| Message ID | 1463868720-7706-1-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On Sat, May 21, 2016 at 3:12 PM, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> wrote: > Commit 8a56038c2aef ("Yama: consolidate error reporting") causes lockups > when someone hits a Yama denial. Call chain: > > process_vm_readv -> process_vm_rw -> process_vm_rw_core -> mm_access > -> ptrace_may_access > task_lock(...) is taken > __ptrace_may_access -> security_ptrace_access_check > -> yama_ptrace_access_check -> report_access -> kstrdup_quotable_cmdline > -> get_cmdline -> access_process_vm -> get_task_mm > task_lock(...) is taken again > > task_lock(p) just calls spin_lock(&p->alloc_lock), so at this point, > spin_lock() is called on a lock that is already held by the current > process. > > Also: Since the alloc_lock is a spinlock, sleeping inside > security_ptrace_access_check hooks is probably not allowed at all? So it's > not even possible to print the cmdline from in there because that might > involve paging in userspace memory. > > It would be tempting to rewrite ptrace_may_access() to drop the alloc_lock > before calling the LSM, but even then, ptrace_may_access() itself might be > called from various contexts in which you're not allowed to sleep; for > example, as far as I understand, to be able to hold a reference to another > task, usually an RCU read lock will be taken (see e.g. kcmp() and > get_robust_list()), so that also prohibits sleeping. (And using e.g. FUSE, > a user can cause pagefault handling to take arbitrary amounts of time - > see https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=808.) > > Therefore, AFAIK, in order to print the name of a process below > security_ptrace_access_check(), you'd have to either grab a reference to > the mm_struct and defer the access violation reporting or just use the > "comm" value that's stored in kernelspace and accessible without big > complications. (Or you could try to use some kind of atomic remote VM > access that fails if the memory isn't paged in, similar to > copy_from_user_inatomic(), and if necessary fall back to comm, but > that'd be kind of ugly because the comm/cmdline choice would look > pretty random to the user.) > > Fix it by deferring reporting of the access violation until current > exits kernelspace the next time. > > Fixes: 8a56038c2aef ("Yama: consolidate error reporting") > Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Ah-ha! Thanks! James, can you please take this? Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Kees > --- > security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > 1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c > index 9b756b1..9d55ade 100644 > --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c > +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c > @@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ > #include <linux/ratelimit.h> > #include <linux/workqueue.h> > #include <linux/string_helpers.h> > +#include <linux/task_work.h> > +#include <linux/sched.h> > +#include <linux/spinlock.h> > > #define YAMA_SCOPE_DISABLED 0 > #define YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL 1 > @@ -42,20 +45,71 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ptracer_relations_lock); > static void yama_relation_cleanup(struct work_struct *work); > static DECLARE_WORK(yama_relation_work, yama_relation_cleanup); > > -static void report_access(const char *access, struct task_struct *target, > - struct task_struct *agent) > +struct access_report_info { > + struct callback_head work; > + const char *access; > + struct task_struct *target; > + struct task_struct *agent; > +}; > + > +static void __report_access(struct callback_head *work) > { > + struct access_report_info *info = > + container_of(work, struct access_report_info, work); > char *target_cmd, *agent_cmd; > > - target_cmd = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(target, GFP_ATOMIC); > - agent_cmd = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(agent, GFP_ATOMIC); > + target_cmd = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(info->target, GFP_ATOMIC); > + agent_cmd = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(info->agent, GFP_ATOMIC); > > pr_notice_ratelimited( > "ptrace %s of \"%s\"[%d] was attempted by \"%s\"[%d]\n", > - access, target_cmd, target->pid, agent_cmd, agent->pid); > + info->access, target_cmd, info->target->pid, agent_cmd, > + info->agent->pid); > > kfree(agent_cmd); > kfree(target_cmd); > + > + put_task_struct(info->agent); > + put_task_struct(info->target); > + kfree(info); > +} > + > +/* defers execution because cmdline access can sleep */ > +static void report_access(const char *access, struct task_struct *target, > + struct task_struct *agent) > +{ > + struct access_report_info *info; > + char agent_comm[sizeof(agent->comm)]; > + > + assert_spin_locked(&target->alloc_lock); /* for agent->comm */ > + > + if (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD) { > + /* I don't think kthreads call task_work_run() before exiting. > + * Imagine angry ranting about procfs here. > + */ > + pr_notice_ratelimited( > + "ptrace %s of \"%s\"[%d] was attempted by \"%s\"[%d]\n", > + access, target->comm, target->pid, > + get_task_comm(agent_comm, agent), agent->pid); > + return; > + } > + > + info = kmalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_ATOMIC); > + if (!info) > + return; > + init_task_work(&info->work, __report_access); > + get_task_struct(target); > + get_task_struct(agent); > + info->access = access; > + info->target = target; > + info->agent = agent; > + if (task_work_add(current, &info->work, true) == 0) > + return; /* success */ > + > + WARN(1, "report_access called from exiting task"); > + put_task_struct(target); > + put_task_struct(agent); > + kfree(info); > } > > /** > -- > 2.1.4 >
On Sat, May 21, 2016 at 03:16:48PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > On Sat, May 21, 2016 at 3:12 PM, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> wrote: > > Commit 8a56038c2aef ("Yama: consolidate error reporting") causes lockups > > when someone hits a Yama denial. Call chain: > > > > process_vm_readv -> process_vm_rw -> process_vm_rw_core -> mm_access > > -> ptrace_may_access > > task_lock(...) is taken > > __ptrace_may_access -> security_ptrace_access_check > > -> yama_ptrace_access_check -> report_access -> kstrdup_quotable_cmdline > > -> get_cmdline -> access_process_vm -> get_task_mm > > task_lock(...) is taken again > > > > task_lock(p) just calls spin_lock(&p->alloc_lock), so at this point, > > spin_lock() is called on a lock that is already held by the current > > process. > > > > Also: Since the alloc_lock is a spinlock, sleeping inside > > security_ptrace_access_check hooks is probably not allowed at all? So it's > > not even possible to print the cmdline from in there because that might > > involve paging in userspace memory. > > > > It would be tempting to rewrite ptrace_may_access() to drop the alloc_lock > > before calling the LSM, but even then, ptrace_may_access() itself might be > > called from various contexts in which you're not allowed to sleep; for > > example, as far as I understand, to be able to hold a reference to another > > task, usually an RCU read lock will be taken (see e.g. kcmp() and > > get_robust_list()), so that also prohibits sleeping. (And using e.g. FUSE, > > a user can cause pagefault handling to take arbitrary amounts of time - > > see https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=808.) > > > > Therefore, AFAIK, in order to print the name of a process below > > security_ptrace_access_check(), you'd have to either grab a reference to > > the mm_struct and defer the access violation reporting or just use the > > "comm" value that's stored in kernelspace and accessible without big > > complications. (Or you could try to use some kind of atomic remote VM > > access that fails if the memory isn't paged in, similar to > > copy_from_user_inatomic(), and if necessary fall back to comm, but > > that'd be kind of ugly because the comm/cmdline choice would look > > pretty random to the user.) > > > > Fix it by deferring reporting of the access violation until current > > exits kernelspace the next time. > > > > Fixes: 8a56038c2aef ("Yama: consolidate error reporting") > > Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> > > Ah-ha! Thanks! James, can you please take this? > > Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Actually... whoops, please don't merge this. I just remembered that the yama_ptrace_traceme() case doesn't take the task_lock, and I only tested the yama_ptrace_access_check() one.
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c index 9b756b1..9d55ade 100644 --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c @@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ #include <linux/ratelimit.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h> #include <linux/string_helpers.h> +#include <linux/task_work.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> #define YAMA_SCOPE_DISABLED 0 #define YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL 1 @@ -42,20 +45,71 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ptracer_relations_lock); static void yama_relation_cleanup(struct work_struct *work); static DECLARE_WORK(yama_relation_work, yama_relation_cleanup); -static void report_access(const char *access, struct task_struct *target, - struct task_struct *agent) +struct access_report_info { + struct callback_head work; + const char *access; + struct task_struct *target; + struct task_struct *agent; +}; + +static void __report_access(struct callback_head *work) { + struct access_report_info *info = + container_of(work, struct access_report_info, work); char *target_cmd, *agent_cmd; - target_cmd = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(target, GFP_ATOMIC); - agent_cmd = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(agent, GFP_ATOMIC); + target_cmd = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(info->target, GFP_ATOMIC); + agent_cmd = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(info->agent, GFP_ATOMIC); pr_notice_ratelimited( "ptrace %s of \"%s\"[%d] was attempted by \"%s\"[%d]\n", - access, target_cmd, target->pid, agent_cmd, agent->pid); + info->access, target_cmd, info->target->pid, agent_cmd, + info->agent->pid); kfree(agent_cmd); kfree(target_cmd); + + put_task_struct(info->agent); + put_task_struct(info->target); + kfree(info); +} + +/* defers execution because cmdline access can sleep */ +static void report_access(const char *access, struct task_struct *target, + struct task_struct *agent) +{ + struct access_report_info *info; + char agent_comm[sizeof(agent->comm)]; + + assert_spin_locked(&target->alloc_lock); /* for agent->comm */ + + if (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD) { + /* I don't think kthreads call task_work_run() before exiting. + * Imagine angry ranting about procfs here. + */ + pr_notice_ratelimited( + "ptrace %s of \"%s\"[%d] was attempted by \"%s\"[%d]\n", + access, target->comm, target->pid, + get_task_comm(agent_comm, agent), agent->pid); + return; + } + + info = kmalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!info) + return; + init_task_work(&info->work, __report_access); + get_task_struct(target); + get_task_struct(agent); + info->access = access; + info->target = target; + info->agent = agent; + if (task_work_add(current, &info->work, true) == 0) + return; /* success */ + + WARN(1, "report_access called from exiting task"); + put_task_struct(target); + put_task_struct(agent); + kfree(info); } /**
Commit 8a56038c2aef ("Yama: consolidate error reporting") causes lockups when someone hits a Yama denial. Call chain: process_vm_readv -> process_vm_rw -> process_vm_rw_core -> mm_access -> ptrace_may_access task_lock(...) is taken __ptrace_may_access -> security_ptrace_access_check -> yama_ptrace_access_check -> report_access -> kstrdup_quotable_cmdline -> get_cmdline -> access_process_vm -> get_task_mm task_lock(...) is taken again task_lock(p) just calls spin_lock(&p->alloc_lock), so at this point, spin_lock() is called on a lock that is already held by the current process. Also: Since the alloc_lock is a spinlock, sleeping inside security_ptrace_access_check hooks is probably not allowed at all? So it's not even possible to print the cmdline from in there because that might involve paging in userspace memory. It would be tempting to rewrite ptrace_may_access() to drop the alloc_lock before calling the LSM, but even then, ptrace_may_access() itself might be called from various contexts in which you're not allowed to sleep; for example, as far as I understand, to be able to hold a reference to another task, usually an RCU read lock will be taken (see e.g. kcmp() and get_robust_list()), so that also prohibits sleeping. (And using e.g. FUSE, a user can cause pagefault handling to take arbitrary amounts of time - see https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=808.) Therefore, AFAIK, in order to print the name of a process below security_ptrace_access_check(), you'd have to either grab a reference to the mm_struct and defer the access violation reporting or just use the "comm" value that's stored in kernelspace and accessible without big complications. (Or you could try to use some kind of atomic remote VM access that fails if the memory isn't paged in, similar to copy_from_user_inatomic(), and if necessary fall back to comm, but that'd be kind of ugly because the comm/cmdline choice would look pretty random to the user.) Fix it by deferring reporting of the access violation until current exits kernelspace the next time. Fixes: 8a56038c2aef ("Yama: consolidate error reporting") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> --- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)