@@ -17,18 +17,10 @@
struct fs_pin;
#if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) && defined(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE)
-/*
- * sysctl for vm.memfd_noexec
- * 0: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL
- * acts like MFD_EXEC was set.
- * 1: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL
- * acts like MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was set.
- * 2: memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be
- * rejected.
- */
-#define MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_EXEC 0
-#define MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEAL 1
-#define MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_ENFORCED 2
+/* modes for vm.memfd_noexec sysctl */
+#define MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_EXEC 0 /* MFD_EXEC implied if unset */
+#define MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEAL 1 /* MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL implied if unset */
+#define MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_ENFORCED 2 /* same as 1, except MFD_EXEC rejected */
#endif
struct pid_namespace {
@@ -271,30 +271,22 @@ long memfd_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned int arg)
static int check_sysctl_memfd_noexec(unsigned int *flags)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
- char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
- int sysctl = MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_EXEC;
- struct pid_namespace *ns;
-
- ns = task_active_pid_ns(current);
- if (ns)
- sysctl = ns->memfd_noexec_scope;
+ int sysctl = task_active_pid_ns(current)->memfd_noexec_scope;
if (!(*flags & (MFD_EXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL))) {
- if (sysctl == MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEAL)
+ if (sysctl >= MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEAL)
*flags |= MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL;
else
*flags |= MFD_EXEC;
}
- if (*flags & MFD_EXEC && sysctl >= MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_ENFORCED) {
- pr_warn_once(
- "memfd_create(): MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is enforced, pid=%d '%s'\n",
- task_pid_nr(current), get_task_comm(comm, current));
-
+ if (!(*flags & MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL) && sysctl >= MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_ENFORCED) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited(
+ "%s[%d]: memfd_create() requires MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL with vm.memfd_noexec=%d\n",
+ current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), sysctl);
return -EACCES;
}
#endif
-
return 0;
}
@@ -302,7 +294,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
const char __user *, uname,
unsigned int, flags)
{
- char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
unsigned int *file_seals;
struct file *file;
int fd, error;
@@ -324,13 +315,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
return -EINVAL;
if (!(flags & (MFD_EXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL))) {
- pr_warn_once(
- "memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, pid=%d '%s'\n",
- task_pid_nr(current), get_task_comm(comm, current));
+ pr_warn_ratelimited(
+ "%s[%d]: memfd_create() called without MFD_EXEC or MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL set\n",
+ current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
}
- if (check_sysctl_memfd_noexec(&flags) < 0)
- return -EACCES;
+ error = check_sysctl_memfd_noexec(&flags);
+ if (error < 0)
+ return error;
/* length includes terminating zero */
len = strnlen_user(uname, MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN + 1);
@@ -1145,11 +1145,23 @@ static void test_sysctl_child(void)
printf("%s sysctl 2\n", memfd_str);
sysctl_assert_write("2");
- mfd_fail_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2",
- MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
- mfd_fail_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2_MFD_EXEC",
- MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_EXEC);
- fd = mfd_assert_new("", 0, MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL);
+ mfd_fail_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2_exec",
+ MFD_EXEC | MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
+
+ fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2_dfl",
+ mfd_def_size,
+ MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
+ mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666);
+ mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC);
+ mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777);
+ close(fd);
+
+ fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2_noexec_seal",
+ mfd_def_size,
+ MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL | MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
+ mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666);
+ mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC);
+ mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777);
close(fd);
sysctl_fail_write("0");
The previous implementation of vm.memfd_noexec=2 did not actually enforce the usage of MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, as any program that set MFD_EXEC would not be affected by the "enforcement" mechanism. This was fixed in in Andrew's tree recently, but there were still some things that could be cleaned up. On the topic of older programs, it seems far less disruptive to have vm.memfd_noexec=2 have the same behaviour as vm.memfd_noexec=1 (default to MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL if unspecified) to avoid breaking older programs that didn't actually care about the exec bits -- which includes the vast majority of programs that use memfd_create(2), thus allowing users to be able to enable this sysctl without all older programs needlessly breaking. Otherwise vm.memfd_noexec=2 would be unusable on most general-purpose systems as it would require an audit of all of userspace. While we're at it, fix the warnings emitted by memfd_create() to use pr_warn_ratelimited(). If the intention of the warning is to get developers to switch to explicitly specifying if they want exec bits or not, you need to warn them whenever they use it. The systemd version on my box doesn't pass MFD_EXEC, making the warning useless for most userspace developers because it was already emitted during boot. Commit 105ff5339f49 ("mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC") mentions that this was switched to pr_warn_once "as per review" but I couldn't find the discussion anywhere, and the obvious issue (the ability for unprivileged userspace to spam the kernel log) should be handled by pr_warn_ratelimited. If the issue is that this is too spammy, we could tie it to using vm.memfd_noexec=1 or higher. This is a user-visible API change, but as it allows programs to do something that would be blocked before, and the sysctl itself was broken and recently released, it seems unlikely this will cause any issues. Cc: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.3+ Fixes: 105ff5339f49 ("mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC") Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> --- include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 16 +++-------- mm/memfd.c | 32 ++++++++-------------- tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 22 +++++++++++---- 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)