From patchwork Thu Aug 25 10:32:36 2016 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= X-Patchwork-Id: 9299213 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C9B6E60459 for ; Thu, 25 Aug 2016 10:48:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BBE13291F7 for ; Thu, 25 Aug 2016 10:48:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id B031629252; Thu, 25 Aug 2016 10:48:56 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 57D55291F7 for ; Thu, 25 Aug 2016 10:48:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933905AbcHYKpo (ORCPT ); Thu, 25 Aug 2016 06:45:44 -0400 Received: from smtp-sh2.infomaniak.ch ([128.65.195.6]:44378 "EHLO smtp-sh2.infomaniak.ch" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S933887AbcHYKpm (ORCPT ); Thu, 25 Aug 2016 06:45:42 -0400 X-Greylist: delayed 570 seconds by postgrey-1.27 at vger.kernel.org; Thu, 25 Aug 2016 06:45:36 EDT Received: from smtp6.infomaniak.ch (smtp6.infomaniak.ch [83.166.132.19]) by smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id u7PAYUvo026305 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Thu, 25 Aug 2016 12:34:30 +0200 Received: from localhost (ns3096276.ip-94-23-54.eu [94.23.54.103]) (authenticated bits=0) by smtp6.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id u7PAYT7i001916; Thu, 25 Aug 2016 12:34:29 +0200 From: =?UTF-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl=20Sala=C3=BCn?= To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: =?UTF-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl=20Sala=C3=BCn?= , Alexei Starovoitov , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , Daniel Mack , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , Elena Reshetova , James Morris , Kees Cook , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Will Drewry , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC v2 01/10] landlock: Add Kconfig Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2016 12:32:36 +0200 Message-Id: <1472121165-29071-2-git-send-email-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.8.1 In-Reply-To: <1472121165-29071-1-git-send-email-mic@digikod.net> References: <1472121165-29071-1-git-send-email-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Antivirus: Dr.Web (R) for Unix mail servers drweb plugin ver.6.0.2.8 X-Antivirus-Code: 0x100000 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Initial Landlock Kconfig needed to split the Landlock eBPF and seccomp parts to ease the review. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Cc: James Morris Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Serge E. Hallyn --- security/Kconfig | 1 + security/landlock/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/landlock/Kconfig diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 176758cdfa57..be6c549dd0ca 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ source security/tomoyo/Kconfig source security/apparmor/Kconfig source security/loadpin/Kconfig source security/yama/Kconfig +source security/landlock/Kconfig source security/integrity/Kconfig diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..dc8328d216d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +config SECURITY_LANDLOCK + bool "Landlock sandbox support" + depends on SECURITY + select BPF_SYSCALL + select SECCOMP + default y + help + Landlock is a stacked LSM which allows any user to load a security policy + to restrict their processes (i.e. create a sandbox). The policy is a list + of stacked eBPF programs for some LSM hooks. Each program can do some + access comparison to check if an access request is legitimate. + + Further information about eBPF can be found in + Documentation/networking/filter.txt + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y.