From patchwork Fri May 6 06:25:46 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ahmad Fatoum X-Patchwork-Id: 12840608 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DF1CBC433F5 for ; Fri, 6 May 2022 06:27:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S242145AbiEFGag (ORCPT ); Fri, 6 May 2022 02:30:36 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:52150 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S242503AbiEFGae (ORCPT ); Fri, 6 May 2022 02:30:34 -0400 Received: from metis.ext.pengutronix.de (metis.ext.pengutronix.de [IPv6:2001:67c:670:201:290:27ff:fe1d:cc33]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9069F62A08 for ; Thu, 5 May 2022 23:26:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: from drehscheibe.grey.stw.pengutronix.de ([2a0a:edc0:0:c01:1d::a2]) by metis.ext.pengutronix.de with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1nmrPo-0005o8-N8; Fri, 06 May 2022 08:26:12 +0200 Received: from [2a0a:edc0:0:1101:1d::ac] (helo=dude04.red.stw.pengutronix.de) by drehscheibe.grey.stw.pengutronix.de with esmtp (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1nmrPh-000edS-Ol; Fri, 06 May 2022 08:26:04 +0200 Received: from afa by dude04.red.stw.pengutronix.de with local (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1nmrPf-004Tva-Eg; Fri, 06 May 2022 08:26:03 +0200 From: Ahmad Fatoum To: Jarkko Sakkinen , =?utf-8?q?Horia_Geant=C4=83?= , Mimi Zohar , Pankaj Gupta , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , James Bottomley Cc: kernel@pengutronix.de, David Howells , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Steffen Trumtrar , Jan Luebbe , David Gstir , Eric Biggers , Richard Weinberger , Franck LENORMAND , Sumit Garg , Andreas Rammhold , Tim Harvey , Matthias Schiffer , Michael Walle , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v9 0/7] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Date: Fri, 6 May 2022 08:25:46 +0200 Message-Id: <20220506062553.1068296-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2a0a:edc0:0:c01:1d::a2 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: afa@pengutronix.de X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on metis.ext.pengutronix.de); SAEximRunCond expanded to false X-PTX-Original-Recipient: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: Series applies on top of v5.18-rc5. Would be great if this could make it into v5.19. v8 was here: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/09e2552c-7392-e1da-926b-53c7db0b118d@pengutronix.de Changelog is beneath each individual patch. Compared to v8, only code change is checking whether CAAM can support blobbing at init-time as apparently some Layerscape SoCs are available in a non-E(ncryption) variant that doesn't do AES. Previously, adding trusted keys on such SoCs would return an error with a cryptic error message. The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP. Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique never-disclosed device-specific key. There has been multiple discussions on how to represent this within the kernel: The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP. Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique never-disclosed device-specific key. There has been multiple discussions on how to represent this within the kernel: - [RFC] crypto: caam - add red blobifier Steffen implemented[1] a PoC sysfs driver to start a discussion on how to best integrate the blob mechanism. Mimi suggested that it could be used to implement trusted keys. Trusted keys back then were a TPM-only feature. - security/keys/secure_key: Adds the secure key support based on CAAM. Udit Agarwal added[2] a new "secure" key type with the CAAM as backend. The key material stays within the kernel only. Mimi and James agreed that this needs a generic interface, not specific to CAAM. Mimi suggested trusted keys. Jan noted that this could serve as basis for TEE-backed keys. - [RFC] drivers: crypto: caam: key: Add caam_tk key type Franck added[3] a new "caam_tk" key type based on Udit's work. This time it uses CAAM "black blobs" instead of "red blobs", so key material stays within the CAAM and isn't exposed to kernel in plaintext. James voiced the opinion that there should be just one user-facing generic wrap/unwrap key type with multiple possible handlers. David suggested trusted keys. - Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support Sumit reworked[4] trusted keys to support multiple possible backends with one chosen at boot time and added a new TEE backend along with TPM. This now sits in Jarkko's master branch to be sent out for v5.13 This patch series builds on top of Sumit's rework to have the CAAM as yet another trusted key backend. The CAAM bits are based on Steffen's initial patch from 2015. His work had been used in the field for some years now, so I preferred not to deviate too much from it. This series has been tested with dmcrypt[5] on an i.MX6Q/DL and an i.MX8M[6]. Looking forward to your feedback. Cheers, Ahmad [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/1447082306-19946-2-git-send-email-s.trumtrar@pengutronix.de/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20180723111432.26830-1-udit.agarwal@nxp.com/ [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1551456599-10603-2-git-send-email-franck.lenormand@nxp.com/ [4]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1604419306-26105-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org/ [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210122084321.24012-2-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/DU2PR04MB8630D83FE9BBC0D782C4FAF595089@DU2PR04MB8630.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com/ Tested-by: Michael Walle # on ls1028a (non-E and E) --- To: Jarkko Sakkinen To: "Horia Geantă" To: Mimi Zohar To: Pankaj Gupta To: Herbert Xu To: "David S. Miller" To: James Bottomley Cc: David Howells Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Steffen Trumtrar Cc: Jan Luebbe Cc: David Gstir Cc: Eric Biggers Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Franck LENORMAND Cc: Sumit Garg Cc: Andreas Rammhold Cc: Tim Harvey Cc: Matthias Schiffer Cc: Michael Walle Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Ahmad Fatoum (7): KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material crypto: caam - determine whether CAAM supports blob encap/decap crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-TRUSTED-CAAM .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 ++ .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 60 +++++- MAINTAINERS | 9 + drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile | 1 + drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c | 182 ++++++++++++++++++ drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c | 10 +- drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h | 1 + drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h | 4 +- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 2 +- include/keys/trusted_caam.h | 11 ++ include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h | 103 ++++++++++ security/keys/Kconfig | 18 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 38 ++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 10 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c | 80 ++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 45 ++++- 17 files changed, 556 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_caam.h create mode 100644 include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c