From patchwork Mon Jul 2 23:39:51 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dave Jiang X-Patchwork-Id: 10502709 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E619860284 for ; Mon, 2 Jul 2018 23:40:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D292528C3D for ; Mon, 2 Jul 2018 23:40:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id C712E28CAC; Mon, 2 Jul 2018 23:40:14 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from ml01.01.org (ml01.01.org [198.145.21.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 625B928C3D for ; Mon, 2 Jul 2018 23:40:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5AA81210DF5C7; Mon, 2 Jul 2018 16:40:14 -0700 (PDT) X-Original-To: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Delivered-To: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Received-SPF: Pass (sender SPF authorized) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=192.55.52.151; helo=mga17.intel.com; envelope-from=dave.jiang@intel.com; receiver=linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Received: from mga17.intel.com (mga17.intel.com [192.55.52.151]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A1E04209605D3 for ; Mon, 2 Jul 2018 16:40:12 -0700 (PDT) X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga007.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.52]) by fmsmga107.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 02 Jul 2018 16:40:12 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.51,301,1526367600"; d="scan'208";a="51551053" Received: from djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com ([143.182.136.93]) by fmsmga007.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 02 Jul 2018 16:39:51 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 08/11] nfit/libnvdimm: add support for issue secure erase DSM to Intel nvdimm From: Dave Jiang To: dan.j.williams@intel.com Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2018 16:39:51 -0700 Message-ID: <153057479159.38125.14622086729471334313.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> In-Reply-To: <153057423804.38125.15912575101400055843.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> References: <153057423804.38125.15912575101400055843.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> User-Agent: StGit/0.17.1-dirty MIME-Version: 1.0 X-BeenThere: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: "Linux-nvdimm developer list." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, alison.schofield@intel.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Errors-To: linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Sender: "Linux-nvdimm" X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Adding support to issue a secure erase DSM to the Intel nvdimm. The required passphrase is acquired from userspace through the kernel key management. To trigger the action, "erase" is written to the "security" sysfs attribute. libnvdimm will support the erase generic API call. Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang --- drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/libnvdimm.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 103 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c b/drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c index 41602be2a33b..4000db2d5ed8 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c @@ -16,6 +16,59 @@ #include #include "nfit.h" +static int intel_dimm_security_erase(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus, + struct nvdimm *nvdimm, const char *passphrase) +{ + struct nvdimm_bus_descriptor *nd_desc = to_nd_desc(nvdimm_bus); + int cmd_rc, rc = 0, pkg_size; + struct nd_intel_secure_erase *cmd; + struct nd_cmd_pkg *pkg; + struct nfit_mem *nfit_mem = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm); + + if (!test_bit(NVDIMM_INTEL_SECURE_ERASE, &nfit_mem->dsm_mask)) + return -ENOTTY; + + pkg_size = sizeof(*pkg) + sizeof(*cmd); + pkg = kzalloc(pkg_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pkg) + return -ENOMEM; + + pkg->nd_command = NVDIMM_INTEL_SECURE_ERASE; + pkg->nd_family = NVDIMM_FAMILY_INTEL; + pkg->nd_size_in = ND_INTEL_PASSPHRASE_SIZE; + pkg->nd_size_out = ND_INTEL_STATUS_SIZE; + pkg->nd_fw_size = pkg->nd_size_out; + cmd = (struct nd_intel_secure_erase *)&pkg->nd_payload; + memcpy(cmd->passphrase, passphrase, ND_INTEL_PASSPHRASE_SIZE); + rc = nd_desc->ndctl(nd_desc, nvdimm, ND_CMD_CALL, pkg, + sizeof(pkg_size), &cmd_rc); + if (rc < 0) + goto out; + if (cmd_rc < 0) { + rc = cmd_rc; + goto out; + } + + switch (cmd->status) { + case 0: + break; + case ND_INTEL_STATUS_INVALID_PASS: + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + case ND_INTEL_STATUS_INVALID_STATE: + default: + rc = -ENXIO; + goto out; + } + + /* DIMM unlocked, invalidate all CPU caches before we read it */ + wbinvd(); + + out: + kfree(pkg); + return rc; +} + static int intel_dimm_security_freeze_lock(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus, struct nvdimm *nvdimm) { @@ -291,4 +344,5 @@ struct nvdimm_security_ops intel_security_ops = { .change_key = intel_dimm_security_update_passphrase, .disable = intel_dimm_security_disable, .freeze_lock = intel_dimm_security_freeze_lock, + .erase = intel_dimm_security_erase, }; diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c b/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c index cd0624663621..b66bde25bfe6 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c @@ -85,6 +85,51 @@ int nvdimm_security_get_state(struct device *dev) &nvdimm->state); } +static int nvdimm_security_erase(struct device *dev) +{ + struct nvdimm *nvdimm = to_nvdimm(dev); + struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus = walk_to_nvdimm_bus(dev); + struct key *key; + char *payload; + int rc = 0; + + if (!nvdimm->security_ops) + return 0; + + /* lock the device and disallow driver bind */ + device_lock(dev); + /* No driver data means dimm is disabled. Proceed if so. */ + if (dev_get_drvdata(dev)) { + dev_warn(dev, "Unable to secure erase while DIMM active.\n"); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (nvdimm->state == NVDIMM_SECURITY_UNSUPPORTED) + goto out; + + key = nvdimm_search_key(dev); + if (!key) + key = nvdimm_request_key(dev); + if (!key) { + rc = -ENXIO; + goto out; + } + + down_read(&key->sem); + payload = key->payload.data[0]; + rc = nvdimm->security_ops->erase(nvdimm_bus, nvdimm, payload); + up_read(&key->sem); + /* remove key since secure erase kills the passphrase */ + key_invalidate(key); + key_put(key); + + out: + device_unlock(dev); + nvdimm_security_get_state(dev); + return rc; +} + static int nvdimm_security_freeze_lock(struct device *dev) { struct nvdimm *nvdimm = to_nvdimm(dev); @@ -650,6 +695,8 @@ static ssize_t security_store(struct device *dev, rc = nvdimm_security_disable(dev); else if (strcmp(buf, "freeze") == 0 || strcmp(buf, "freeze\n") == 0) rc = nvdimm_security_freeze_lock(dev); + else if (strcmp(buf, "erase") == 0 || strcmp(buf, "erase\n") == 0) + rc = nvdimm_security_erase(dev); else return -EINVAL; diff --git a/include/linux/libnvdimm.h b/include/linux/libnvdimm.h index 683e4cadc7f6..e330a452238e 100644 --- a/include/linux/libnvdimm.h +++ b/include/linux/libnvdimm.h @@ -181,6 +181,8 @@ struct nvdimm_security_ops { struct nvdimm *nvdimm, const char *pass); int (*freeze_lock)(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus, struct nvdimm *nvdimm); + int (*erase)(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus, + struct nvdimm *nvdimm, const char *passphrase); }; void badrange_init(struct badrange *badrange);