@@ -201,9 +201,15 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset,
msg_start = ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
- *(__be16 *)(ptr + 2) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->signalg);
- memset(ptr + 4, 0xff, 4);
- *(__be16 *)(ptr + 4) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->sealalg);
+ /*
+ * signalg and sealalg are stored as if they were converted from LE
+ * to host endian, even though they're opaque pairs of bytes according
+ * to the RFC.
+ */
+ *(__le16 *)(ptr + 2) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->signalg);
+ *(__le16 *)(ptr + 4) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->sealalg);
+ ptr[6] = 0xff;
+ ptr[7] = 0xff;
gss_krb5_make_confounder(msg_start, conflen);
@@ -438,7 +444,7 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset,
u8 *ptr, *plainhdr;
s32 now;
u8 flags = 0x00;
- __be16 *be16ptr, ec = 0;
+ __be16 *be16ptr;
__be64 *be64ptr;
u32 err;
@@ -468,16 +474,16 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset,
be16ptr = (__be16 *)ptr;
blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->acceptor_enc);
- *be16ptr++ = cpu_to_be16(ec);
+ *be16ptr++ = 0;
/* "inner" token header always uses 0 for RRC */
- *be16ptr++ = cpu_to_be16(0);
+ *be16ptr++ = 0;
be64ptr = (__be64 *)be16ptr;
spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
*be64ptr = cpu_to_be64(kctx->seq_send64++);
spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock);
- err = (*kctx->gk5e->encrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, buf, ec, pages);
+ err = (*kctx->gk5e->encrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, buf, 0, pages);
if (err)
return err;
Fix the endianness handling in gss_wrap_kerberos_v1 and drop the memset call there in favor of setting the filler bytes directly. In gss_wrap_kerberos_v2, get rid of the "ec" variable which is always zero, and drop the endianness conversion of 0. Sparse handles 0 as a special case, so it's not necessary. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com> --- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)