mbox series

[v8,0/4] Landlock: Add abstract unix socket connect

Message ID cover.1722570749.git.fahimitahera@gmail.com (mailing list archive)
Headers show
Series Landlock: Add abstract unix socket connect | expand

Message

Tahera Fahimi Aug. 2, 2024, 4:02 a.m. UTC
This patch series adds scoping mechanism for abstract unix sockets.
Closes: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/7

Problem
=======

Abstract unix sockets are used for local inter-process communications
independent of the filesystem. Currently, a sandboxed process can
connect to a socket outside of the sandboxed environment, since Landlock
has no restriction for connecting to an abstract socket address(see more
details in [1,2]). Access to such sockets for a sandboxed process should
be scoped the same way ptrace is limited.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231023.ahphah4Wii4v@digikod.net/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231102.MaeWaepav8nu@digikod.net/

Solution
========

To solve this issue, we extend the user space interface by adding a new
"scoped" field to Landlock ruleset attribute structure. This field can
contains different rights to restrict different functionalities. For
abstract unix sockets, we introduce
"LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET" field to specify that a ruleset
will deny any connection from within the sandbox domain to its parent
(i.e. any parent sandbox or non-sandbox processes).

Example
=======

Starting a listening socket with socat(1):
	socat abstract-listen:mysocket -

Starting a sandboxed shell from $HOME with samples/landlock/sandboxer:
	LL_FS_RO=/ LL_FS_RW=. LL_SCOPED="a" ./sandboxer /bin/bash

If we try to connect to the listening socket, the connection would be
refused.
	socat - abstract-connect:mysocket --> fails


Notes of Implementation
=======================

* Using the "scoped" field provides enough compatibility and flexibility
  to extend the scoping mechanism for other IPCs(e.g. signals).

* To access the domain of a socket, we use its credentials of the file's FD
  which point to the credentials of the process that created the socket.
  (see more details in [3]). Cases where the process using the socket has
  a different domain than the process created it are covered in the 
  unix_sock_special_cases test.

[3]https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240611.Pi8Iph7ootae@digikod.net/


Previous Versions
=================
v6: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Zn32CYZiu7pY+rdI@tahera-OptiPlex-5000/
and https://lore.kernel.org/all/Zn32KKIJrY7Zi51K@tahera-OptiPlex-5000/
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZnSZnhGBiprI6FRk@tahera-OptiPlex-5000/
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZnNcE3ph2SWi1qmd@tahera-OptiPlex-5000/
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZmJJ7lZdQuQop7e5@tahera-OptiPlex-5000/
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZgX5TRTrSDPrJFfF@tahera-OptiPlex-5000/
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZgXN5fi6A1YQKiAQ@tahera-OptiPlex-5000/

Tahera Fahimi (4):
  Landlock: Add abstract unix socket connect restriction
  selftests/landlock: Abstract unix socket restriction tests
  sample/Landlock: Support abstract unix socket restriction
  Landlock: Document LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET and ABI
    versioning

 Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst      |   33 +-
 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h                 |   30 +
 samples/landlock/sandboxer.c                  |   56 +-
 security/landlock/limits.h                    |    3 +
 security/landlock/ruleset.c                   |    7 +-
 security/landlock/ruleset.h                   |   23 +-
 security/landlock/syscalls.c                  |   14 +-
 security/landlock/task.c                      |  155 +++
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c  |    2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h     |   72 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c    |   34 -
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c   |   31 +-
 .../landlock/scoped_abstract_unix_test.c      | 1136 +++++++++++++++++
 13 files changed, 1518 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_abstract_unix_test.c