From patchwork Wed Sep 26 20:47:51 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dave Jiang X-Patchwork-Id: 10616795 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4969E14BD for ; Wed, 26 Sep 2018 20:47:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3928A2B6CF for ; Wed, 26 Sep 2018 20:47:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 2CD6B2B76E; Wed, 26 Sep 2018 20:47:54 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from ml01.01.org (ml01.01.org [198.145.21.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B64E42B6CF for ; Wed, 26 Sep 2018 20:47:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ACBE5211597FC; Wed, 26 Sep 2018 13:47:53 -0700 (PDT) X-Original-To: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Delivered-To: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Received-SPF: Pass (sender SPF authorized) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=134.134.136.31; helo=mga06.intel.com; envelope-from=dave.jiang@intel.com; receiver=linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6A55B211597F3 for ; Wed, 26 Sep 2018 13:47:52 -0700 (PDT) X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga005.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.32]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 26 Sep 2018 13:47:52 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.54,307,1534834800"; d="scan'208";a="265994478" Received: from djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com ([143.182.136.93]) by fmsmga005.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 26 Sep 2018 13:47:51 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v10 12/12] libnvdimm: add documentation for nvdimm security support From: Dave Jiang To: dan.j.williams@intel.com Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 13:47:51 -0700 Message-ID: <153799487169.71621.5218226610050907633.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> In-Reply-To: <153799466529.71621.10728628542331983376.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> References: <153799466529.71621.10728628542331983376.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> User-Agent: StGit/unknown-version MIME-Version: 1.0 X-BeenThere: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: "Linux-nvdimm developer list." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: alison.schofield@intel.com, keescook@chromium.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, ebiggers3@gmail.com, dhowells@redhat.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org Errors-To: linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Sender: "Linux-nvdimm" X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Add theory of operation for the security support that's going into libnvdimm. Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang --- Documentation/nvdimm/security.txt | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 99 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/nvdimm/security.txt diff --git a/Documentation/nvdimm/security.txt b/Documentation/nvdimm/security.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..50cbb6cb96a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/nvdimm/security.txt @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +NVDIMM SECURITY +=============== + +1. Introduction +--------------- + +With the introduction of Intel DSM v1.7 specification [1], security DSMs are +introduced. The spec added the following security DSMs: "get security state", +"set passphrase", "disable passphrase", "unlock unit", "freeze lock", +"secure erase", and "overwrite". A security_ops data structure has been +added to struct dimm in order to support the security operations and generic +APIs are exposed to allow vendor neutral operations. + +2. Sysfs Interface +------------------ +The "security" sysfs attribute is provided in the nvdimm sysfs directory. For +example: +/sys/devices/LNXSYSTM:00/LNXSYBUS:00/ACPI0012:00/ndbus0/nmem0/security + +The "show" function of that attribute will display the security state for +that DIMM. The following states are available: disabled, unlocked, locked, +frozen, and unsupported. + +The "store" function takes several commands when the attribute is written to +in order to support some of the security functionalities: +update - enable security. Add or update current key. +disable - disable enabled security and remove key. +freeze - freeze changing of security states. +erase - generate new ecryption key for DIMM and crypto-scrambles + all existing user data. + +3. Key Management +----------------- + +The key is associted to the payload by the DIMM id. For example: +# cat /sys/devices/LNXSYSTM:00/LNXSYBUS:00/ACPI0012:00/ndbus0/nmem0/nfit/id +8089-a2-1740-00000133 +The DIMM id would be provided along with the key payload (passphrase) to +the kernel. + +The security keys are managed on the basis of a single key per DIMM. The +key "passphrase" is expected to be 32bytes long or padded to 32bytes. This is +similar to the ATA security specification [2]. A key is initially acquired +via the request_key() kernel API call and retrieved from userspace. It is up to +the user to provide an upcall application to retrieve the key in whatever +fashion meets their security requirements. + +A nvdimm user logon key has the description format of: +nvdimm: + +4. Unlocking +------------ +When the DIMMs are being enumerated by the kernel, the kernel will attempt to +retrieve the key from its keyring. If that fails, it will attempt to +acquire the key from the userspace upcall function. This is the only time +a locked DIMM can be unlocked. Once unlocked, the DIMM will remain unlocked +until reboot. + +5. Update +--------- +When doing an update, it is expected that the new key with the 64bit payload of +format described above is added via the keyutils API or utility. The update +command written to the sysfs attribute will be with the format: +update + +It is expected that a user logon key has been injected via keyutils to provide +the payload for the update operation. The kernel will take the new user key, +attempt the update operation with the nvdimm, and replace the existing key's +payload with the new passphrase. + +If there is no old key id due to a security enabling, then a 0 should be +passed in. If a nvdimm has an existing passphrase, then an "old" key should +be injected with a key description that does not have the "nvdimm:" prefix. + +6. Freeze +--------- +The freeze operation does not require any keys. The security config can be +frozen by a user with root privelege. + +7. Disable +---------- +The security disable command format is: +disable + +An "old" key with the passphrase payload that is tied to the nvdimm should be +injected with a key description that does not have the "nvdimm:" prefix and +its keyid should be passed in via sysfs. + +8. Secure Erase +--------------- +The command format for doing a secure erase is: +erase + +An "old" key with the passphrase payload that is tied to the nvdimm should be +injected with a key description that does not have the "nvdimm:" prefix and +its keyid should be passed in via sysfs. + +[1]: http://pmem.io/documents/NVDIMM_DSM_Interface-V1.7.pdf +[2]: http://www.t13.org/documents/UploadedDocuments/docs2006/e05179r4-ACS-SecurityClarifications.pdf