From patchwork Tue May 18 07:20:32 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 12263951 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3D61AC43603 for ; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ml01.01.org (ml01.01.org [198.145.21.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F2F19610CD for ; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:53 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org F2F19610CD Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Received: from ml01.vlan13.01.org (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D1FF8100EB339; Tue, 18 May 2021 00:21:53 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: Pass (mailfrom) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=198.145.29.99; helo=mail.kernel.org; envelope-from=rppt@kernel.org; receiver= Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 619D4100EB334 for ; Tue, 18 May 2021 00:21:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7E86060FF2; Tue, 18 May 2021 07:21:39 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1621322511; bh=VvJS0+ZJEoquXgUk8xJF5PKmUdUMF1JI5SU1kjFhtvo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=rXKV5xSSk4VG2jEf9nzGlBJR53Wh4leDl8+/8xyUEs819qQ2tIZz2xiwz7ZgCUpns G2CW8lT02BiO7ZnW5TqyEI6NRe5ha7QbYoSf5xM5Ys5rGf/+7BGSSDaqcOwagE6ol2 neY5Rr8IiaxFWUk3A0sNmsEcYIEXcOkqRMVO1ZdWoTIjXuBKxmF5gYIK3ZyOpAHK0r l2LEP8aiowY9Yj10NpAdCO5qVjAdjZvI2j9de8afBgqPO26su0L6fm5MCQCpSIkMKn z9PP7ICM/triYEsfzV3I/fIndVc/GswBjdGwsQ0bgOqWuAIon0LnVtSA8tMdYb6XM7 483GRYphYfiIQ== From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Subject: [PATCH v20 5/7] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 10:20:32 +0300 Message-Id: <20210518072034.31572-6-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID-Hash: TCNHPN6UEQT7J4YVSPAZLNFW7ADL56MD X-Message-ID-Hash: TCNHPN6UEQT7J4YVSPAZLNFW7ADL56MD X-MailFrom: rppt@kernel.org X-Mailman-Rule-Hits: nonmember-moderation X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation CC: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Hagen Paul Pfeifer , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , James Bottomley , Kees Cook , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Matthew Garrett , Mark Rutland , Michal Hocko , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shakeel Butt , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , Yury Norov , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org X-Mailman-Version: 3.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: "Linux-nvdimm developer list." Archived-At: List-Archive: List-Help: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: From: Mike Rapoport It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings. Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users. Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Acked-by: David Hildenbrand Acked-by: James Bottomley Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Christopher Lameter Cc: Dan Williams Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: David Hildenbrand Cc: Elena Reshetova Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: James Bottomley Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Michael Kerrisk Cc: Palmer Dabbelt Cc: Palmer Dabbelt Cc: Paul Walmsley Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Rick Edgecombe Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Shakeel Butt Cc: Shuah Khan Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Tycho Andersen Cc: Will Deacon --- include/linux/secretmem.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/power/hibernate.c | 5 ++++- mm/secretmem.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/secretmem.h b/include/linux/secretmem.h index e617b4afcc62..21c3771e6a56 100644 --- a/include/linux/secretmem.h +++ b/include/linux/secretmem.h @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page) } bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma); +bool secretmem_active(void); #else @@ -43,6 +44,11 @@ static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page) return false; } +static inline bool secretmem_active(void) +{ + return false; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */ #endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */ diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c index da0b41914177..559acef3fddb 100644 --- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c +++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "power.h" @@ -81,7 +82,9 @@ void hibernate_release(void) bool hibernation_available(void) { - return nohibernate == 0 && !security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION); + return nohibernate == 0 && + !security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION) && + !secretmem_active(); } /** diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c index 972cd1bbc3cc..f77d25467a14 100644 --- a/mm/secretmem.c +++ b/mm/secretmem.c @@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ module_param_named(enable, secretmem_enable, bool, 0400); MODULE_PARM_DESC(secretmem_enable, "Enable secretmem and memfd_secret(2) system call"); +static atomic_t secretmem_users; + +bool secretmem_active(void) +{ + return !!atomic_read(&secretmem_users); +} + static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) { struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping; @@ -94,6 +101,12 @@ static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = { .fault = secretmem_fault, }; +static int secretmem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + atomic_dec(&secretmem_users); + return 0; +} + static int secretmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) { unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; @@ -116,6 +129,7 @@ bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma) } static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = { + .release = secretmem_release, .mmap = secretmem_mmap, }; @@ -202,6 +216,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned int, flags) file->f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE; fd_install(fd, file); + atomic_inc(&secretmem_users); return fd; err_put_fd: