id C6EBF8D0081; Tue, 4 Aug 2020 05:50:50 -0400 (EDT) X-Original-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org X-Delivered-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 63042) id AE7E58D0146; Tue, 4 Aug 2020 05:50:50 -0400 (EDT) X-Original-To: linux-mm@kvack.org X-Delivered-To: linux-mm@kvack.org Received: from forelay.hostedemail.com (smtprelay0062.hostedemail.com [216.40.44.62]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9172E8D0081 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2020 05:50:50 -0400 (EDT) Received: from smtpin16.hostedemail.com (10.5.19.251.rfc1918.com [10.5.19.251]) by forelay03.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 443478248047 for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2020 09:50:50 +0000 (UTC) X-FDA: 77112417060.16.help02_240411f26fa5 Received: from filter.hostedemail.com (10.5.16.251.rfc1918.com [10.5.16.251]) by smtpin16.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 066D2100E54AF for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2020 09:50:50 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Summary: 1,0,0,cddf4248e5a95cf2,d41d8cd98f00b204,rppt@kernel.org,,RULES_HIT:2:41:355:379:541:800:960:967:973:982:988:989:1260:1311:1314:1345:1437:1515:1535:1605:1606:1730:1747:1777:1792:1801:2194:2198:2199:2200:2393:2525:2553:2559:2566:2570:2682:2685:2693:2703:2736:2859:2895:2897:2898:2901:2924:2926:2933:2937:2939:2942:2945:2947:2951:2954:3022:3865:3866:3867:3868:3870:3871:3872:3874:3934:3936:3938:3941:3944:3947:3950:3953:3956:3959:4118:4250:4321:4605:5007:6119:6261:7576:7903:8603:8660:9025:10004:11658:13148:13149:13161:13229:13230,0,RBL:198.145.29.99:@kernel.org:.lbl8.mailshell.net-64.100.201.201 62.2.0.100;04y8f1cqiakm4uuqrseryysbfeqs3opu6u4ftfmyknhu6bwooz9o8eet736b1qq.mtqthd658fcnxa6ktr9wnzfg1hbstx7fqse1996tb6jcknfydcnnqkxfqnm88ye.r-lbl8.mailshell.net-223.238.255.100,CacheIP:none,Bayesian:0.5,0.5,0.5,Netcheck:none,DomainCache:0,MSF:not bulk,SPF:fp,MSBL:0,DNSBL:neutral,Custom_rules:0:0:0,LFtime:25,LUA_SUMMARY:none X-HE-Tag: help02_240411f26fa5 X-Filterd-Recvd-Size: 7573 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by imf27.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP for ; Tue, 4 Aug 2020 09:50:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: from aquarius.haifa.ibm.com (nesher1.haifa.il.ibm.com [195.110.40.7]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2A61D206DA; Tue, 4 Aug 2020 09:50:39 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1596534648; bh=td5J9Vxgk+gTO+L9zbaF5BaPjjiLjmM4vrr/SBOLFKU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=RmFywTyRGmjSjjTGim05to90O8GVoSHviD+l0nIkYuIaFtl1JVO+6upwcXnWdTUQX lkiRQ6AbRc5Y05F6PO7WjYZU9ibrAtxRMsRsAfzikpflcCJKMWGPzYp8AwUTqpVpkc YWncexe8pS1r0ZZ6v4SxAIyNUNyGQ+9cOkXZRy8k= From: Mike Rapoport To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Alexander Viro , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Idan Yaniv , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 12:50:29 +0300 Message-Id: <20200804095035.18778-1-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 066D2100E54AF X-Spamd-Result: default: False [0.00 / 100.00] X-Rspamd-Server: rspam05 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: From: Mike Rapoport Hi, This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. v3 changes: * Squash kernel-parameters.txt update into the commit that added the command line option. * Make uncached mode explicitly selectable by architectures. For now enable it only on x86. v2 changes: * Follow Michael's suggestion and name the new system call 'memfd_secret' * Add kernel-parameters documentation about the boot option * Fix i386-tinyconfig regression reported by the kbuild bot. CONFIG_SECRETMEM now depends on !EMBEDDED to disable it on small systems from one side and still make it available unconditionally on architectures that support SET_DIRECT_MAP. The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings. Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings. Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host. For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library [1] that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification. I've hesitated whether to continue to use new flags to memfd_create() or to add a new system call and I've decided to use a new system call after I've started to look into man pages update. There would have been two completely independent descriptions and I think it would have been very confusing. Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows (ab)use of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks. The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future. As the fragmentation of the direct map was one of the major concerns raised during the previous postings, I've added an amortizing cache of PMD-size pages to each file descriptor and an ability to reserve large chunks of the physical memory at boot time and then use this memory as an allocation pool for the secret memory areas. v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200727162935.31714-1-rppt@kernel.org v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200720092435.17469-1-rppt@kernel.org/ rfc-v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200706172051.19465-1-rppt@kernel.org/ rfc-v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200130162340.GA14232@rapoport-lnx/ Mike Rapoport (6): mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER mmap: make mlock_future_check() global mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot arch/Kconfig | 7 + arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + fs/dax.c | 10 +- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 +- include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h | 9 + kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 4 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/internal.h | 3 + mm/mmap.c | 5 +- mm/secretmem.c | 458 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 20 files changed, 510 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c