@@ -85,24 +85,15 @@ struct krb5_ctx {
* GSS Kerberos 5 mechanism Per-Message calls.
*/
-u32 gss_krb5_get_mic_v1(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
- struct xdr_netobj *token);
u32 gss_krb5_get_mic_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
struct xdr_netobj *token);
-u32 gss_krb5_verify_mic_v1(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *message_buffer,
- struct xdr_netobj *read_token);
u32 gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *message_buffer,
struct xdr_netobj *read_token);
-u32 gss_krb5_wrap_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset,
- struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages);
u32 gss_krb5_wrap_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset,
struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages);
-u32 gss_krb5_unwrap_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len,
- struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int *slack,
- unsigned int *align);
u32 gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len,
struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int *slack,
unsigned int *align);
@@ -30,10 +30,6 @@
static struct gss_api_mech gss_kerberos_mech;
-#if defined(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5_SIMPLIFIED)
-static int gss_krb5_import_ctx_des(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask);
-static int gss_krb5_import_ctx_v1(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask);
-#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5_CRYPTOSYSTEM)
static int gss_krb5_import_ctx_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask);
#endif
@@ -414,46 +410,6 @@ gss_import_v1_context(const void *p, const void *end, struct krb5_ctx *ctx)
return PTR_ERR(p);
}
-#if defined(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5_SIMPLIFIED)
-static int
-gss_krb5_import_ctx_des(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask)
-{
- return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-static int
-gss_krb5_import_ctx_v1(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask)
-{
- struct xdr_netobj keyin, keyout;
-
- keyin.data = ctx->Ksess;
- keyin.len = ctx->gk5e->keylength;
-
- ctx->seq = gss_krb5_alloc_cipher_v1(ctx, &keyin);
- if (ctx->seq == NULL)
- goto out_err;
- ctx->enc = gss_krb5_alloc_cipher_v1(ctx, &keyin);
- if (ctx->enc == NULL)
- goto out_free_seq;
-
- /* derive cksum */
- keyout.data = ctx->cksum;
- keyout.len = ctx->gk5e->keylength;
- if (krb5_derive_key(ctx, &keyin, &keyout, KG_USAGE_SIGN,
- KEY_USAGE_SEED_CHECKSUM, gfp_mask))
- goto out_free_enc;
-
- return 0;
-
-out_free_enc:
- crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->enc);
-out_free_seq:
- crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->seq);
-out_err:
- return -EINVAL;
-}
-#endif
-
#if defined(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5_CRYPTOSYSTEM)
static struct crypto_sync_skcipher *
@@ -71,75 +71,6 @@
# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
#endif
-#if defined(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5_SIMPLIFIED)
-
-static void *
-setup_token(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_netobj *token)
-{
- u16 *ptr;
- void *krb5_hdr;
- int body_size = GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + ctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
-
- token->len = g_token_size(&ctx->mech_used, body_size);
-
- ptr = (u16 *)token->data;
- g_make_token_header(&ctx->mech_used, body_size, (unsigned char **)&ptr);
-
- /* ptr now at start of header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */
- krb5_hdr = ptr;
- *ptr++ = KG_TOK_MIC_MSG;
- /*
- * signalg is stored as if it were converted from LE to host endian, even
- * though it's an opaque pair of bytes according to the RFC.
- */
- *ptr++ = (__force u16)cpu_to_le16(ctx->gk5e->signalg);
- *ptr++ = SEAL_ALG_NONE;
- *ptr = 0xffff;
-
- return krb5_hdr;
-}
-
-u32
-gss_krb5_get_mic_v1(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
- struct xdr_netobj *token)
-{
- char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
- struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata),
- .data = cksumdata};
- void *ptr;
- time64_t now;
- u32 seq_send;
- u8 *cksumkey;
-
- dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__);
- BUG_ON(ctx == NULL);
-
- now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
-
- ptr = setup_token(ctx, token);
-
- if (ctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum)
- cksumkey = ctx->cksum;
- else
- cksumkey = NULL;
-
- if (make_checksum(ctx, ptr, 8, text, 0, cksumkey,
- KG_USAGE_SIGN, &md5cksum))
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
- memcpy(ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len);
-
- seq_send = atomic_fetch_inc(&ctx->seq_send);
-
- if (krb5_make_seq_num(ctx, ctx->seq, ctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff,
- seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8))
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
- return (ctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-}
-
-#endif
-
static void *
setup_token_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_netobj *token)
{
@@ -69,83 +69,6 @@
# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
#endif
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5_SIMPLIFIED)
-/* read_token is a mic token, and message_buffer is the data that the mic was
- * supposedly taken over. */
-u32
-gss_krb5_verify_mic_v1(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *message_buffer,
- struct xdr_netobj *read_token)
-{
- int signalg;
- int sealalg;
- char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
- struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata),
- .data = cksumdata};
- s32 now;
- int direction;
- u32 seqnum;
- unsigned char *ptr = (unsigned char *)read_token->data;
- int bodysize;
- u8 *cksumkey;
-
- dprintk("RPC: krb5_read_token\n");
-
- if (g_verify_token_header(&ctx->mech_used, &bodysize, &ptr,
- read_token->len))
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
-
- if ((ptr[0] != ((KG_TOK_MIC_MSG >> 8) & 0xff)) ||
- (ptr[1] != (KG_TOK_MIC_MSG & 0xff)))
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
-
- /* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */
-
- signalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8);
- if (signalg != ctx->gk5e->signalg)
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
-
- sealalg = ptr[4] + (ptr[5] << 8);
- if (sealalg != SEAL_ALG_NONE)
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
-
- if ((ptr[6] != 0xff) || (ptr[7] != 0xff))
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
-
- if (ctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum)
- cksumkey = ctx->cksum;
- else
- cksumkey = NULL;
-
- if (make_checksum(ctx, ptr, 8, message_buffer, 0,
- cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SIGN, &md5cksum))
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
- if (memcmp(md5cksum.data, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
- ctx->gk5e->cksumlength))
- return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
-
- /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */
-
- now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
-
- if (now > ctx->endtime)
- return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
-
- /* do sequencing checks */
-
- if (krb5_get_seq_num(ctx, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8,
- &direction, &seqnum))
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
- if ((ctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
- (!ctx->initiate && direction != 0))
- return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
-
- return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-}
-#endif
-
u32
gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *message_buffer,
struct xdr_netobj *read_token)
@@ -40,293 +40,6 @@
# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
#endif
-#if defined(CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5_SIMPLIFIED)
-
-static inline int
-gss_krb5_padding(int blocksize, int length)
-{
- return blocksize - (length % blocksize);
-}
-
-static inline void
-gss_krb5_add_padding(struct xdr_buf *buf, int offset, int blocksize)
-{
- int padding = gss_krb5_padding(blocksize, buf->len - offset);
- char *p;
- struct kvec *iov;
-
- if (buf->page_len || buf->tail[0].iov_len)
- iov = &buf->tail[0];
- else
- iov = &buf->head[0];
- p = iov->iov_base + iov->iov_len;
- iov->iov_len += padding;
- buf->len += padding;
- memset(p, padding, padding);
-}
-
-static inline int
-gss_krb5_remove_padding(struct xdr_buf *buf, int blocksize)
-{
- u8 *ptr;
- u8 pad;
- size_t len = buf->len;
-
- if (len <= buf->head[0].iov_len) {
- pad = *(u8 *)(buf->head[0].iov_base + len - 1);
- if (pad > buf->head[0].iov_len)
- return -EINVAL;
- buf->head[0].iov_len -= pad;
- goto out;
- } else
- len -= buf->head[0].iov_len;
- if (len <= buf->page_len) {
- unsigned int last = (buf->page_base + len - 1)
- >>PAGE_SHIFT;
- unsigned int offset = (buf->page_base + len - 1)
- & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
- ptr = kmap_atomic(buf->pages[last]);
- pad = *(ptr + offset);
- kunmap_atomic(ptr);
- goto out;
- } else
- len -= buf->page_len;
- BUG_ON(len > buf->tail[0].iov_len);
- pad = *(u8 *)(buf->tail[0].iov_base + len - 1);
-out:
- /* XXX: NOTE: we do not adjust the page lengths--they represent
- * a range of data in the real filesystem page cache, and we need
- * to know that range so the xdr code can properly place read data.
- * However adjusting the head length, as we do above, is harmless.
- * In the case of a request that fits into a single page, the server
- * also uses length and head length together to determine the original
- * start of the request to copy the request for deferal; so it's
- * easier on the server if we adjust head and tail length in tandem.
- * It's not really a problem that we don't fool with the page and
- * tail lengths, though--at worst badly formed xdr might lead the
- * server to attempt to parse the padding.
- * XXX: Document all these weird requirements for gss mechanism
- * wrap/unwrap functions. */
- if (pad > blocksize)
- return -EINVAL;
- if (buf->len > pad)
- buf->len -= pad;
- else
- return -EINVAL;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Assumptions: the head and tail of inbuf are ours to play with.
- * The pages, however, may be real pages in the page cache and we replace
- * them with scratch pages from **pages before writing to them. */
-/* XXX: obviously the above should be documentation of wrap interface,
- * and shouldn't be in this kerberos-specific file. */
-
-/* XXX factor out common code with seal/unseal. */
-
-u32
-gss_krb5_wrap_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset,
- struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages)
-{
- char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
- struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata),
- .data = cksumdata};
- int blocksize = 0, plainlen;
- unsigned char *ptr, *msg_start;
- time64_t now;
- int headlen;
- struct page **tmp_pages;
- u32 seq_send;
- u8 *cksumkey;
- u32 conflen = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc);
-
- dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__);
-
- now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
-
- blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc);
- gss_krb5_add_padding(buf, offset, blocksize);
- BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % blocksize);
- plainlen = conflen + buf->len - offset;
-
- headlen = g_token_size(&kctx->mech_used,
- GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength + plainlen) -
- (buf->len - offset);
-
- ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
- /* shift data to make room for header. */
- xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, headlen);
-
- /* XXX Would be cleverer to encrypt while copying. */
- BUG_ON((buf->len - offset - headlen) % blocksize);
-
- g_make_token_header(&kctx->mech_used,
- GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN +
- kctx->gk5e->cksumlength + plainlen, &ptr);
-
-
- /* ptr now at header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */
- ptr[0] = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff);
- ptr[1] = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff);
-
- msg_start = ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
-
- /*
- * signalg and sealalg are stored as if they were converted from LE
- * to host endian, even though they're opaque pairs of bytes according
- * to the RFC.
- */
- *(__le16 *)(ptr + 2) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->signalg);
- *(__le16 *)(ptr + 4) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->sealalg);
- ptr[6] = 0xff;
- ptr[7] = 0xff;
-
- krb5_make_confounder(msg_start, conflen);
-
- if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum)
- cksumkey = kctx->cksum;
- else
- cksumkey = NULL;
-
- /* XXXJBF: UGH!: */
- tmp_pages = buf->pages;
- buf->pages = pages;
- if (make_checksum(kctx, ptr, 8, buf, offset + headlen - conflen,
- cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SEAL, &md5cksum))
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- buf->pages = tmp_pages;
-
- memcpy(ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len);
-
- seq_send = atomic_fetch_inc(&kctx->seq_send);
-
- /* XXX would probably be more efficient to compute checksum
- * and encrypt at the same time: */
- if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx, kctx->seq, kctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff,
- seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8)))
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
- if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf,
- offset + headlen - conflen, pages))
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
- return (kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-}
-
-u32
-gss_krb5_unwrap_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len,
- struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int *slack,
- unsigned int *align)
-{
- int signalg;
- int sealalg;
- char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
- struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata),
- .data = cksumdata};
- time64_t now;
- int direction;
- s32 seqnum;
- unsigned char *ptr;
- int bodysize;
- void *data_start, *orig_start;
- int data_len;
- int blocksize;
- u32 conflen = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc);
- int crypt_offset;
- u8 *cksumkey;
- unsigned int saved_len = buf->len;
-
- dprintk("RPC: gss_unwrap_kerberos\n");
-
- ptr = (u8 *)buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
- if (g_verify_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, &bodysize, &ptr,
- len - offset))
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
-
- if ((ptr[0] != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff)) ||
- (ptr[1] != (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff)))
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
-
- /* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */
-
- /* get the sign and seal algorithms */
-
- signalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8);
- if (signalg != kctx->gk5e->signalg)
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
-
- sealalg = ptr[4] + (ptr[5] << 8);
- if (sealalg != kctx->gk5e->sealalg)
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
-
- if ((ptr[6] != 0xff) || (ptr[7] != 0xff))
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
-
- /*
- * Data starts after token header and checksum. ptr points
- * to the beginning of the token header
- */
- crypt_offset = ptr + (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) -
- (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base;
-
- buf->len = len;
- if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, crypt_offset))
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
-
- if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum)
- cksumkey = kctx->cksum;
- else
- cksumkey = NULL;
-
- if (make_checksum(kctx, ptr, 8, buf, crypt_offset,
- cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SEAL, &md5cksum))
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
- if (memcmp(md5cksum.data, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
- kctx->gk5e->cksumlength))
- return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
-
- /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */
-
- now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
-
- if (now > kctx->endtime)
- return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
-
- /* do sequencing checks */
-
- if (krb5_get_seq_num(kctx, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
- ptr + 8, &direction, &seqnum))
- return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
-
- if ((kctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
- (!kctx->initiate && direction != 0))
- return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
-
- /* Copy the data back to the right position. XXX: Would probably be
- * better to copy and encrypt at the same time. */
-
- blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc);
- data_start = ptr + (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) +
- conflen;
- orig_start = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
- data_len = (buf->head[0].iov_base + buf->head[0].iov_len) - data_start;
- memmove(orig_start, data_start, data_len);
- buf->head[0].iov_len -= (data_start - orig_start);
- buf->len = len - (data_start - orig_start);
-
- if (gss_krb5_remove_padding(buf, blocksize))
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
-
- /* slack must include room for krb5 padding */
- *slack = XDR_QUADLEN(saved_len - buf->len);
- /* The GSS blob always precedes the RPC message payload */
- *align = *slack;
- return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-}
-
-#endif
-
/*
* We can shift data by up to LOCAL_BUF_LEN bytes in a pass. If we need
* to do more than that, we shift repeatedly. Kevin Coffman reports