| Message ID | PH7PR20MB59258C767EF853A54273B3A7BF712@PH7PR20MB5925.namprd20.prod.outlook.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Changes Requested |
| Headers | show |
| Series | target: sbp: integer overflow and potential memory corruption | expand |
Fullway, > The code in sbp_make_tpg() is confusing because tpgt was limited > to UINT_MAX but the datatype of tpg->tport_tpgt is actually u16. > Correctly fix the data type problem to avoid integer overflow. > > This is similar to CVE-2015-4036 in the sense that sbp is a clone > of vhost/scsi, and the bug was inherited but never fixed. > +#define SBP_MAX_TARGET 256 Why 256?
diff --git a/drivers/target/sbp/sbp_target.c b/drivers/target/sbp/sbp_target.c index b604fcae21e1..1ba742ee48b0 100644 --- a/drivers/target/sbp/sbp_target.c +++ b/drivers/target/sbp/sbp_target.c @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ static const u32 sbp_unit_directory_template[] = { }; #define SESSION_MAINTENANCE_INTERVAL HZ +#define SBP_MAX_TARGET 256 static atomic_t login_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0); @@ -1961,12 +1962,12 @@ static struct se_portal_group *sbp_make_tpg(struct se_wwn *wwn, container_of(wwn, struct sbp_tport, tport_wwn); struct sbp_tpg *tpg; - unsigned long tpgt; + u16 tpgt; int ret; if (strstr(name, "tpgt_") != name) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - if (kstrtoul(name + 5, 10, &tpgt) || tpgt > UINT_MAX) + if (kstrtou16(name + 5, 10, &tpgt) || tpgt >= SBP_MAX_TARGET) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); if (tport->tpg) {
The code in sbp_make_tpg() is confusing because tpgt was limited to UINT_MAX but the datatype of tpg->tport_tpgt is actually u16. Correctly fix the data type problem to avoid integer overflow. This is similar to CVE-2015-4036 in the sense that sbp is a clone of vhost/scsi, and the bug was inherited but never fixed. Signed-off-by: Fullway Wang <fullwaywang@outlook.com> --- drivers/target/sbp/sbp_target.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)