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David Alan Gilbert" , , , , , Brijesh Singh Subject: [PATCH v9 41/43] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2022 11:18:02 -0600 Message-ID: <20220128171804.569796-42-brijesh.singh@amd.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20220128171804.569796-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> References: <20220128171804.569796-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [10.180.168.240] X-ClientProxiedBy: SATLEXMB03.amd.com (10.181.40.144) To SATLEXMB04.amd.com (10.181.40.145) X-EOPAttributedMessage: 0 X-MS-PublicTrafficType: Email X-MS-Office365-Filtering-Correlation-Id: de2d1f45-07ef-46bd-a256-08d9e28257ff X-MS-TrafficTypeDiagnostic: DM5PR12MB1643:EE_ X-Microsoft-Antispam-PRVS: X-MS-Oob-TLC-OOBClassifiers: OLM:4714; X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck: 1 X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-Relay: 0 X-Microsoft-Antispam: BCL:0; X-Microsoft-Antispam-Message-Info: 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 X-Forefront-Antispam-Report: CIP:165.204.84.17;CTRY:US;LANG:en;SCL:1;SRV:;IPV:CAL;SFV:NSPM;H:SATLEXMB04.amd.com;PTR:InfoDomainNonexistent;CAT:NONE;SFS:(13230001)(4636009)(40470700004)(46966006)(36840700001)(36756003)(83380400001)(4326008)(508600001)(426003)(30864003)(336012)(5660300002)(81166007)(7696005)(44832011)(7416002)(7406005)(2906002)(86362001)(8676002)(316002)(2616005)(16526019)(186003)(26005)(1076003)(356005)(6666004)(70206006)(40460700003)(47076005)(70586007)(966005)(54906003)(36860700001)(8936002)(82310400004)(84970400001)(110136005)(36900700001)(2101003)(20210929001);DIR:OUT;SFP:1101; X-OriginatorOrg: amd.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 28 Jan 2022 17:19:29.8382 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: de2d1f45-07ef-46bd-a256-08d9e28257ff X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalAttributedTenantConnectingIp: TenantId=3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d;Ip=[165.204.84.17];Helo=[SATLEXMB04.amd.com] X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: DM6NAM11FT021.eop-nam11.prod.protection.outlook.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Anonymous X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: HybridOnPrem X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: DM5PR12MB1643 X-Rspamd-Server: rspam07 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 5F0FC40015 X-Stat-Signature: h5h4h9bejqijye3i3qsj48aidtmhppj6 X-Rspam-User: nil Authentication-Results: imf17.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=amd.com header.s=selector1 header.b=2gqLH5rl; spf=pass (imf17.hostedemail.com: domain of brijesh.singh@amd.com designates 40.107.237.59 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=brijesh.singh@amd.com; dmarc=pass (policy=quarantine) header.from=amd.com X-HE-Tag: 1643390372-193254 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: SEV-SNP specification provides the guest a mechanism to communicate with the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to read, alter, drop or replay the messages sent. The driver uses snp_issue_guest_request() to issue GHCB SNP_GUEST_REQUEST or SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST NAE events to submit the request to PSP. The PSP requires that all communication should be encrypted using key specified through the platform_data. The userspace can use SNP_GET_REPORT ioctl() to query the guest attestation report. See SEV-SNP spec section Guest Messages for more details. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh Reviewed-by: Peter Gonda --- Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst | 81 ++++ drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig | 12 + drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.c | 605 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.h | 98 +++++ include/uapi/linux/sev-guest.h | 50 +++ 8 files changed, 852 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.c create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.h create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/sev-guest.h diff --git a/Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst b/Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..47ef3b0821d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +=================================================================== +The Definitive SEV Guest API Documentation +=================================================================== + +1. General description +====================== + +The SEV API is a set of ioctls that are used by the guest or hypervisor +to get or set certain aspect of the SEV virtual machine. The ioctls belong +to the following classes: + + - Hypervisor ioctls: These query and set global attributes which affect the + whole SEV firmware. These ioctl are used by platform provision tools. + + - Guest ioctls: These query and set attributes of the SEV virtual machine. + +2. API description +================== + +This section describes ioctls that can be used to query or set SEV guests. +For each ioctl, the following information is provided along with a +description: + + Technology: + which SEV technology provides this ioctl. sev, sev-es, sev-snp or all. + + Type: + hypervisor or guest. The ioctl can be used inside the guest or the + hypervisor. + + Parameters: + what parameters are accepted by the ioctl. + + Returns: + the return value. General error numbers (ENOMEM, EINVAL) + are not detailed, but errors with specific meanings are. + +The guest ioctl should be issued on a file descriptor of the /dev/sev-guest device. +The ioctl accepts struct snp_user_guest_request. The input and output structure is +specified through the req_data and resp_data field respectively. If the ioctl fails +to execute due to a firmware error, then fw_err code will be set otherwise the +fw_err will be set to 0xff. + +:: + struct snp_guest_request_ioctl { + /* Message version number */ + __u32 msg_version; + + /* Request and response structure address */ + __u64 req_data; + __u64 resp_data; + + /* firmware error code on failure (see psp-sev.h) */ + __u64 fw_err; + }; + +2.1 SNP_GET_REPORT +------------------ + +:Technology: sev-snp +:Type: guest ioctl +:Parameters (in): struct snp_report_req +:Returns (out): struct snp_report_resp on success, -negative on error + +The SNP_GET_REPORT ioctl can be used to query the attestation report from the +SEV-SNP firmware. The ioctl uses the SNP_GUEST_REQUEST (MSG_REPORT_REQ) command +provided by the SEV-SNP firmware to query the attestation report. + +On success, the snp_report_resp.data will contains the report. The report +contain the format described in the SEV-SNP specification. See the SEV-SNP +specification for further details. + + +Reference +--------- + +SEV-SNP and GHCB specification: developer.amd.com/sev + +The driver is based on SEV-SNP firmware spec 0.9 and GHCB spec version 2.0. diff --git a/drivers/virt/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/Kconfig index 8061e8ef449f..e457e47610d3 100644 --- a/drivers/virt/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/virt/Kconfig @@ -36,4 +36,7 @@ source "drivers/virt/vboxguest/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/nitro_enclaves/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/acrn/Kconfig" + +source "drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig" + endif diff --git a/drivers/virt/Makefile b/drivers/virt/Makefile index 3e272ea60cd9..9c704a6fdcda 100644 --- a/drivers/virt/Makefile +++ b/drivers/virt/Makefile @@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-y += vboxguest/ obj-$(CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVES) += nitro_enclaves/ obj-$(CONFIG_ACRN_HSM) += acrn/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SEV_GUEST) += coco/sevguest/ diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..07ab9ec6471c --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +config SEV_GUEST + tristate "AMD SEV Guest driver" + default y + depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT && CRYPTO_AEAD2 + help + SEV-SNP firmware provides the guest a mechanism to communicate with + the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to read, + alter, drop or replay the messages sent. The driver provides + userspace interface to communicate with the PSP to request the + attestation report and more. + + If you choose 'M' here, this module will be called sevguest. diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Makefile b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b1ffb2b4177b --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +obj-$(CONFIG_SEV_GUEST) += sevguest.o diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6dc0785ddd4b --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.c @@ -0,0 +1,605 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) guest request interface + * + * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. + * + * Author: Brijesh Singh + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "sevguest.h" + +#define DEVICE_NAME "sev-guest" +#define AAD_LEN 48 +#define MSG_HDR_VER 1 + +struct snp_guest_crypto { + struct crypto_aead *tfm; + u8 *iv, *authtag; + int iv_len, a_len; +}; + +struct snp_guest_dev { + struct device *dev; + struct miscdevice misc; + + struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto; + struct snp_guest_msg *request, *response; + struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout; + struct snp_req_data input; + u32 *os_area_msg_seqno; + u8 *vmpck; +}; + +static u32 vmpck_id; +module_param(vmpck_id, uint, 0444); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(vmpck_id, "The VMPCK ID to use when communicating with the PSP."); + +static DEFINE_MUTEX(snp_cmd_mutex); + +static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +{ + char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN] = {0}; + + if (snp_dev->vmpck) + return memcmp(snp_dev->vmpck, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN) == 0; + + return true; +} + +static void snp_disable_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +{ + memzero_explicit(snp_dev->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); + snp_dev->vmpck = NULL; +} + +static inline u64 __snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +{ + u64 count; + + lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex); + + /* Read the current message sequence counter from secrets pages */ + count = *snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno; + + return count + 1; +} + +/* Return a non-zero on success */ +static u64 snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +{ + u64 count = __snp_get_msg_seqno(snp_dev); + + /* + * The message sequence counter for the SNP guest request is a 64-bit + * value but the version 2 of GHCB specification defines a 32-bit storage + * for it. If the counter exceeds the 32-bit value then return zero. + * The caller should check the return value, but if the caller happens to + * not check the value and use it, then the firmware treats zero as an + * invalid number and will fail the message request. + */ + if (count >= UINT_MAX) { + pr_err_ratelimited("SNP guest request message sequence counter overflow\n"); + return 0; + } + + return count; +} + +static void snp_inc_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +{ + /* + * The counter is also incremented by the PSP, so increment it by 2 + * and save in secrets page. + */ + *snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno += 2; +} + +static inline struct snp_guest_dev *to_snp_dev(struct file *file) +{ + struct miscdevice *dev = file->private_data; + + return container_of(dev, struct snp_guest_dev, misc); +} + +static struct snp_guest_crypto *init_crypto(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u8 *key, size_t keylen) +{ + struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto; + + crypto = kzalloc(sizeof(*crypto), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!crypto) + return NULL; + + crypto->tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(crypto->tfm)) + goto e_free; + + if (crypto_aead_setkey(crypto->tfm, key, keylen)) + goto e_free_crypto; + + crypto->iv_len = crypto_aead_ivsize(crypto->tfm); + if (crypto->iv_len < 12) { + dev_err(snp_dev->dev, "IV length is less than 12.\n"); + goto e_free_crypto; + } + + crypto->iv = kmalloc(crypto->iv_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!crypto->iv) + goto e_free_crypto; + + if (crypto_aead_authsize(crypto->tfm) > MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN) { + if (crypto_aead_setauthsize(crypto->tfm, MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN)) { + dev_err(snp_dev->dev, "failed to set authsize to %d\n", MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN); + goto e_free_crypto; + } + } + + crypto->a_len = crypto_aead_authsize(crypto->tfm); + crypto->authtag = kmalloc(crypto->a_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!crypto->authtag) + goto e_free_crypto; + + return crypto; + +e_free_crypto: + crypto_free_aead(crypto->tfm); +e_free: + kfree(crypto->iv); + kfree(crypto->authtag); + kfree(crypto); + + return NULL; +} + +static void deinit_crypto(struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto) +{ + crypto_free_aead(crypto->tfm); + kfree(crypto->iv); + kfree(crypto->authtag); + kfree(crypto); +} + +static int enc_dec_message(struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto, struct snp_guest_msg *msg, + u8 *src_buf, u8 *dst_buf, size_t len, bool enc) +{ + struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *hdr = &msg->hdr; + struct scatterlist src[3], dst[3]; + DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); + struct aead_request *req; + int ret; + + req = aead_request_alloc(crypto->tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* + * AEAD memory operations: + * +------ AAD -------+------- DATA -----+---- AUTHTAG----+ + * | msg header | plaintext | hdr->authtag | + * | bytes 30h - 5Fh | or | | + * | | cipher | | + * +------------------+------------------+----------------+ + */ + sg_init_table(src, 3); + sg_set_buf(&src[0], &hdr->algo, AAD_LEN); + sg_set_buf(&src[1], src_buf, hdr->msg_sz); + sg_set_buf(&src[2], hdr->authtag, crypto->a_len); + + sg_init_table(dst, 3); + sg_set_buf(&dst[0], &hdr->algo, AAD_LEN); + sg_set_buf(&dst[1], dst_buf, hdr->msg_sz); + sg_set_buf(&dst[2], hdr->authtag, crypto->a_len); + + aead_request_set_ad(req, AAD_LEN); + aead_request_set_tfm(req, crypto->tfm); + aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, crypto_req_done, &wait); + + aead_request_set_crypt(req, src, dst, len, crypto->iv); + ret = crypto_wait_req(enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req), &wait); + + aead_request_free(req); + return ret; +} + +static int __enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_msg *msg, + void *plaintext, size_t len) +{ + struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto; + struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *hdr = &msg->hdr; + + memset(crypto->iv, 0, crypto->iv_len); + memcpy(crypto->iv, &hdr->msg_seqno, sizeof(hdr->msg_seqno)); + + return enc_dec_message(crypto, msg, plaintext, msg->payload, len, true); +} + +static int dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_msg *msg, + void *plaintext, size_t len) +{ + struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto; + struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *hdr = &msg->hdr; + + /* Build IV with response buffer sequence number */ + memset(crypto->iv, 0, crypto->iv_len); + memcpy(crypto->iv, &hdr->msg_seqno, sizeof(hdr->msg_seqno)); + + return enc_dec_message(crypto, msg, msg->payload, plaintext, len, false); +} + +static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, void *payload, u32 sz) +{ + struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto; + struct snp_guest_msg *resp = snp_dev->response; + struct snp_guest_msg *req = snp_dev->request; + struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *req_hdr = &req->hdr; + struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *resp_hdr = &resp->hdr; + + dev_dbg(snp_dev->dev, "response [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n", + resp_hdr->msg_seqno, resp_hdr->msg_type, resp_hdr->msg_version, resp_hdr->msg_sz); + + /* Verify that the sequence counter is incremented by 1 */ + if (unlikely(resp_hdr->msg_seqno != (req_hdr->msg_seqno + 1))) + return -EBADMSG; + + /* Verify response message type and version number. */ + if (resp_hdr->msg_type != (req_hdr->msg_type + 1) || + resp_hdr->msg_version != req_hdr->msg_version) + return -EBADMSG; + + /* + * If the message size is greater than our buffer length then return + * an error. + */ + if (unlikely((resp_hdr->msg_sz + crypto->a_len) > sz)) + return -EBADMSG; + + /* Decrypt the payload */ + return dec_payload(snp_dev, resp, payload, resp_hdr->msg_sz + crypto->a_len); +} + +static bool enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 seqno, int version, u8 type, + void *payload, size_t sz) +{ + struct snp_guest_msg *req = snp_dev->request; + struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *hdr = &req->hdr; + + memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req)); + + hdr->algo = SNP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM; + hdr->hdr_version = MSG_HDR_VER; + hdr->hdr_sz = sizeof(*hdr); + hdr->msg_type = type; + hdr->msg_version = version; + hdr->msg_seqno = seqno; + hdr->msg_vmpck = vmpck_id; + hdr->msg_sz = sz; + + /* Verify the sequence number is non-zero */ + if (!hdr->msg_seqno) + return -ENOSR; + + dev_dbg(snp_dev->dev, "request [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n", + hdr->msg_seqno, hdr->msg_type, hdr->msg_version, hdr->msg_sz); + + return __enc_payload(snp_dev, req, payload, sz); +} + +static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, int msg_ver, + u8 type, void *req_buf, size_t req_sz, void *resp_buf, + u32 resp_sz, __u64 *fw_err) +{ + unsigned long err; + u64 seqno; + int rc; + + /* Get message sequence and verify that its a non-zero */ + seqno = snp_get_msg_seqno(snp_dev); + if (!seqno) + return -EIO; + + memset(snp_dev->response, 0, sizeof(*snp_dev->response)); + + /* Encrypt the userspace provided payload */ + rc = enc_payload(snp_dev, seqno, msg_ver, type, req_buf, req_sz); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* Call firmware to process the request */ + rc = snp_issue_guest_request(exit_code, &snp_dev->input, &err); + if (fw_err) + *fw_err = err; + + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = verify_and_dec_payload(snp_dev, resp_buf, resp_sz); + if (rc) { + /* + * The verify_and_dec_payload() will fail only if the hypervisor is + * actively modifying the message header or corrupting the encrypted payload. + * This hints that hypervisor is acting in a bad faith. Disable the VMPCK so that + * the key cannot be used for any communication. The key is disabled to ensure + * that AES-GCM does not use the same IV while encrypting the request payload. + */ + dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, + "Detected unexpected decode failure, disabling the vmpck_id %d\n", + vmpck_id); + snp_disable_vmpck(snp_dev); + return rc; + } + + /* Increment to new message sequence after payload decryption was successful. */ + snp_inc_msg_seqno(snp_dev); + + return 0; +} + +static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg) +{ + struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto; + struct snp_report_req req = {0}; + struct snp_report_resp *resp; + int rc, resp_len; + + if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Copy the request payload from userspace */ + if (copy_from_user(&req, (void __user *)arg->req_data, sizeof(req))) + return -EFAULT; + + /* + * The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the + * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the + * authtag. + */ + resp_len = sizeof(resp->data) + crypto->a_len; + resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!resp) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* Issue the command to get the attestation report */ + rc = handle_guest_request(snp_dev, SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST, arg->msg_version, + SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ, &req, sizeof(req), resp->data, + resp_len, &arg->fw_err); + if (rc) + goto e_free; + + /* Copy the response payload to userspace */ + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, resp, sizeof(*resp))) + rc = -EFAULT; + +e_free: + kfree(resp); + return rc; +} + +static long snp_guest_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg) +{ + struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev = to_snp_dev(file); + void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg; + struct snp_guest_request_ioctl input; + int ret = -ENOTTY; + + if (copy_from_user(&input, argp, sizeof(input))) + return -EFAULT; + + input.fw_err = 0xff; + + /* Message version must be non-zero */ + if (!input.msg_version) + return -EINVAL; + + mutex_lock(&snp_cmd_mutex); + + /* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */ + if (is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) { + dev_err_ratelimited(snp_dev->dev, "VMPCK is disabled\n"); + mutex_unlock(&snp_cmd_mutex); + return -ENOTTY; + } + + switch (ioctl) { + case SNP_GET_REPORT: + ret = get_report(snp_dev, &input); + break; + default: + break; + } + + mutex_unlock(&snp_cmd_mutex); + + if (input.fw_err && copy_to_user(argp, &input, sizeof(input))) + return -EFAULT; + + return ret; +} + +static void free_shared_pages(void *buf, size_t sz) +{ + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + + if (!buf) + return; + + /* If fail to restore the encryption mask then leak it. */ + if (WARN_ONCE(set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)buf, npages), + "Failed to restore encryption mask (leak it)\n")) + return; + + __free_pages(virt_to_page(buf), get_order(sz)); +} + +static void *alloc_shared_pages(size_t sz) +{ + unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + struct page *page; + int ret; + + page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, get_order(sz)); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return NULL; + + ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)page_address(page), npages); + if (ret) { + pr_err("SEV-SNP: failed to mark page shared, ret=%d\n", ret); + __free_pages(page, get_order(sz)); + return NULL; + } + + return page_address(page); +} + +static const struct file_operations snp_guest_fops = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .unlocked_ioctl = snp_guest_ioctl, +}; + +static u8 *get_vmpck(int id, struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout, u32 **seqno) +{ + u8 *key = NULL; + + switch (id) { + case 0: + *seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_0; + key = layout->vmpck0; + break; + case 1: + *seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_1; + key = layout->vmpck1; + break; + case 2: + *seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_2; + key = layout->vmpck2; + break; + case 3: + *seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_3; + key = layout->vmpck3; + break; + default: + break; + } + + return key; +} + +static int __init snp_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) +{ + struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout; + struct snp_guest_platform_data *data; + struct device *dev = &pdev->dev; + struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev; + struct miscdevice *misc; + int ret; + + if (!dev->platform_data) + return -ENODEV; + + data = (struct snp_guest_platform_data *)dev->platform_data; + layout = (__force void *)ioremap_encrypted(data->secrets_gpa, PAGE_SIZE); + if (!layout) + return -ENODEV; + + ret = -ENOMEM; + snp_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_dev), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!snp_dev) + goto e_fail; + + ret = -EINVAL; + snp_dev->vmpck = get_vmpck(vmpck_id, layout, &snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno); + if (!snp_dev->vmpck) { + dev_err(dev, "invalid vmpck id %d\n", vmpck_id); + goto e_fail; + } + + /* Verify that VMPCK is not zero. */ + if (is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) { + dev_err(dev, "vmpck id %d is null\n", vmpck_id); + goto e_fail; + } + + platform_set_drvdata(pdev, snp_dev); + snp_dev->dev = dev; + snp_dev->layout = layout; + + /* Allocate the shared page used for the request and response message. */ + snp_dev->request = alloc_shared_pages(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); + if (!snp_dev->request) + goto e_fail; + + snp_dev->response = alloc_shared_pages(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); + if (!snp_dev->response) + goto e_fail; + + ret = -EIO; + snp_dev->crypto = init_crypto(snp_dev, snp_dev->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); + if (!snp_dev->crypto) + goto e_fail; + + misc = &snp_dev->misc; + misc->minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR; + misc->name = DEVICE_NAME; + misc->fops = &snp_guest_fops; + + /* initial the input address for guest request */ + snp_dev->input.req_gpa = __pa(snp_dev->request); + snp_dev->input.resp_gpa = __pa(snp_dev->response); + + ret = misc_register(misc); + if (ret) + goto e_fail; + + dev_info(dev, "Initialized SEV-SNP guest driver (using vmpck_id %d)\n", vmpck_id); + return 0; + +e_fail: + iounmap(layout); + free_shared_pages(snp_dev->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); + free_shared_pages(snp_dev->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); + + return ret; +} + +static int __exit snp_guest_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) +{ + struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); + + free_shared_pages(snp_dev->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); + free_shared_pages(snp_dev->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); + deinit_crypto(snp_dev->crypto); + misc_deregister(&snp_dev->misc); + + return 0; +} + +static struct platform_driver snp_guest_driver = { + .remove = __exit_p(snp_guest_remove), + .driver = { + .name = "snp-guest", + }, +}; + +module_platform_driver_probe(snp_guest_driver, snp_guest_probe); + +MODULE_AUTHOR("Brijesh Singh "); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_VERSION("1.0.0"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AMD SNP Guest Driver"); diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.h b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cfa76cf8a21a --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.h @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. + * + * Author: Brijesh Singh + * + * SEV-SNP API spec is available at https://developer.amd.com/sev + */ + +#ifndef __LINUX_SEVGUEST_H_ +#define __LINUX_SEVGUEST_H_ + +#include + +#define MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN 32 + +/* See SNP spec SNP_GUEST_REQUEST section for the structure */ +enum msg_type { + SNP_MSG_TYPE_INVALID = 0, + SNP_MSG_CPUID_REQ, + SNP_MSG_CPUID_RSP, + SNP_MSG_KEY_REQ, + SNP_MSG_KEY_RSP, + SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ, + SNP_MSG_REPORT_RSP, + SNP_MSG_EXPORT_REQ, + SNP_MSG_EXPORT_RSP, + SNP_MSG_IMPORT_REQ, + SNP_MSG_IMPORT_RSP, + SNP_MSG_ABSORB_REQ, + SNP_MSG_ABSORB_RSP, + SNP_MSG_VMRK_REQ, + SNP_MSG_VMRK_RSP, + + SNP_MSG_TYPE_MAX +}; + +enum aead_algo { + SNP_AEAD_INVALID, + SNP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM, +}; + +struct snp_guest_msg_hdr { + u8 authtag[MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN]; + u64 msg_seqno; + u8 rsvd1[8]; + u8 algo; + u8 hdr_version; + u16 hdr_sz; + u8 msg_type; + u8 msg_version; + u16 msg_sz; + u32 rsvd2; + u8 msg_vmpck; + u8 rsvd3[35]; +} __packed; + +struct snp_guest_msg { + struct snp_guest_msg_hdr hdr; + u8 payload[4000]; +} __packed; + +/* + * The secrets page contains 96-bytes of reserved field that can be used by + * the guest OS. The guest OS uses the area to save the message sequence + * number for each VMPCK. + * + * See the GHCB spec section Secret page layout for the format for this area. + */ +struct secrets_os_area { + u32 msg_seqno_0; + u32 msg_seqno_1; + u32 msg_seqno_2; + u32 msg_seqno_3; + u64 ap_jump_table_pa; + u8 rsvd[40]; + u8 guest_usage[32]; +} __packed; + +#define VMPCK_KEY_LEN 32 + +/* See the SNP spec version 0.9 for secrets page format */ +struct snp_secrets_page_layout { + u32 version; + u32 imien : 1, + rsvd1 : 31; + u32 fms; + u32 rsvd2; + u8 gosvw[16]; + u8 vmpck0[VMPCK_KEY_LEN]; + u8 vmpck1[VMPCK_KEY_LEN]; + u8 vmpck2[VMPCK_KEY_LEN]; + u8 vmpck3[VMPCK_KEY_LEN]; + struct secrets_os_area os_area; + u8 rsvd3[3840]; +} __packed; + +#endif /* __LINUX_SNP_GUEST_H__ */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sev-guest.h b/include/uapi/linux/sev-guest.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..081d314a6279 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/uapi/linux/sev-guest.h @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +/* + * Userspace interface for AMD SEV and SEV-SNP guest driver. + * + * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. + * + * Author: Brijesh Singh + * + * SEV API specification is available at: https://developer.amd.com/sev/ + */ + +#ifndef __UAPI_LINUX_SEV_GUEST_H_ +#define __UAPI_LINUX_SEV_GUEST_H_ + +#include + +struct snp_report_req { + /* user data that should be included in the report */ + __u8 user_data[64]; + + /* The vmpl level to be included in the report */ + __u32 vmpl; + + /* Must be zero filled */ + __u8 rsvd[28]; +}; + +struct snp_report_resp { + /* response data, see SEV-SNP spec for the format */ + __u8 data[4000]; +}; + +struct snp_guest_request_ioctl { + /* message version number (must be non-zero) */ + __u8 msg_version; + + /* Request and response structure address */ + __u64 req_data; + __u64 resp_data; + + /* firmware error code on failure (see psp-sev.h) */ + __u64 fw_err; +}; + +#define SNP_GUEST_REQ_IOC_TYPE 'S' + +/* Get SNP attestation report */ +#define SNP_GET_REPORT _IOWR(SNP_GUEST_REQ_IOC_TYPE, 0x0, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl) + +#endif /* __UAPI_LINUX_SEV_GUEST_H_ */