diff mbox series

[PATCHv2,47/59] kvm, x86, mmu: setup MKTME keyID to spte for given PFN

Message ID 20190731150813.26289-48-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series Intel MKTME enabling | expand

Commit Message

Kirill A . Shutemov July 31, 2019, 3:08 p.m. UTC 
From: Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>

Setup keyID to SPTE, which will be eventually programmed to shadow MMU
or EPT table, according to page's associated keyID, so that guest is
able to use correct keyID to access guest memory.

Note current shadow_me_mask doesn't suit MKTME's needs, since for MKTME
there's no fixed memory encryption mask, but can vary from keyID 1 to
maximum keyID, therefore shadow_me_mask remains 0 for MKTME.

Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Comments

Tom Lendacky Aug. 6, 2019, 8:26 p.m. UTC | #1 
On 7/31/19 10:08 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> From: Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>
> 
> Setup keyID to SPTE, which will be eventually programmed to shadow MMU
> or EPT table, according to page's associated keyID, so that guest is
> able to use correct keyID to access guest memory.
> 
> Note current shadow_me_mask doesn't suit MKTME's needs, since for MKTME
> there's no fixed memory encryption mask, but can vary from keyID 1 to
> maximum keyID, therefore shadow_me_mask remains 0 for MKTME.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
> index 8f72526e2f68..b8742e6219f6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
> @@ -2936,6 +2936,22 @@ static bool kvm_is_mmio_pfn(kvm_pfn_t pfn)
>  #define SET_SPTE_WRITE_PROTECTED_PT	BIT(0)
>  #define SET_SPTE_NEED_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH	BIT(1)
>  
> +static u64 get_phys_encryption_mask(kvm_pfn_t pfn)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME
> +	struct page *page;
> +
> +	if (!pfn_valid(pfn))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
> +
> +	return ((u64)page_keyid(page)) << mktme_keyid_shift();
> +#else
> +	return shadow_me_mask;
> +#endif
> +}

This patch breaks AMD virtualization (SVM) in general (non-SEV and SEV
guests) when SME is active. Shouldn't this be a run time, vs build time,
check for MKTME being active?

Thanks,
Tom

> +
>  static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
>  		    unsigned pte_access, int level,
>  		    gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool speculative,
> @@ -2982,7 +2998,7 @@ static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
>  		pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;
>  
>  	if (!kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn))
> -		spte |= shadow_me_mask;
> +		spte |= get_phys_encryption_mask(pfn);
>  
>  	spte |= (u64)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
>  
>
Kirill A . Shutemov Aug. 7, 2019, 2:28 p.m. UTC | #2 
On Tue, Aug 06, 2019 at 08:26:52PM +0000, Lendacky, Thomas wrote:
> On 7/31/19 10:08 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > From: Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>
> > 
> > Setup keyID to SPTE, which will be eventually programmed to shadow MMU
> > or EPT table, according to page's associated keyID, so that guest is
> > able to use correct keyID to access guest memory.
> > 
> > Note current shadow_me_mask doesn't suit MKTME's needs, since for MKTME
> > there's no fixed memory encryption mask, but can vary from keyID 1 to
> > maximum keyID, therefore shadow_me_mask remains 0 for MKTME.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
> >  1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
> > index 8f72526e2f68..b8742e6219f6 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
> > @@ -2936,6 +2936,22 @@ static bool kvm_is_mmio_pfn(kvm_pfn_t pfn)
> >  #define SET_SPTE_WRITE_PROTECTED_PT	BIT(0)
> >  #define SET_SPTE_NEED_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH	BIT(1)
> >  
> > +static u64 get_phys_encryption_mask(kvm_pfn_t pfn)
> > +{
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME
> > +	struct page *page;
> > +
> > +	if (!pfn_valid(pfn))
> > +		return 0;
> > +
> > +	page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
> > +
> > +	return ((u64)page_keyid(page)) << mktme_keyid_shift();
> > +#else
> > +	return shadow_me_mask;
> > +#endif
> > +}
> 
> This patch breaks AMD virtualization (SVM) in general (non-SEV and SEV
> guests) when SME is active. Shouldn't this be a run time, vs build time,
> check for MKTME being active?

Thanks, I've missed this.

This fixup should help:

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index 00d17bdfec0f..54931acf260e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -2947,18 +2947,17 @@ static bool kvm_is_mmio_pfn(kvm_pfn_t pfn)
 
 static u64 get_phys_encryption_mask(kvm_pfn_t pfn)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME
 	struct page *page;
 
+	if (!mktme_enabled())
+		return shadow_me_mask;
+
 	if (!pfn_valid(pfn))
 		return 0;
 
 	page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
 
 	return ((u64)page_keyid(page)) << mktme_keyid_shift();
-#else
-	return shadow_me_mask;
-#endif
 }
 
 static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index 8f72526e2f68..b8742e6219f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -2936,6 +2936,22 @@  static bool kvm_is_mmio_pfn(kvm_pfn_t pfn)
 #define SET_SPTE_WRITE_PROTECTED_PT	BIT(0)
 #define SET_SPTE_NEED_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH	BIT(1)
 
+static u64 get_phys_encryption_mask(kvm_pfn_t pfn)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME
+	struct page *page;
+
+	if (!pfn_valid(pfn))
+		return 0;
+
+	page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
+
+	return ((u64)page_keyid(page)) << mktme_keyid_shift();
+#else
+	return shadow_me_mask;
+#endif
+}
+
 static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
 		    unsigned pte_access, int level,
 		    gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool speculative,
@@ -2982,7 +2998,7 @@  static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
 		pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;
 
 	if (!kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn))
-		spte |= shadow_me_mask;
+		spte |= get_phys_encryption_mask(pfn);
 
 	spte |= (u64)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;