From patchwork Tue Jun 22 12:37:49 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ahmad Fatoum X-Patchwork-Id: 12337229 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8289AC49EA4 for ; Tue, 22 Jun 2021 12:39:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6B9316135A for ; Tue, 22 Jun 2021 12:39:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231748AbhFVMlk (ORCPT ); Tue, 22 Jun 2021 08:41:40 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:48276 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231303AbhFVMlG (ORCPT ); Tue, 22 Jun 2021 08:41:06 -0400 Received: from metis.ext.pengutronix.de (metis.ext.pengutronix.de [IPv6:2001:67c:670:201:290:27ff:fe1d:cc33]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5AEC9C06124A for ; Tue, 22 Jun 2021 05:38:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: from dude.hi.pengutronix.de ([2001:67c:670:100:1d::7]) by metis.ext.pengutronix.de with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1lvffW-0001dm-6Z; Tue, 22 Jun 2021 14:38:18 +0200 Received: from afa by dude.hi.pengutronix.de with local (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1lvffS-0002Q8-M3; Tue, 22 Jun 2021 14:38:14 +0200 From: Ahmad Fatoum To: James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Mimi Zohar , David Howells Cc: kernel@pengutronix.de, Ahmad Fatoum , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , =?utf-8?q?Horia_Geant=C4=83?= , Aymen Sghaier , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Udit Agarwal , Jan Luebbe , Eric Biggers , David Gstir , Richard Weinberger , Franck LENORMAND , Sumit Garg , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2 3/6] KEYS: trusted: allow users to use kernel RNG for key material Date: Tue, 22 Jun 2021 14:37:49 +0200 Message-Id: <0119a7ef4c9b5420dffcc885338ac06979491cef.1624364386.git-series.a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2001:67c:670:100:1d::7 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: afa@pengutronix.de X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on metis.ext.pengutronix.de); SAEximRunCond expanded to false X-PTX-Original-Recipient: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG, but instead let the hardware doing the sealing/unsealing also generate the random key material. However, Users may want to place less trust into the quality of the trust source's random number generator and instead use the kernel entropy pool, which can be seeded from multiple entropy sources. Make this possible by adding a new trusted.kernel_rng parameter, that will force use of the kernel RNG. In its absence, it's up to the trust source to decide, which random numbers to use, maintaining the existing behavior. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum --- To: James Bottomley To: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Mimi Zohar To: David Howells Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: "Horia Geantă" Cc: Aymen Sghaier Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Udit Agarwal Cc: Jan Luebbe Cc: Eric Biggers Cc: David Gstir Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Franck LENORMAND Cc: Sumit Garg Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 ++++++- Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 20 +++++++++------- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 17 +++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index cb89dbdedc46..f8bdc898c354 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5644,6 +5644,13 @@ first trust source as a backend which is initialized successfully during iteration. + trusted.kernel_rng = [KEYS] + Format: + When set to true (1), the kernel random number pool + is used to generate key material for trusted keys. + The default is to leave the RNG's choice to each + individual trust source. + tsc= Disable clocksource stability checks for TSC. Format: [x86] reliable: mark tsc clocksource as reliable, this diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index cc2e677b3bb6..3fb5562ee937 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -87,22 +87,26 @@ Key Generation Trusted Keys ------------ -New keys are created from random numbers generated in the trust source. They -are encrypted/decrypted using a child key in the storage key hierarchy. -Encryption and decryption of the child key must be protected by a strong -access control policy within the trust source. +New keys are created from random numbers. They are encrypted/decrypted using +a child key in the storage key hierarchy. Encryption and decryption of the +child key must be protected by a strong access control policy within the +trust source. The random number generator in use differs according to the +selected trust source: - * TPM (hardware device) based RNG + * TPM: hardware device based RNG - Strength of random numbers may vary from one device manufacturer to - another. + Keys are generated within the TPM. Strength of random numbers may vary + from one device manufacturer to another. - * TEE (OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone) based RNG + * TEE: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone based RNG RNG is customizable as per platform needs. It can either be direct output from platform specific hardware RNG or a software based Fortuna CSPRNG which can be seeded via multiple entropy sources. +Optionally, users may specify ``trusted.kernel_rng=1`` on the kernel +command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool. + Encrypted Keys -------------- diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c index 2223e11c8bb5..2eeb7117e86b 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -16,12 +16,17 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include +static bool trusted_kernel_rng; +module_param_named(kernel_rng, trusted_kernel_rng, bool, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(kernel_rng, "Generate key material from kernel RNG"); + static char *trusted_key_source; module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0); MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm or tee)"); @@ -329,8 +334,14 @@ struct key_type key_type_trusted = { }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted); +static int kernel_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) +{ + return get_random_bytes_wait(key, key_len) ?: key_len; +} + static int __init init_trusted(void) { + int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len); int i, ret = 0; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(trusted_key_sources); i++) { @@ -339,6 +350,10 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void) strlen(trusted_key_sources[i].name))) continue; + get_random = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->get_random; + if (trusted_kernel_rng) + get_random = kernel_get_random; + static_call_update(trusted_key_init, trusted_key_sources[i].ops->init); static_call_update(trusted_key_seal, @@ -346,7 +361,7 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void) static_call_update(trusted_key_unseal, trusted_key_sources[i].ops->unseal); static_call_update(trusted_key_get_random, - trusted_key_sources[i].ops->get_random); + get_random); static_call_update(trusted_key_exit, trusted_key_sources[i].ops->exit); migratable = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->migratable;