diff mbox series

[v7,08/12] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process

Message ID 29e45605-7a3c-944b-7bea-5959f8ff0793@linux.intel.com (mailing list archive)
State Not Applicable
Headers show
Series Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability | expand

Commit Message

Alexey Budankov Feb. 17, 2020, 8:10 a.m. UTC
Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without
the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse
the credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage
for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
capability.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

Comments

James Morris Feb. 18, 2020, 7:29 p.m. UTC | #1
On Mon, 17 Feb 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote:

> For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains
> open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage
> for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
> capability.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>


Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
index e1a8fee3ad49..d46b6709ec56 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@  static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	else
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	if (count != sizeof(uint32_t))