diff mbox series

[v2,1/4] mm: kasan: Ensure the tags are visible before the tag in page->flags

Message ID 20220610152141.2148929-2-catalin.marinas@arm.com (mailing list archive)
State New
Headers show
Series kasan: Fix ordering between MTE tag colouring and page->flags | expand

Commit Message

Catalin Marinas June 10, 2022, 3:21 p.m. UTC
__kasan_unpoison_pages() colours the memory with a random tag and stores
it in page->flags in order to re-create the tagged pointer via
page_to_virt() later. When the tag from the page->flags is read, ensure
that the in-memory tags are already visible by re-ordering the
page_kasan_tag_set() after kasan_unpoison(). The former already has
barriers in place through try_cmpxchg(). On the reader side, the order
is ensured by the address dependency between page->flags and the memory
access.

Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
---
 mm/kasan/common.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Comments

Vincenzo Frascino June 16, 2022, 8:31 a.m. UTC | #1
On 6/10/22 16:21, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> __kasan_unpoison_pages() colours the memory with a random tag and stores
> it in page->flags in order to re-create the tagged pointer via
> page_to_virt() later. When the tag from the page->flags is read, ensure
> that the in-memory tags are already visible by re-ordering the
> page_kasan_tag_set() after kasan_unpoison(). The former already has
> barriers in place through try_cmpxchg(). On the reader side, the order
> is ensured by the address dependency between page->flags and the memory
> access.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>

Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>

> ---
>  mm/kasan/common.c | 3 ++-
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index c40c0e7b3b5f..78be2beb7453 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -108,9 +108,10 @@ void __kasan_unpoison_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, bool init)
>  		return;
>  
>  	tag = kasan_random_tag();
> +	kasan_unpoison(set_tag(page_address(page), tag),
> +		       PAGE_SIZE << order, init);
>  	for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
>  		page_kasan_tag_set(page + i, tag);
> -	kasan_unpoison(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order, init);
>  }
>  
>  void __kasan_poison_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, bool init)
Will Deacon July 7, 2022, 9:22 a.m. UTC | #2
On Fri, Jun 10, 2022 at 04:21:38PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> __kasan_unpoison_pages() colours the memory with a random tag and stores
> it in page->flags in order to re-create the tagged pointer via
> page_to_virt() later. When the tag from the page->flags is read, ensure
> that the in-memory tags are already visible by re-ordering the
> page_kasan_tag_set() after kasan_unpoison(). The former already has
> barriers in place through try_cmpxchg(). On the reader side, the order
> is ensured by the address dependency between page->flags and the memory
> access.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
> ---
>  mm/kasan/common.c | 3 ++-
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index c40c0e7b3b5f..78be2beb7453 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -108,9 +108,10 @@ void __kasan_unpoison_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, bool init)
>  		return;
>  
>  	tag = kasan_random_tag();
> +	kasan_unpoison(set_tag(page_address(page), tag),
> +		       PAGE_SIZE << order, init);
>  	for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
>  		page_kasan_tag_set(page + i, tag);
> -	kasan_unpoison(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order, init);

This looks good to me, but after reading the cover letter I'm wondering
whether the try_cmpxchg() in page_kasan_tag_set() could be relaxed to
try_cmpxchg_release() as a separate optimisation?

Will
Catalin Marinas July 7, 2022, 11:44 a.m. UTC | #3
On Thu, Jul 07, 2022 at 10:22:37AM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 10, 2022 at 04:21:38PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > __kasan_unpoison_pages() colours the memory with a random tag and stores
> > it in page->flags in order to re-create the tagged pointer via
> > page_to_virt() later. When the tag from the page->flags is read, ensure
> > that the in-memory tags are already visible by re-ordering the
> > page_kasan_tag_set() after kasan_unpoison(). The former already has
> > barriers in place through try_cmpxchg(). On the reader side, the order
> > is ensured by the address dependency between page->flags and the memory
> > access.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
> > Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
> > Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
> > ---
> >  mm/kasan/common.c | 3 ++-
> >  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> > index c40c0e7b3b5f..78be2beb7453 100644
> > --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> > +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> > @@ -108,9 +108,10 @@ void __kasan_unpoison_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, bool init)
> >  		return;
> >  
> >  	tag = kasan_random_tag();
> > +	kasan_unpoison(set_tag(page_address(page), tag),
> > +		       PAGE_SIZE << order, init);
> >  	for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
> >  		page_kasan_tag_set(page + i, tag);
> > -	kasan_unpoison(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order, init);
> 
> This looks good to me, but after reading the cover letter I'm wondering
> whether the try_cmpxchg() in page_kasan_tag_set() could be relaxed to
> try_cmpxchg_release() as a separate optimisation?

I think it can be a try_cmpxchg_release() (I did not realise we have
one). I'll post a patch later today.
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index c40c0e7b3b5f..78be2beb7453 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -108,9 +108,10 @@  void __kasan_unpoison_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, bool init)
 		return;
 
 	tag = kasan_random_tag();
+	kasan_unpoison(set_tag(page_address(page), tag),
+		       PAGE_SIZE << order, init);
 	for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
 		page_kasan_tag_set(page + i, tag);
-	kasan_unpoison(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order, init);
 }
 
 void __kasan_poison_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, bool init)