Message ID | 4896f0fd85947a139dce0ad514044c76048eaed2.1655761627.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New |
Headers | show |
Series | Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) | expand |
On 6/21/22 01:06, Ashish Kalra wrote: > From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > > Implement a workaround for an SNP erratum where the CPU will incorrectly > signal an RMP violation #PF if a hugepage (2mb or 1gb) collides with the > RMP entry of a VMCB, VMSA or AVIC backing page. > > When SEV-SNP is globally enabled, the CPU marks the VMCB, VMSA, and AVIC > backing pages as "in-use" in the RMP after a successful VMRUN. This > is done for _all_ VMs, not just SNP-Active VMs. > > If the hypervisor accesses an in-use page through a writable > translation, the CPU will throw an RMP violation #PF. On early SNP > hardware, if an in-use page is 2mb aligned and software accesses any > part of the associated 2mb region with a hupage, the CPU will > incorrectly treat the entire 2mb region as in-use and signal a spurious > RMP violation #PF. > > The recommended is to not use the hugepage for the VMCB, VMSA or > AVIC backing page. Add a generic allocator that will ensure that the > page returns is not hugepage (2mb or 1gb) and is safe to be used when > SEV-SNP is enabled. > > Co-developed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 + > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++ > arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 5 ++++- > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++++++-- > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 + > 6 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h > index da47f60a4650..a66292dae698 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h > @@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(msr_filter_changed) > KVM_X86_OP(complete_emulated_msr) > KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector) > KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons); > +KVM_X86_OP(alloc_apic_backing_page) > > #undef KVM_X86_OP > #undef KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > index c24a72ddc93b..0205e2944067 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > @@ -1512,6 +1512,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { > * Returns vCPU specific APICv inhibit reasons > */ > unsigned long (*vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); > + > + void *(*alloc_apic_backing_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); > }; > > struct kvm_x86_nested_ops { > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c > index 66b0eb0bda94..7c7fc6c4a7f9 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c > @@ -2506,7 +2506,10 @@ int kvm_create_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int timer_advance_ns) > > vcpu->arch.apic = apic; > > - apic->regs = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); > + if (kvm_x86_ops.alloc_apic_backing_page) > + apic->regs = static_call(kvm_x86_alloc_apic_backing_page)(vcpu); > + else > + apic->regs = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); > if (!apic->regs) { > printk(KERN_ERR "malloc apic regs error for vcpu %x\n", > vcpu->vcpu_id); > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > index b49c370d5ae9..93365996bd59 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > @@ -3030,3 +3030,38 @@ void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector) > break; > } > } > + > +struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > +{ > + unsigned long pfn; > + struct page *p; > + > + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) > + return alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO); > + > + /* > + * Allocate an SNP safe page to workaround the SNP erratum where > + * the CPU will incorrectly signal an RMP violation #PF if a > + * hugepage (2mb or 1gb) collides with the RMP entry of VMCB, VMSA > + * or AVIC backing page. The recommeded workaround is to not use the > + * hugepage. > + * > + * Allocate one extra page, use a page which is not 2mb aligned > + * and free the other. > + */ > + p = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO, 1); > + if (!p) > + return NULL; > + > + split_page(p, 1); > + > + pfn = page_to_pfn(p); > + if (IS_ALIGNED(__pfn_to_phys(pfn), PMD_SIZE)) { I think you could simply IS_ALIGNED(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD), no need to expand to full phys. > + pfn++; > + __free_page(p); To avoid pfn_to_page(), drop 'pfn++' and __free_page(p++); > + } else { > + __free_page(pfn_to_page(pfn + 1)); __free_page(p+1); > + } > + > + return pfn_to_page(pfn); return p; > +} > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > index efc7623d0f90..b4bd64f94d3a 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c > @@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > svm = to_svm(vcpu); > > err = -ENOMEM; > - vmcb01_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO); > + vmcb01_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu); > if (!vmcb01_page) > goto out; > > @@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > * SEV-ES guests require a separate VMSA page used to contain > * the encrypted register state of the guest. > */ > - vmsa_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO); > + vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu); > if (!vmsa_page) > goto error_free_vmcb_page; > > @@ -4598,6 +4598,16 @@ static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) > return 0; > } > > +static void *svm_alloc_apic_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > +{ > + struct page *page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu); > + > + if (!page) > + return NULL; > + > + return page_address(page); > +} > + > static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = { > .name = "kvm_amd", > > @@ -4722,6 +4732,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = { > > .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector, > .vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = avic_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons, > + > + .alloc_apic_backing_page = svm_alloc_apic_backing_page, > }; > > /* > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > index 1f4a8bd09c9e..9672e25a338d 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > @@ -659,6 +659,7 @@ void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm); > void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector); > void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa); > void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm); > +struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); > > /* vmenter.S */ >
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h index da47f60a4650..a66292dae698 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h @@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(msr_filter_changed) KVM_X86_OP(complete_emulated_msr) KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons); +KVM_X86_OP(alloc_apic_backing_page) #undef KVM_X86_OP #undef KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index c24a72ddc93b..0205e2944067 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -1512,6 +1512,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { * Returns vCPU specific APICv inhibit reasons */ unsigned long (*vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + + void *(*alloc_apic_backing_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); }; struct kvm_x86_nested_ops { diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c index 66b0eb0bda94..7c7fc6c4a7f9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c @@ -2506,7 +2506,10 @@ int kvm_create_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int timer_advance_ns) vcpu->arch.apic = apic; - apic->regs = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (kvm_x86_ops.alloc_apic_backing_page) + apic->regs = static_call(kvm_x86_alloc_apic_backing_page)(vcpu); + else + apic->regs = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!apic->regs) { printk(KERN_ERR "malloc apic regs error for vcpu %x\n", vcpu->vcpu_id); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index b49c370d5ae9..93365996bd59 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -3030,3 +3030,38 @@ void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector) break; } } + +struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + unsigned long pfn; + struct page *p; + + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) + return alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO); + + /* + * Allocate an SNP safe page to workaround the SNP erratum where + * the CPU will incorrectly signal an RMP violation #PF if a + * hugepage (2mb or 1gb) collides with the RMP entry of VMCB, VMSA + * or AVIC backing page. The recommeded workaround is to not use the + * hugepage. + * + * Allocate one extra page, use a page which is not 2mb aligned + * and free the other. + */ + p = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO, 1); + if (!p) + return NULL; + + split_page(p, 1); + + pfn = page_to_pfn(p); + if (IS_ALIGNED(__pfn_to_phys(pfn), PMD_SIZE)) { + pfn++; + __free_page(p); + } else { + __free_page(pfn_to_page(pfn + 1)); + } + + return pfn_to_page(pfn); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index efc7623d0f90..b4bd64f94d3a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) svm = to_svm(vcpu); err = -ENOMEM; - vmcb01_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO); + vmcb01_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu); if (!vmcb01_page) goto out; @@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * SEV-ES guests require a separate VMSA page used to contain * the encrypted register state of the guest. */ - vmsa_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO); + vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu); if (!vmsa_page) goto error_free_vmcb_page; @@ -4598,6 +4598,16 @@ static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) return 0; } +static void *svm_alloc_apic_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct page *page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu); + + if (!page) + return NULL; + + return page_address(page); +} + static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = { .name = "kvm_amd", @@ -4722,6 +4732,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = { .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector, .vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = avic_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons, + + .alloc_apic_backing_page = svm_alloc_apic_backing_page, }; /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h index 1f4a8bd09c9e..9672e25a338d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h @@ -659,6 +659,7 @@ void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm); void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector); void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa); void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm); +struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); /* vmenter.S */