From patchwork Thu Feb 1 14:22:00 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Chuck Lever X-Patchwork-Id: 13541169 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CEF8C5F461; Thu, 1 Feb 2024 14:22:01 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706797321; cv=none; b=ExppddmE8ftmN2CNNQJx/hnfidH6gtff8Lw+46E6n0mXkA8wV2Q4Au8FDaJPWqgTzEwE5L+sHSOY8ANwlkUfyWksvyffGIB3DqN5c9zrKhsESKHFtG8G12GzM8gQtQydilpHuaQ4ousOaEOu175bVGD8b28IHQcy7TukTAFkoCU= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706797321; c=relaxed/simple; bh=G8V7OwNT2CSseoqs4Yn69XzUV+2Z9gjyYa+kMeHms7E=; h=Subject:From:To:Cc:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=fWP4LzHMdnGax1plzwMzSGmD2+uFH5bc2Tw7nkXvpLP1Sj2FTyNBk9VeBGkNARuNrO7mqj46yiJJ24oYeZZIMH+O+J6lBAPfJ0rxWJ3Ut35WhiB7VMn6wo6hJxyiig8BXCWDczmRzdu1tknwTEqFMxr7oJCXmbcBeia08PJHuuU= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=K5bu9vRi; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="K5bu9vRi" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 44123C43390; Thu, 1 Feb 2024 14:22:01 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1706797321; bh=G8V7OwNT2CSseoqs4Yn69XzUV+2Z9gjyYa+kMeHms7E=; h=Subject:From:To:Cc:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=K5bu9vRiX5l1g6aT+550jWzv2Y+IaW6IzYKMmKjJV3QfxjAu7r+evHhrun+C+XND3 Tt/VjVeIf7pqlfYIhG/sQ7DhmqyNIhRMnWT9+MGcIpXy2vGlaf1D+6shSimj85Tf9F dYWdgi+qzeS4h9aEr4fc63rqEMTG5UeIogb8IwfDznPn1uXU1KKGprj6PuP+2a2HuE f95gRLsJ8n3PoHQPa5DWR8oTl2y7XuNPE8FBakOBqlo5jaOcfi4Q9Xpz1QAgeMFO/Q 0aatUZEIjs7Ry1r7oh6Gb/hOvBdxYh4WaIJW9wP76p77bBhyPK7ZEbFyFgeQKVRqj8 d2DR2hnDUh/cQ== Subject: [PATCH 3/3] From: NeilBrown From: Chuck Lever To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Date: Thu, 01 Feb 2024 09:22:00 -0500 Message-ID: <170679732037.13994.1681444722076001479.stgit@klimt.1015granger.net> In-Reply-To: <170679726132.13994.12738575104218499729.stgit@klimt.1015granger.net> References: <170679726132.13994.12738575104218499729.stgit@klimt.1015granger.net> User-Agent: StGit/1.5 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Chuck Lever Date: Mon Jan 22 14:58:16 2024 +1100 nfsd: fix RELEASE_LOCKOWNER [ Upstream commit edcf9725150e42beeca42d085149f4c88fa97afd ] The test on so_count in nfsd4_release_lockowner() is nonsense and harmful. Revert to using check_for_locks(), changing that to not sleep. First: harmful. As is documented in the kdoc comment for nfsd4_release_lockowner(), the test on so_count can transiently return a false positive resulting in a return of NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD when in fact no locks are held. This is clearly a protocol violation and with the Linux NFS client it can cause incorrect behaviour. If RELEASE_LOCKOWNER is sent while some other thread is still processing a LOCK request which failed because, at the time that request was received, the given owner held a conflicting lock, then the nfsd thread processing that LOCK request can hold a reference (conflock) to the lock owner that causes nfsd4_release_lockowner() to return an incorrect error. The Linux NFS client ignores that NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD error because it never sends NFS4_RELEASE_LOCKOWNER without first releasing any locks, so it knows that the error is impossible. It assumes the lock owner was in fact released so it feels free to use the same lock owner identifier in some later locking request. When it does reuse a lock owner identifier for which a previous RELEASE failed, it will naturally use a lock_seqid of zero. However the server, which didn't release the lock owner, will expect a larger lock_seqid and so will respond with NFS4ERR_BAD_SEQID. So clearly it is harmful to allow a false positive, which testing so_count allows. The test is nonsense because ... well... it doesn't mean anything. so_count is the sum of three different counts. 1/ the set of states listed on so_stateids 2/ the set of active vfs locks owned by any of those states 3/ various transient counts such as for conflicting locks. When it is tested against '2' it is clear that one of these is the transient reference obtained by find_lockowner_str_locked(). It is not clear what the other one is expected to be. In practice, the count is often 2 because there is precisely one state on so_stateids. If there were more, this would fail. In my testing I see two circumstances when RELEASE_LOCKOWNER is called. In one case, CLOSE is called before RELEASE_LOCKOWNER. That results in all the lock states being removed, and so the lockowner being discarded (it is removed when there are no more references which usually happens when the lock state is discarded). When nfsd4_release_lockowner() finds that the lock owner doesn't exist, it returns success. The other case shows an so_count of '2' and precisely one state listed in so_stateid. It appears that the Linux client uses a separate lock owner for each file resulting in one lock state per lock owner, so this test on '2' is safe. For another client it might not be safe. So this patch changes check_for_locks() to use the (newish) find_any_file_locked() so that it doesn't take a reference on the nfs4_file and so never calls nfsd_file_put(), and so never sleeps. With this check is it safe to restore the use of check_for_locks() rather than testing so_count against the mysterious '2'. Fixes: ce3c4ad7f4ce ("NFSD: Fix possible sleep during nfsd4_release_lockowner()") Signed-off-by: NeilBrown Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.2+ Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index f8533299db1c..07ea35803629 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -7257,14 +7257,16 @@ check_for_locks(struct nfs4_file *fp, struct nfs4_lockowner *lowner) { struct file_lock *fl; int status = false; - struct nfsd_file *nf = find_any_file(fp); + struct nfsd_file *nf; struct inode *inode; struct file_lock_context *flctx; + spin_lock(&fp->fi_lock); + nf = find_any_file_locked(fp); if (!nf) { /* Any valid lock stateid should have some sort of access */ WARN_ON_ONCE(1); - return status; + goto out; } inode = locks_inode(nf->nf_file); @@ -7280,7 +7282,8 @@ check_for_locks(struct nfs4_file *fp, struct nfs4_lockowner *lowner) } spin_unlock(&flctx->flc_lock); } - nfsd_file_put(nf); +out: + spin_unlock(&fp->fi_lock); return status; } @@ -7290,10 +7293,8 @@ check_for_locks(struct nfs4_file *fp, struct nfs4_lockowner *lowner) * @cstate: NFSv4 COMPOUND state * @u: RELEASE_LOCKOWNER arguments * - * The lockowner's so_count is bumped when a lock record is added - * or when copying a conflicting lock. The latter case is brief, - * but can lead to fleeting false positives when looking for - * locks-in-use. + * Check if theree are any locks still held and if not - free the lockowner + * and any lock state that is owned. * * Return values: * %nfs_ok: lockowner released or not found @@ -7329,10 +7330,13 @@ nfsd4_release_lockowner(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock); return nfs_ok; } - if (atomic_read(&lo->lo_owner.so_count) != 2) { - spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock); - nfs4_put_stateowner(&lo->lo_owner); - return nfserr_locks_held; + + list_for_each_entry(stp, &lo->lo_owner.so_stateids, st_perstateowner) { + if (check_for_locks(stp->st_stid.sc_file, lo)) { + spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock); + nfs4_put_stateowner(&lo->lo_owner); + return nfserr_locks_held; + } } unhash_lockowner_locked(lo); while (!list_empty(&lo->lo_owner.so_stateids)) {