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[209.85.220.65]) by mx.google.com with SMTPS id f9sor82460297plr.31.2019.07.31.09.58.59 for (Google Transport Security); Wed, 31 Jul 2019 09:58:59 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of salyzyn@android.com designates 209.85.220.65 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.220.65; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@android.com header.s=20161025 header.b=NxNTAM7e; spf=pass (google.com: domain of salyzyn@android.com designates 209.85.220.65 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=salyzyn@android.com; dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE) header.from=android.com DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=android.com; s=20161025; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=ddnpbwfJp/Jg1pT3kuq1L6l9gRs3Cs0gd96QxcsmyTc=; b=NxNTAM7ePY8xngcq2yrLiNdxT7CuMygtVKpGXjyTP1843Lxq3fuRcpO356BEw65bML cslir7uf6cvVuCP9q4xsk5uosGElWGirNimNzKrc650HUmz1fcBB61CoIH5xL+D6t+CN lkgiXjR28DexwU9n5MUD3Rjni5SxfQKoEMJtAXxirw4R0yG+pAisAOWmheolYpwp53ID 4zZ50cuVIfn/XOJq39llAkPYw0YtG0AM8a81+qWkiTu+RGung173hM1OoZAbjwJnu0ik UAxNyUzM3oGCOwLas54+/ewVgWOJ+RFTHxNEgnLne0IkbzKnN487Iy0JoBLRQK2Hoy+6 RnyQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqw/fnityvjNohJ2x3SxdKBfN0+54rDA11lGujd0yUSK2/q6bwTxrbWfMZk+DO1MQPqz4TBhTA== X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:694a:: with SMTP id k10mr120262361plt.255.1564592339473; Wed, 31 Jul 2019 09:58:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: from nebulus.mtv.corp.google.com ([2620:15c:211:200:5404:91ba:59dc:9400]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id f72sm2245954pjg.10.2019.07.31.09.58.57 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=AEAD-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 31 Jul 2019 09:58:58 -0700 (PDT) From: Mark Salyzyn To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-team@android.com, Mark Salyzyn , Miklos Szeredi , Jonathan Corbet , Vivek Goyal , "Eric W . Biederman" , Amir Goldstein , Randy Dunlap , Stephen Smalley , linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Eric Van Hensbergen , Latchesar Ionkov , Dominique Martinet , David Howells , Chris Mason , Josef Bacik , David Sterba , Jeff Layton , Sage Weil , Ilya Dryomov , Steve French , Tyler Hicks , Jan Kara , Theodore Ts'o , Andreas Dilger , Jaegeuk Kim , Chao Yu , Bob Peterson , Andreas Gruenbacher , David Woodhouse , Richard Weinberger , Dave Kleikamp , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Tejun Heo , Trond Myklebust , Anna Schumaker , Mark Fasheh , Joel Becker , Joseph Qi , Mike Marshall , Martin Brandenburg , Alexander Viro , Phillip Lougher , "Darrick J . Wong" , linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org, Hugh Dickins , "David S . Miller" , Andrew Morton , Mathieu Malaterre , =?utf-8?q?Ernesto_A_=2E_Fern=C3=A1nde?= =?utf-8?q?z?= , Vyacheslav Dubeyko , v9fs-developer@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, samba-technical@lists.samba.org, ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cluster-devel@redhat.com, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, jfs-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, ocfs2-devel@oss.oracle.com, devel@lists.orangefs.org, reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v13 5/5] overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2019 09:58:00 -0700 Message-Id: <20190731165803.4755-6-salyzyn@android.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.22.0.770.g0f2c4a37fd-goog In-Reply-To: <20190731165803.4755-1-salyzyn@android.com> References: <20190731165803.4755-1-salyzyn@android.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are checked against the caller's credentials. If the principles of least privilege are applied, the mounter's credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's when accessing the overlayfs filesystem. For example, a file that a lower DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the generally higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector. We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the caller's credentials. The module boolean parameter and mount option override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature", existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/override_creds. It was not always this way. Circa 4.6 there was no recorded mounter's credentials, instead privileged access to upper or work directories were temporarily increased to perform the operations. The MAC (selinux) policies were caller's in all cases. override_creds=off partially returns us to this older access model minus the insecure temporary credential increases. This is to permit use in a system with non-overlapping security models for each executable including the agent that mounts the overlayfs filesystem. In Android this is the case since init, which performs the mount operations, has a minimal MAC set of privileges to reduce any attack surface, and services that use the content have a different set of MAC privileges (eg: read, for vendor labelled configuration, execute for vendor libraries and modules). The caveats are not a problem in the Android usage model, however they should be fixed for completeness and for general use in time. Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn Cc: Miklos Szeredi Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: Vivek Goyal Cc: Eric W. Biederman Cc: Amir Goldstein Cc: Randy Dunlap Cc: Stephen Smalley Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-team@android.com Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen Cc: Latchesar Ionkov Cc: Dominique Martinet Cc: David Howells Cc: Chris Mason Cc: Josef Bacik Cc: David Sterba Cc: Jeff Layton Cc: Sage Weil Cc: Ilya Dryomov Cc: Steve French Cc: Tyler Hicks Cc: Jan Kara Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Andreas Dilger Cc: Jaegeuk Kim Cc: Chao Yu Cc: Bob Peterson Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Dave Kleikamp Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Tejun Heo Cc: Trond Myklebust Cc: Anna Schumaker Cc: Mark Fasheh Cc: Joel Becker Cc: Joseph Qi Cc: Mike Marshall Cc: Martin Brandenburg Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Phillip Lougher Cc: Darrick J. Wong Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: Hugh Dickins Cc: David S. Miller Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Mathieu Malaterre Cc: Ernesto A. Fernández Cc: Vyacheslav Dubeyko Cc: v9fs-developer@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org Cc: samba-technical@lists.samba.org Cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: cluster-devel@redhat.com Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org Cc: jfs-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: ocfs2-devel@oss.oracle.com Cc: devel@lists.orangefs.org Cc: reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4, 4.9, 4.14 & 4.19 NB: this is a desired feature --- v12 + v13: - Rebase v11: - add sb argument to ovl_revert_creds to match future work v10: - Rebase (and expand because of increased revert_cred usage) v9: - Add to the caveats v8: - drop pr_warn message after straw poll to remove it. - added a use case in the commit message v7: - change name of internal parameter to ovl_override_creds_def - report override_creds only if different than default v6: - Drop CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS. - Do better with the documentation. - pr_warn message adjusted to report consequences. v5: - beefed up the caveats in the Documentation - Is dependent on "overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh" "overlayfs: check CAP_MKNOD before issuing vfs_whiteout" - Added prwarn when override_creds=off v4: - spelling and grammar errors in text v3: - Change name from caller_credentials / creator_credentials to the boolean override_creds. - Changed from creator to mounter credentials. - Updated and fortified the documentation. - Added CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS v2: - Forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error. - altered commit message. --- Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 2 +- fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 11 ++++++----- fs/overlayfs/file.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 18 +++++++++--------- fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 6 +++--- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 1 + fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 1 + fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 4 ++-- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++- fs/overlayfs/util.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 11 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt index 1da2f1668f08..d48125076602 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt @@ -102,6 +102,29 @@ Only the lists of names from directories are merged. Other content such as metadata and extended attributes are reported for the upper directory only. These attributes of the lower directory are hidden. +credentials +----------- + +By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the +recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are +checked against the caller's credentials. + +In the case where caller MAC or DAC credentials do not overlap, a +use case available in older versions of the driver, the +override_creds mount flag can be turned off and help when the use +pattern has caller with legitimate credentials where the mounter +does not. Several unintended side effects will occur though. The +caller without certain key capabilities or lower privilege will not +always be able to delete files or directories, create nodes, or +search some restricted directories. The ability to search and read +a directory entry is spotty as a result of the cache mechanism not +retesting the credentials because of the assumption, a privileged +caller can fill cache, then a lower privilege can read the directory +cache. The uneven security model where cache, upperdir and workdir +are opened at privilege, but accessed without creating a form of +privilege escalation, should only be used with strict understanding +of the side effects and of the security policies. + whiteouts and opaque directories -------------------------------- diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c index b801c6353100..1c1b9415e533 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c @@ -886,7 +886,7 @@ int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags) dput(parent); dput(next); } - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(dentry->d_sb, old_cred); return err; } diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c index 702aa63f6774..49b8ffc1294f 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c @@ -563,7 +563,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid; if (!attr->hardlink) { err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry, - attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred, + attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, + old_cred ? old_cred : current_cred(), override_cred); if (err) { put_cred(override_cred); @@ -579,7 +580,7 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, attr); } out_revert_creds: - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(dentry->d_sb, old_cred); return err; } @@ -655,7 +656,7 @@ static int ovl_set_link_redirect(struct dentry *dentry) old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); err = ovl_set_redirect(dentry, false); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(dentry->d_sb, old_cred); return err; } @@ -851,7 +852,7 @@ static int ovl_do_remove(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir) err = ovl_remove_upper(dentry, is_dir, &list); else err = ovl_remove_and_whiteout(dentry, &list); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(dentry->d_sb, old_cred); if (!err) { if (is_dir) clear_nlink(dentry->d_inode); @@ -1221,7 +1222,7 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct inode *olddir, struct dentry *old, out_unlock: unlock_rename(new_upperdir, old_upperdir); out_revert_creds: - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(old->d_sb, old_cred); if (update_nlink) ovl_nlink_end(new); out_drop_write: diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/file.c b/fs/overlayfs/file.c index e235a635d9ec..d94d6ec785a7 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/file.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/file.c @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file, old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); realfile = open_with_fake_path(&file->f_path, flags, realinode, current_cred()); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(inode->i_sb, old_cred); pr_debug("open(%p[%pD2/%c], 0%o) -> (%p, 0%o)\n", file, file, ovl_whatisit(inode, realinode), file->f_flags, @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static loff_t ovl_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence) old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); ret = vfs_llseek(real.file, offset, whence); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(inode->i_sb, old_cred); file->f_pos = real.file->f_pos; inode_unlock(inode); @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static ssize_t ovl_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb); ret = vfs_iter_read(real.file, iter, &iocb->ki_pos, ovl_iocb_to_rwf(iocb)); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb, old_cred); ovl_file_accessed(file); @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ static ssize_t ovl_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) ret = vfs_iter_write(real.file, iter, &iocb->ki_pos, ovl_iocb_to_rwf(iocb)); file_end_write(real.file); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb, old_cred); /* Update size */ ovl_copyattr(ovl_inode_real(inode), inode); @@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static int ovl_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync) if (file_inode(real.file) == ovl_inode_upper(file_inode(file))) { old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb); ret = vfs_fsync_range(real.file, start, end, datasync); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb, old_cred); } fdput(real); @@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static int ovl_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb); ret = call_mmap(vma->vm_file, vma); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb, old_cred); if (ret) { /* Drop reference count from new vm_file value */ @@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ static long ovl_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb); ret = vfs_fallocate(real.file, mode, offset, len); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb, old_cred); /* Update size */ ovl_copyattr(ovl_inode_real(inode), inode); @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ static int ovl_fadvise(struct file *file, loff_t offset, loff_t len, int advice) old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb); ret = vfs_fadvise(real.file, offset, len, advice); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb, old_cred); fdput(real); @@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static long ovl_real_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb); ret = vfs_ioctl(real.file, cmd, arg); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb, old_cred); fdput(real); @@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ static loff_t ovl_copyfile(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in, flags); break; } - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(file_inode(file_out)->i_sb, old_cred); /* Update size */ ovl_copyattr(ovl_inode_real(inode_out), inode_out); diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c index 1bf11ae44313..fc1828aa30ed 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) inode_lock(upperdentry->d_inode); old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); err = notify_change(upperdentry, attr, NULL); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(dentry->d_sb, old_cred); if (!err) ovl_copyattr(upperdentry->d_inode, dentry->d_inode); inode_unlock(upperdentry->d_inode); @@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ int ovl_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, stat->nlink = dentry->d_inode->i_nlink; out: - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(dentry->d_sb, old_cred); return err; } @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) mask |= MAY_READ; } err = inode_permission(realinode, mask); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(inode->i_sb, old_cred); return err; } @@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static const char *ovl_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); p = vfs_get_link(ovl_dentry_real(dentry), done); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(dentry->d_sb, old_cred); return p; } @@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, WARN_ON(flags != XATTR_REPLACE); err = vfs_removexattr(realdentry, name); } - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(dentry->d_sb, old_cred); /* copy c/mtime */ ovl_copyattr(d_inode(realdentry), inode); @@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); res = __vfs_getxattr(realdentry, d_inode(realdentry), name, value, size, flags); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(dentry->d_sb, old_cred); return res; } @@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size) old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); res = vfs_listxattr(realdentry, list, size); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(dentry->d_sb, old_cred); if (res <= 0 || size == 0) return res; @@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type) old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); acl = get_acl(realinode, type); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(inode->i_sb, old_cred); return acl; } @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static int ovl_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo, filemap_write_and_wait(realinode->i_mapping); err = realinode->i_op->fiemap(realinode, fieinfo, start, len); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(inode->i_sb, old_cred); return err; } diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c index a4a452c489fa..bab1f97dc201 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c @@ -1079,7 +1079,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, goto out_free_oe; } - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(dentry->d_sb, old_cred); if (origin_path) { dput(origin_path->dentry); kfree(origin_path); @@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, kfree(upperredirect); out: kfree(d.redirect); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(dentry->d_sb, old_cred); return ERR_PTR(err); } @@ -1160,7 +1160,7 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry) dput(this); } } - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(dentry->d_sb, old_cred); return positive; } diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h index 9d26d8758513..ad1a11e7ecbd 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h @@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ int ovl_want_write(struct dentry *dentry); void ovl_drop_write(struct dentry *dentry); struct dentry *ovl_workdir(struct dentry *dentry); const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb); +void ovl_revert_creds(struct super_block *sb, const struct cred *oldcred); ssize_t ovl_do_vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *buf, size_t size); struct super_block *ovl_same_sb(struct super_block *sb); diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h index 28a2d12a1029..2637c5aadf7f 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h +++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ struct ovl_config { bool nfs_export; int xino; bool metacopy; + bool override_creds; }; struct ovl_sb { diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c index 47a91c9733a5..874a1b3ff99a 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static int ovl_check_whiteouts(struct dentry *dir, struct ovl_readdir_data *rdd) } inode_unlock(dir->d_inode); } - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(rdd->dentry->d_sb, old_cred); return err; } @@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ int ovl_check_empty_dir(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list) old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); err = ovl_dir_read_merged(dentry, list, &root); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(dentry->d_sb, old_cred); if (err) return err; diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c index 6f041e1fceda..2c1278451f38 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c @@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ module_param_named(xino_auto, ovl_xino_auto_def, bool, 0644); MODULE_PARM_DESC(xino_auto, "Auto enable xino feature"); +static bool __read_mostly ovl_override_creds_def = true; +module_param_named(override_creds, ovl_override_creds_def, bool, 0644); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(ovl_override_creds_def, + "Use mounter's credentials for accesses"); + static void ovl_entry_stack_free(struct ovl_entry *oe) { unsigned int i; @@ -362,6 +367,9 @@ static int ovl_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *dentry) if (ofs->config.metacopy != ovl_metacopy_def) seq_printf(m, ",metacopy=%s", ofs->config.metacopy ? "on" : "off"); + if (ofs->config.override_creds != ovl_override_creds_def) + seq_show_option(m, "override_creds", + ofs->config.override_creds ? "on" : "off"); return 0; } @@ -402,6 +410,8 @@ enum { OPT_XINO_AUTO, OPT_METACOPY_ON, OPT_METACOPY_OFF, + OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_ON, + OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_OFF, OPT_ERR, }; @@ -420,6 +430,8 @@ static const match_table_t ovl_tokens = { {OPT_XINO_AUTO, "xino=auto"}, {OPT_METACOPY_ON, "metacopy=on"}, {OPT_METACOPY_OFF, "metacopy=off"}, + {OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_ON, "override_creds=on"}, + {OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_OFF, "override_creds=off"}, {OPT_ERR, NULL} }; @@ -478,6 +490,7 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config) config->redirect_mode = kstrdup(ovl_redirect_mode_def(), GFP_KERNEL); if (!config->redirect_mode) return -ENOMEM; + config->override_creds = ovl_override_creds_def; while ((p = ovl_next_opt(&opt)) != NULL) { int token; @@ -558,6 +571,14 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config) config->metacopy = false; break; + case OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_ON: + config->override_creds = true; + break; + + case OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_OFF: + config->override_creds = false; + break; + default: pr_err("overlayfs: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" or missing value\n", p); return -EINVAL; @@ -1674,7 +1695,6 @@ static int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) ovl_dentry_lower(root_dentry), NULL); sb->s_root = root_dentry; - return 0; out_free_oe: diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c index c588c0d66d8c..9e97e785e44c 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c @@ -37,9 +37,17 @@ const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb) { struct ovl_fs *ofs = sb->s_fs_info; + if (!ofs->config.override_creds) + return NULL; return override_creds(ofs->creator_cred); } +void ovl_revert_creds(struct super_block *sb, const struct cred *old_cred) +{ + if (old_cred) + revert_creds(old_cred); +} + ssize_t ovl_do_vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *buf, size_t size) { @@ -798,7 +806,7 @@ int ovl_nlink_start(struct dentry *dentry) * value relative to the upper inode nlink in an upper inode xattr. */ err = ovl_set_nlink_upper(dentry); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(dentry->d_sb, old_cred); out: if (err) @@ -816,7 +824,7 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry) old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); ovl_cleanup_index(dentry); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(dentry->d_sb, old_cred); } ovl_inode_unlock(inode);