[v5,18/37] mm: kfence: Disable KMSAN when checking the canary

Commit Message

Ilya Leoshkevich June 19, 2024, 3:43 p.m. UTC

KMSAN warns about check_canary() accessing the canary.

The reason is that, even though set_canary() is properly instrumented
and sets shadow, slub explicitly poisons the canary's address range
afterwards.

Unpoisoning the canary is not the right thing to do: only
check_canary() is supposed to ever touch it. Instead, disable KMSAN
checks around canary read accesses.

Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[e-mail]>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[e-mail]>
---
 mm/kfence/core.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Patch

diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c
index 964b8482275b..83f8e78827c0 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/core.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
@@ -305,8 +305,14 @@  metadata_update_state(struct kfence_metadata *meta, enum kfence_object_state nex
 	WRITE_ONCE(meta->state, next);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
+#define check_canary_attributes noinline __no_kmsan_checks
+#else
+#define check_canary_attributes inline
+#endif
+
 /* Check canary byte at @addr. */
-static inline bool check_canary_byte(u8 *addr)
+static check_canary_attributes bool check_canary_byte(u8 *addr)
 {
 	struct kfence_metadata *meta;
 	unsigned long flags;
@@ -341,7 +347,8 @@  static inline void set_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
 		*((u64 *)addr) = KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN_U64;
 }
 
-static inline void check_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
+static check_canary_attributes void
+check_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
 {
 	const unsigned long pageaddr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE);
 	unsigned long addr = pageaddr;