From patchwork Wed Feb 5 17:34:24 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Alexey Budankov X-Patchwork-Id: 11366777 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9EB6792A for ; Wed, 5 Feb 2020 17:34:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8758D20659 for ; Wed, 5 Feb 2020 17:34:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727083AbgBERee (ORCPT ); Wed, 5 Feb 2020 12:34:34 -0500 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:8668 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726957AbgBERee (ORCPT ); Wed, 5 Feb 2020 12:34:34 -0500 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga001.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.23]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 05 Feb 2020 09:34:33 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.70,406,1574150400"; d="scan'208";a="343794118" Received: from linux.intel.com ([10.54.29.200]) by fmsmga001.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 05 Feb 2020 09:34:32 -0800 Received: from [10.252.5.149] (abudanko-mobl.ccr.corp.intel.com [10.252.5.149]) by linux.intel.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 782CD5802BC; Wed, 5 Feb 2020 09:34:25 -0800 (PST) Subject: [PATCH v6 06/10] trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process From: Alexey Budankov To: James Morris , Serge Hallyn , Stephen Smalley , Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Ingo Molnar , "joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com" , Alexei Starovoitov , Will Deacon , Paul Mackerras , Michael Ellerman Cc: Andi Kleen , Thomas Gleixner , Stephane Eranian , Igor Lubashev , Jiri Olsa , linux-kernel , "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , "selinux@vger.kernel.org" , linux-arm-kernel , "linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" , "linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" , oprofile-list@lists.sf.net References: <576a6141-36d4-14c0-b395-8d195892b916@linux.intel.com> Organization: Intel Corp. Message-ID: Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2020 20:34:24 +0300 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.4.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <576a6141-36d4-14c0-b395-8d195892b916@linux.intel.com> Content-Language: en-US Sender: linux-parisc-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Open access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov --- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index e5ef4ae9edb5..334f1d71ebb1 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -1395,7 +1395,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info) u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len; int ret; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!perfmon_capable()) return -EPERM; if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT) return -EINVAL;