From patchwork Wed Aug 26 14:52:24 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Casey Schaufler X-Patchwork-Id: 11738827 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4C5D113B1 for ; Wed, 26 Aug 2020 15:01:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E5BF2078A for ; Wed, 26 Aug 2020 15:01:30 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=yahoo.com header.i=@yahoo.com header.b="EPQt2en4" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727116AbgHZPB2 (ORCPT ); Wed, 26 Aug 2020 11:01:28 -0400 Received: from sonic312-29.consmr.mail.ne1.yahoo.com ([66.163.191.210]:42522 "EHLO sonic312-29.consmr.mail.ne1.yahoo.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726870AbgHZPB1 (ORCPT ); Wed, 26 Aug 2020 11:01:27 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=yahoo.com; s=s2048; t=1598454085; bh=CIprrtoQZG++4seg3drsFIW+XB8ydG7lOlC+5xA2G+o=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:References:From:Subject; b=EPQt2en4NA9k3jQDPjSK8uj4fHoLrmC2yIDUV6e2Cc6X41aeoajyn44Lm3VhgSWskX/4e/Pu2U30s7kcbrBDJfrHLHsQnua9P8pAB1wG1B2Ftio+sgD6ETqd+GkmVz3FfUb3+M07P+WhlUkCkEDujLnoZW0f9HxFiF8jv6sMlTwVYxCRDZwYqW/RCmfIy857p61BMwWQFxCYKUqXsWzIIM09jYzvrquMXmByu3kMqYKdIiiacDYyctDlpef56TIyEvkgVK1U9cpM0rBrXflsWyHp0a5lwSYlVbHwsCG7lh7kp9jdM72pY4GCy3BDVICa5vkNR0obemZCPrHZPbVRJA== X-YMail-OSG: 8wsskgUVM1kqX9502ssC0eVvIWw86KJWa1VECE8YyUwdMfMz4zCMyk7kqfOL9g. qrJpBPAqB8i0WAzcBXyGSoeQOEuWT3rif69SZVxDLEOuueQN_Q.n0w6u0QIJr3Rz2UvkNKr8ejZH vAc6snj682R8q9RBigJOdpsbJH987qbxgfgUqxjbuxM_blAV8pFcmRO3QDsq1zq95yFVULvknZIh ptICrWwLbFcCMaMAuIDh87caOf8Cki4i5QAiRHM5QmzZ3dTCa9x4hFEl67.gZjRdjLU3XrNyOAwE fQX.pni741Dv8ikgOZEwX6szKDSvPZfTG_I6eaZoWfuliJL72QJdVUY3VdTrm7RO2T.dy7I8Mc21 DvGPlCdgjnHgRTI4AgcOn_dzzfOA3.tkp1MUfgcAjdTksD6KugepWLDyfH18HEcp0uz4I83oBTUv 8S7x4mRLpkOvY7iYucgYV200wOXzQk6226Ye95Vrpt7c_bdnOrjSpNadxPNW0xaBhmbByJ.dZcLC uI5WldL8zQbF_nkt61KRoTzblbbR08rFrGPvkoBSRD8mJu7YYQBtQ7rrCZXorjg7.ZCJnKW0B4C9 jUfrPeJZWioQZxl38.l5jCgCbpOwyDzJ8b69kBh4bbPeGRln4dXpXYUADjHQ2rfcNUd50mrnHACQ 2h4eeO8_4durumodGqI0weiZDTJVVUN0ec0GfE1HhiJO2nvJ2ONUgX5VVMtno07nLDVnnI3UJUsV TIQLjGpZ2qBdr6N8SzI2ZPAxniL5ihdpMv3j_A_CEhjkHl5A7T65V0zzpWaNhzVWA1t8N5qGz.wZ jTYEbeuXLi8Cd_0jqOHjfHhoUBqOknBTp2Alz4KR6tNLMF7TVimsdMEg_2KN6ZEJvnXBbBK9Gudv YgC_u6U.i6TjuXB9kx.hIpoFApvKs0sGtLB2STM93NNDqGZJFdYA57RP0Od0BcpHnF_R7Adi0MKq ziGPEA2h52_zRWZZCFtrY707aAxToNbbS.sCrvKOepARYd9M2rkx02R.JjLbhwV54apeRNU8vKXZ wlj_A0O.h3EmXbsjNIONJftjlDvsZhxPFeasilCbESaW8aI4a2qAHird7M._ayl.ie035OX1ZaW5 7_._.IPlifF0WlyRZDJ85DyI6KfrpGmzilFWMwA3YFn6NTIHHYiAC1LasYEFeVAvu5fzS.r3.t2q XO.78uS.XaZy5N1LtqTwFFR5VRz1Xnxw47NaMlAVx6VTA7ABEDKmvbf6X7cmcn_4b6orwK67par1 HzRMisUggiVght8wil46bTAo_WUEz5HkqGmjCPQwpJXOeMN_xiHMybU6PRfSr70D3ABPIhygmYEI jQbQvHAeY3hhWT_FklfXm9qSanBGbw942ztLbqGrLRqjQGUi1TM1Aq5.Hj.s5lemRaSzlpMCqY.W UUgl8MbBg2IyQJND2p8NuXJAm7Cxisouyys6YF1fZEAMDJfQ1j.WN2xh2l19mqUYAcoQ8AibUhOc i09yXiWk.DfZw7tRbtiNT2VsjbJ2aqOi24mCHm5OF_Mo62SWE26n8WHMscUGG_GxeT2zaIS3jXEu qqWc54QxfDAr5eiHnTQy3kCkLQHQ- Received: from sonic.gate.mail.ne1.yahoo.com by sonic312.consmr.mail.ne1.yahoo.com with HTTP; Wed, 26 Aug 2020 15:01:25 +0000 Received: by smtp418.mail.bf1.yahoo.com (VZM Hermes SMTP Server) with ESMTPA ID e53da90d5ab8b8d266654b349c82bd5f; Wed, 26 Aug 2020 15:01:25 +0000 (UTC) From: Casey Schaufler To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-audit@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: [PATCH v20 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2020 07:52:24 -0700 Message-Id: <20200826145247.10029-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.24.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20200826145247.10029-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com> Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: This patchset provides the changes required for the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other. v20: Rebase to 5.9-rc1 Change the BPF security module to use the lsmblob data. (patch 0002) Repair length logic in subject label processing (patch 0015) Handle -EINVAL from the empty BPF setprocattr hook (patch 0020) Correct length processing in append_ctx() (patch 0022) v19: Rebase to 5.8-rc6 Incorporate feedback from v18 - Revert UDS SO_PEERSEC implementation to use lsmblobs directly, rather than allocating as needed. The correct treatment of out-of-memory conditions in the later case is difficult to define. (patch 0005) - Use a size_t in append_ctx() (patch 0021) - Fix a memory leak when creating compound contexts. (patch 0021) Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0013) Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0020) Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0021) v18: Rebase to 5.8-rc3 Incorporate feedback from v17 - Null pointer checking in UDS (patch 0005) Match changes in IMA code (patch 0012) Fix the behavior of LSM context supplimental audit records so that there's always exactly one when it's appropriate for there to be one. This is a substantial change that requires extention of the audit_context beyond syscall events. (patch 0020) v17: Rebase to 5.7-rc4 v16: Rebase to 5.6 Incorporate feedback from v15 - Thanks Stephen, Mimi and Paul - Generally improve commit messages WRT scaffolding - Comment ima_lsm_isset() (patch 0002) - Some question may remain on IMA warning (patch 0002) - Mark lsm_slot as __lsm_ro_after_init not __init_data (patch 0002) - Change name of lsmblob variable in ima_match_rules() (patch 0003) - Instead of putting a struct lsmblob into the unix_skb_parms structure put a pointer to an allocated instance. There is currently only space for 5 u32's in unix_skb_parms and it is likely to get even tighter. Fortunately, the lifecycle management of the allocated lsmblob is simple. (patch 0005) - Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0005) - Improved commentary on secmark labeling scaffolding. (patch 0006) - Reduced secmark related labeling scaffolding. (patch 0006) - Replace use of the zeroth entry of an lsmblob in scaffolding with a function lsmblob_value() to hopefully make it less obscure. (patch 0006) - Convert security_secmark_relabel_packet to use lsmblob as this reduces much of the most contentious scaffolding. (patch 0006) - Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0006) - Added BUILD_BUG_ON() for CIPSO tag 6. (patch 0018) - Reworked audit subject information. Instead of adding fields in the middle of existing records add a new record to the event. When a separate record is required use subj="?". (patch 0020) - Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0020) - Reworked audit object information. Instead of adding fields in the middle of existing records add a new record to the event. When a separate record is required use obj="?". (patch 0021) - Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0021) - Enhanced documentation (patch 0022) - Removed unnecessary error code check in security_getprocattr() (patch 0021) v15: Rebase to 5.6-rc1 - Revise IMA data use (patch 0002) Incorporate feedback from v14 - Fix lockdown module registration naming (patch 0002) - Revise how /proc/self/attr/context is gathered. (patch 0022) - Revise access modes on /proc/self/attr/context. (patch 0022) - Revise documentation on LSM external interfaces. (patch 0022) v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5 Incorporate feedback from v13 - Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002) - Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002) - Remove unneeded include (patch 0013) - Use context.len correctly (patch 0015) - Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016) - Drop SO_PEERCONTEXT as it's not needed yet (patch 0023) v13: Rebase to 5.5-rc2 Incorporate feedback from v12 - Print lsmblob size with %z (Patch 0002) - Convert lockdown LSM initialization. (Patch 0002) - Restore error check in nft_secmark_compute_secid (Patch 0006) - Correct blob scaffolding in ima_must_appraise() (Patch 0009) - Make security_setprocattr() clearer (Patch 0013) - Use lsm_task_display more widely (Patch 0013) - Use passed size in lsmcontext_init() (Patch 0014) - Don't add a smack_release_secctx() hook (Patch 0014) - Don't print warning in security_release_secctx() (Patch 0014) - Don't duplicate the label in nfs4_label_init_security() (Patch 0016) - Remove reviewed-by as code has significant change (Patch 0016) - Send the entire lsmblob for Tag 6 (Patch 0019) - Fix description of socket_getpeersec_stream parameters (Patch 0023) - Retain LSMBLOB_FIRST. What was I thinking? (Patch 0023) - Add compound context to LSM documentation (Patch 0023) v12: Rebase to 5.5-rc1 Fixed a couple of incorrect contractions in the text. v11: Rebase to 5.4-rc6 Incorporate feedback from v10 - Disambiguate reading /proc/.../attr/display by restricting all use of the interface to the current process. - Fix a merge error in AppArmor's display attribute check v10: Ask the security modules if the display can be changed. v9: There is no version 9 v8: Incorporate feedback from v7 - Minor clean-up in display value management - refactor "compound" context creation to use a common append_ctx() function. v7: Incorporate feedback from v6 - Make setting the display a privileged operation. The availability of compound contexts reduces the need for setting the display. v6: Incorporate feedback from v5 - Add subj_= and obj_= fields to audit records - Add /proc/.../attr/context to get the full context in lsmname\0value\0... format as suggested by Simon McVittie - Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for getsockopt() to get the full context in the same format, also suggested by Simon McVittie. - Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm_display_default to provide the display default value. v5: Incorporate feedback from v4 - Initialize the lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx() - Clear the lsmcontext in all security_release_secctx() cases - Don't use the "display" on strictly internal context interfaces. - The SELinux binder hooks check for cases where the context "display" isn't compatible with SELinux. v4: Incorporate feedback from v3 - Mark new lsm__alloc functions static - Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the slot value. - Validate slot values used in security.c - Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing. - fix display value check in dentry_init_security - Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting the audit log v3: Incorporate feedback from v2 - Make lsmblob parameter and variable names more meaningful, changing "le" and "l" to "blob". - Improve consistency of constant naming. - Do more sanity checking during LSM initialization. - Be a bit clearer about what is temporary scaffolding. - Rather than clutter security_getpeersec_dgram with otherwise unnecessary checks remove the apparmor stub, which does nothing useful. Patch 0001 moves management of the sock security blob from the individual modules to the infrastructure. Patches 0002-0012 replace system use of a "secid" with a structure "lsmblob" containing information from the security modules to be held and reused later. At this point lsmblob contains an array of u32 secids, one "slot" for each of the security modules compiled into the kernel that used secids. A "slot" is allocated when a security module requests one. The infrastructure is changed to use the slot number to pass the correct secid to or from the security module hooks. It is important that the lsmblob be a fixed size entity that does not have to be allocated. Several of the places where it is used would have performance and/or locking issues with dynamic allocation. Patch 0013 provides a mechanism for a process to identify which security module's hooks should be used when displaying or converting a security context string. A new interface /proc/self/attr/display contains the name of the security module to show. Reading from this file will present the name of the module, while writing to it will set the value. Only names of active security modules are accepted. Internally, the name is translated to the appropriate "slot" number for the module which is then stored in the task security blob. Setting the display requires that all modules using the /proc interfaces allow the transition. The "display" of other processess can be neither read nor written. All suggested cases for reading the display of a different process have race conditions. Patch 0014 Starts the process of changing how a security context is represented. Since it is possible for a security context to have been generated by more than one security module it is now necessary to note which module created a security context so that the correct "release" hook can be called. There are several places where the module that created a security context cannot be inferred. This is achieved by introducing a "lsmcontext" structure which contains the context string, its length and the "slot" number of the security module that created it. The security_release_secctx() interface is changed, replacing the (string,len) pointer pair with a lsmcontext pointer. Patches 0015-0017 convert the security interfaces from (string,len) pointer pairs to a lsmcontext pointer. The slot number identifying the creating module is added by the infrastructure. Where the security context is stored for extended periods the data type is changed. The Netlabel code is converted to save lsmblob structures instead of secids in Patch 0018. Patch 0019 adds checks to the binder hooks which verify that if both ends of a transaction use the same "display". Patches 0020-0021 add addition audit records for subject and object LSM data when there are multiple security modules with such data. The AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is used in conjuction with a "subj=?" field to identify the subject data. The AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is used in conjuction with a "obj=?" field to identify the object data. The AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record identifies the security module with the data: "subj_selinux=xyz_t subj_apparmor=abc". The AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record identifies the security module with the data: "obj_selinux=xyz_t obj_apparmor=abc". While AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS records will always contain an entry for each possible security modules, AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS records will only contain entries for security modules for which the object in question has data. Patch 0022 adds a new interfaces for getting the compound security contexts. /proc/self/attr/context Finally, with all interference on the AppArmor hooks removed, Patch 0023 removes the exclusive bit from AppArmor. An unnecessary stub hook was also removed. The Ubuntu project is using an earlier version of this patchset in their distribution to enable stacking for containers. Performance measurements to date have the change within the "noise". The sockperf and dbench results are on the order of 0.2% to 0.8% difference, with better performance being as common as worse. The benchmarks were run with AppArmor and Smack on Ubuntu. https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.8-rc6-a-v19 Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler