From patchwork Tue Nov 3 13:43:04 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: YiFei Zhu X-Patchwork-Id: 11877747 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E32A96A2 for ; Tue, 3 Nov 2020 14:16:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BC0D722243 for ; Tue, 3 Nov 2020 14:16:57 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.b="G1JRzHPG" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729315AbgKCNqv (ORCPT ); Tue, 3 Nov 2020 08:46:51 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:40308 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729243AbgKCNpX (ORCPT ); Tue, 3 Nov 2020 08:45:23 -0500 Received: from mail-qk1-x741.google.com (mail-qk1-x741.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::741]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6560AC0613D1; Tue, 3 Nov 2020 05:45:21 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-qk1-x741.google.com with SMTP id a64so11234852qkc.5; Tue, 03 Nov 2020 05:45:21 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=es+7eu/1JIS0u6NUqnkeBJLaNZv/3XzsgPMcIjCfPvw=; b=G1JRzHPGQrx/xpiw57sn8HU7v/308dFEf/ILepEmaZjyWnlEsJ7Jt8m85wS0ZL7hAX XJeTMJwilfEZakFun1JP0oOz/kjVO7ntj0lbqnvdowtp9Sjnb4O57j6xGZ2A2TDRxJ5E 4hyVqojJ8zyBb4O4e8FxEZk0ckMCMU3mtuanjys2GXmepYyg59GuQpOTy/c3oAXZmE4r zn17hosEuRctElxq5KH0mRPs2x9n7TVfGejNrQeTj7gxbeRUVtnODP8Albhmr3L5TIw9 um6WfN/bCe4QtVClrP0rodIxZuduSktya09MfYs5Ip8/wx86oaN0d6GJOt+Tk6mRBi/J YDVg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=es+7eu/1JIS0u6NUqnkeBJLaNZv/3XzsgPMcIjCfPvw=; b=m/A9QztpOsVmCpkUWlhd8rZ9sTTXE+XIpboOAhfz/PFPrsPlo8p6Uh+HHkq2LBcB3o wzS4LoRrovuKvvaPRQQ/92xirf2v0k9aGYxIHdQ2/t7Beca8NJD+G68/JYwss31lyD3K qw+zhAf6+cgHUNffBwj4b3UgdzgyMkE7tStwUSnT0iB6jFkn0Yopwpp2sgTZ4dfctt9e YuPeaOoe7VvNvCqrM/QITfyeePzVaxDOV0v2ZGYtzzdS+jkd0FbTUY9yePn0m58YOxcm CE+4YXapk+6d9E9xacPPpK4lqGMBoxyeI57rIb4tm3wkVmhIHPR87bbipUiAKo8dxrPd JMSw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531TTI2TICX6I1S+tamAKlUJav5zBZ2CeBUmE1ymv9VuKgXW787W t42+v80yFFRJNJ4Rdqi8cGc= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzUUsDjnuEHVk6XCSkkESwGkcTgkeydQBunRI0YUoWla6WErrBjgwkAC8sVvIMrobSGWNFG7g== X-Received: by 2002:a37:7e82:: with SMTP id z124mr19653601qkc.107.1604411120584; Tue, 03 Nov 2020 05:45:20 -0800 (PST) Received: from zhuyifei1999-ThinkPad-T480.gw.illinois.edu ([2620:0:e00:400f::31]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id a206sm7356568qkb.64.2020.11.03.05.45.19 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 03 Nov 2020 05:45:19 -0800 (PST) From: YiFei Zhu To: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: YiFei Zhu , linux-csky@vger.kernel.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Aleksa Sarai , Andrea Arcangeli , Andy Lutomirski , David Laight , Dimitrios Skarlatos , Giuseppe Scrivano , Hubertus Franke , Jack Chen , Jann Horn , Josep Torrellas , Kees Cook , Tianyin Xu , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Tycho Andersen , Valentin Rothberg , Will Drewry Subject: [PATCH seccomp 8/8] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 07:43:04 -0600 Message-Id: <6bf174724c135a880fb8cbe602b665f613bab58e.1604410035.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org From: YiFei Zhu Currently the kernel does not provide an infrastructure to translate architecture numbers to a human-readable name. Translating syscall numbers to syscall names is possible through FTRACE_SYSCALL infrastructure but it does not provide support for compat syscalls. This will create a file for each PID as /proc/pid/seccomp_cache. The file will be empty when no seccomp filters are loaded, or be in the format of: where ALLOW means the cache is guaranteed to allow the syscall, and filter means the cache will pass the syscall to the BPF filter. For the docker default profile on x86_64 it looks like: x86_64 0 ALLOW x86_64 1 ALLOW x86_64 2 ALLOW x86_64 3 ALLOW [...] x86_64 132 ALLOW x86_64 133 ALLOW x86_64 134 FILTER x86_64 135 FILTER x86_64 136 FILTER x86_64 137 ALLOW x86_64 138 ALLOW x86_64 139 FILTER x86_64 140 ALLOW x86_64 141 ALLOW [...] This file is guarded by CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG with a default of N because I think certain users of seccomp might not want the application to know which syscalls are definitely usable. For the same reason, it is also guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Suggested-by: Jann Horn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3Ofqp4crXGksLmZY6=fGrF_tWyUCg7PBkAetvbbOPeOA@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu --- arch/Kconfig | 15 +++++++++++ fs/proc/base.c | 6 +++++ include/linux/seccomp.h | 7 +++++ kernel/seccomp.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 87 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index 56b6ccc0e32d..6e2eb7171da0 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -514,6 +514,21 @@ config SECCOMP_FILTER See Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst for details. +config SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG + bool "Show seccomp filter cache status in /proc/pid/seccomp_cache" + depends on SECCOMP + depends on SECCOMP_FILTER && !HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR + depends on PROC_FS + help + This enables the /proc/pid/seccomp_cache interface to monitor + seccomp cache data. The file format is subject to change. Reading + the file requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. + + This option is for debugging only. Enabling presents the risk that + an adversary may be able to infer the seccomp filter logic. + + If unsure, say N. + config HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK bool help diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 0f707003dda5..d652f9dbaecc 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -3261,6 +3261,9 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS ONE("arch_status", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_arch_status), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG + ONE("seccomp_cache", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_seccomp_cache), +#endif }; static int proc_tgid_base_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) @@ -3590,6 +3593,9 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS ONE("arch_status", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_arch_status), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG + ONE("seccomp_cache", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_seccomp_cache), +#endif }; static int proc_tid_base_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h index 02aef2844c38..76963ec4641a 100644 --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h @@ -121,4 +121,11 @@ static inline long seccomp_get_metadata(struct task_struct *task, return -EINVAL; } #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER && CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG +struct seq_file; + +int proc_pid_seccomp_cache(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, + struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task); +#endif #endif /* _LINUX_SECCOMP_H */ diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index d8cf468dbe1e..76f524e320b1 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -553,6 +553,9 @@ void seccomp_filter_release(struct task_struct *tsk) { struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter; + /* We are effectively holding the siglock by not having any sighand. */ + WARN_ON(tsk->sighand != NULL); + /* Detach task from its filter tree. */ tsk->seccomp.filter = NULL; __seccomp_filter_release(orig); @@ -2335,3 +2338,59 @@ static int __init seccomp_sysctl_init(void) device_initcall(seccomp_sysctl_init) #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG +/* Currently CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG implies SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */ +static void proc_pid_seccomp_cache_arch(struct seq_file *m, const char *name, + const void *bitmap, size_t bitmap_size) +{ + int nr; + + for (nr = 0; nr < bitmap_size; nr++) { + bool cached = test_bit(nr, bitmap); + char *status = cached ? "ALLOW" : "FILTER"; + + seq_printf(m, "%s %d %s\n", name, nr, status); + } +} + +int proc_pid_seccomp_cache(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, + struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct seccomp_filter *f; + unsigned long flags; + + /* + * We don't want some sandboxed process to know what their seccomp + * filters consist of. + */ + if (!file_ns_capable(m->file, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EACCES; + + if (!lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) + return -ESRCH; + + f = READ_ONCE(task->seccomp.filter); + if (!f) { + unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags); + return 0; + } + + /* prevent filter from being freed while we are printing it */ + __get_seccomp_filter(f); + unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags); + + proc_pid_seccomp_cache_arch(m, SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME, + f->cache.allow_native, + SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR); + +#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT + proc_pid_seccomp_cache_arch(m, SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NAME, + f->cache.allow_compat, + SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR); +#endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT */ + + __put_seccomp_filter(f); + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG */