| Message ID | 1493123038-30590-5-git-send-email-tixxdz@gmail.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On Tue, Apr 25, 2017 at 5:23 AM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> wrote: > This patch allows to have multiple private procfs instances inside the > same pid namespace. Lot of other areas in the kernel and filesystems > have been updated to be able to support private instances, devpts is one > major example. The aim here is lightweight sandboxes, and to allow that we > have to modernize procfs internals. > > 1) The main aim of this work is to have on embedded systems one > supervisor for apps. Right now we have some lightweight sandbox support, > however if we create pid namespacess we have to manages all the > processes inside too, where our goal is to be able to run a bunch of > apps each one inside its own mount namespace without being able to > notice each other. We only want to use mount namespaces, and we want > procfs to behave more like a real mount point. > > 2) Linux Security Modules have multiple ptrace paths inside some > subsystems, however inside procfs, the implementation does not guarantee > that the ptrace() check which triggers the security_ptrace_check() hook > will always run. We have the 'hidepid' mount option that can be used to > force the ptrace_may_access() check inside has_pid_permissions() to run. > The problem is that 'hidepid' is per pid namespace and not attached to > the mount point, any remount or modification of 'hidepid' will propagate > to all other procfs mounts. > > This also does not allow to support Yama LSM easily in desktop and user > sessions. Yama ptrace scope which restricts ptrace and some other > syscalls to be allowed only on inferiors, can be updated to have a > per-task context, where the context will be inherited during fork(), > clone() and preserved across execve(). If we support multiple private > procfs instances, then we may force the ptrace_may_access() on > /proc/<pids>/ to always run inside that new procfs instances. This will > allow to specifiy on user sessions if we should populate procfs with > pids that the user can ptrace or not. > > By using Yama ptrace scope, some restricted users will only be able to see > inferiors inside /proc, they won't even be able to see their other > processes. Some software like Chromium, Firefox's crash handler, Wine > and others are already using Yama to restrict which processes can be > ptracable. With this change this will give the possibility to restrict > /proc/<pids>/ but more importantly this will give desktop users a > generic and usuable way to specifiy which users should see all processes > and which users can not. > > Side notes: > * This covers the lack of seccomp where it is not able to parse > arguments, it is easy to install a seccomp filter on direct syscalls > that operate on pids, however /proc/<pid>/ is a Linux ABI using > filesystem syscalls. With this change LSMs should be able to analyze > open/read/write/close... > > 3) This will modernize procfs and align it with all other filesystems > and subsystems that have been updated recently to be able to work in a > flexible way. This is the same as devpts where each mount now is a distinct > filesystem such that ptys and their indicies allocated in one mount are > independent from ptys and their indicies in all other mounts. > > We have to align procfs and modernize it to have a per mount context > where at least the mount option do not propagate to all other mounts, > then maybe we can continue to implement new features. One example is to > require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the init user namespace on some /proc/* which are > not pids and which are are not virtualized by design, or CAP_NET_ADMIN > inside userns on the net bits that are virtualized, etc. > These mount options won't propagate to previous mounts, and the system > will continue to be usable. > > Ths patch introduces the new 'limit_pids' mount option as it was also > suggesed by Andy Lutomirski [1]. When this option is passed we > automatically create a private procfs instance. This is not the default > behaviour since we do not want to break userspace and we do not want to > provide different devices IDs by default, please see [1] for why. I think that calling the option to make a separate instance "limit_pids" is extremely counterintuitive. My strong preference would be to make proc *always* make a separate instance (unless it's a bind mount) and to make it work. If that means fudging stat() output, so be it. Failing that, let's come up with some coherent way to make this work. "new_instance" or similar would do. Then make limit_pid cause an error unless new_instance is also set. --Andy -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Thu, Apr 27, 2017 at 12:13 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote: > On Tue, Apr 25, 2017 at 5:23 AM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> wrote: [...] >> We have to align procfs and modernize it to have a per mount context >> where at least the mount option do not propagate to all other mounts, >> then maybe we can continue to implement new features. One example is to >> require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the init user namespace on some /proc/* which are >> not pids and which are are not virtualized by design, or CAP_NET_ADMIN >> inside userns on the net bits that are virtualized, etc. >> These mount options won't propagate to previous mounts, and the system >> will continue to be usable. >> >> Ths patch introduces the new 'limit_pids' mount option as it was also >> suggesed by Andy Lutomirski [1]. When this option is passed we >> automatically create a private procfs instance. This is not the default >> behaviour since we do not want to break userspace and we do not want to >> provide different devices IDs by default, please see [1] for why. > > I think that calling the option to make a separate instance > "limit_pids" is extremely counterintuitive. Ok. > My strong preference would be to make proc *always* make a separate > instance (unless it's a bind mount) and to make it work. If that > means fudging stat() output, so be it. I also agree, but as said if we change stat(), userspace won't be able to notice if these two proc instances are really separated, the device ID is the only indication here. So, > Failing that, let's come up with some coherent way to make this work. > "new_instance" or similar would do. Then make limit_pid cause an > error unless new_instance is also set. This is reasonable and it follows devpts filesystem, when 'new_instance' was introduced to gradually switch to private instances, then it was made default behaviour. We can do the same and improve the situation bit by bit without breaking anything. I will prepare a new clean version with "newinstance" and "pids=ptraceable" requiring it, this way we don't change anything that is related to current 'hidepid' behaviour. Let me know please if you don't agree. Thank you for the feedback!
On Tue, May 2, 2017 at 7:29 AM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> wrote: > On Thu, Apr 27, 2017 at 12:13 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote: >> On Tue, Apr 25, 2017 at 5:23 AM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> wrote: > [...] >>> We have to align procfs and modernize it to have a per mount context >>> where at least the mount option do not propagate to all other mounts, >>> then maybe we can continue to implement new features. One example is to >>> require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the init user namespace on some /proc/* which are >>> not pids and which are are not virtualized by design, or CAP_NET_ADMIN >>> inside userns on the net bits that are virtualized, etc. >>> These mount options won't propagate to previous mounts, and the system >>> will continue to be usable. >>> >>> Ths patch introduces the new 'limit_pids' mount option as it was also >>> suggesed by Andy Lutomirski [1]. When this option is passed we >>> automatically create a private procfs instance. This is not the default >>> behaviour since we do not want to break userspace and we do not want to >>> provide different devices IDs by default, please see [1] for why. >> >> I think that calling the option to make a separate instance >> "limit_pids" is extremely counterintuitive. > > Ok. > >> My strong preference would be to make proc *always* make a separate >> instance (unless it's a bind mount) and to make it work. If that >> means fudging stat() output, so be it. > > I also agree, but as said if we change stat(), userspace won't be able > to notice if these two proc instances are really separated, the device > ID is the only indication here. I re-read all the threads and I'm still not convinced I see why we need new_instance to be non-default. It's true that the device numbers of /proc/ns/* matter, but if you look (with stat -L, for example), they're *already* not tied to the procfs instance. I'm okay with adding new_instance to be on the safe side, but I'd like it to be done in a way that we could make it become the default some day without breaking anything. This means that we need to be rather careful about how new_instance and hidepid interact. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Tue, May 2, 2017 at 6:33 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote: > On Tue, May 2, 2017 at 7:29 AM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> wrote: >> On Thu, Apr 27, 2017 at 12:13 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote: >>> On Tue, Apr 25, 2017 at 5:23 AM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> wrote: >> [...] >>>> We have to align procfs and modernize it to have a per mount context >>>> where at least the mount option do not propagate to all other mounts, >>>> then maybe we can continue to implement new features. One example is to >>>> require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the init user namespace on some /proc/* which are >>>> not pids and which are are not virtualized by design, or CAP_NET_ADMIN >>>> inside userns on the net bits that are virtualized, etc. >>>> These mount options won't propagate to previous mounts, and the system >>>> will continue to be usable. >>>> >>>> Ths patch introduces the new 'limit_pids' mount option as it was also >>>> suggesed by Andy Lutomirski [1]. When this option is passed we >>>> automatically create a private procfs instance. This is not the default >>>> behaviour since we do not want to break userspace and we do not want to >>>> provide different devices IDs by default, please see [1] for why. >>> >>> I think that calling the option to make a separate instance >>> "limit_pids" is extremely counterintuitive. >> >> Ok. >> >>> My strong preference would be to make proc *always* make a separate >>> instance (unless it's a bind mount) and to make it work. If that >>> means fudging stat() output, so be it. >> >> I also agree, but as said if we change stat(), userspace won't be able >> to notice if these two proc instances are really separated, the device >> ID is the only indication here. > > I re-read all the threads and I'm still not convinced I see why we > need new_instance to be non-default. It's true that the device > numbers of /proc/ns/* matter, but if you look (with stat -L, for > example), they're *already* not tied to the procfs instance. Hmm, indeed, so the namespace FDs point internally to the internal proc mount that is created during pidns initialization, this means NS_GET_PARENT ioctl won't change which is good, only things that relate on stat()ing other inodes may notice. > > I'm okay with adding new_instance to be on the safe side, but I'd like > it to be done in a way that we could make it become the default some > day without breaking anything. This means that we need to be rather > careful about how new_instance and hidepid interact. Sounds good, from the devpts history it seems that "newinstance" was used to absorb new changes/updates easily, and it was made a no-op only recently with commit eedf265aa003b4 "devpts: Make each mount of devpts an independent filesystem." last year, where the initial introduction was via commit 2a1b2dc0c83bbfc24 "Enable multiple instances of devpts" in 2009 Starting from this: 1) "hidepid" works withe the "gid" membership option which is sticky, I would like to avoid this combination, plus 2) "hidepid" now changes the pid namespace option. With "newinstance" set: * "hidepid" instead of changing the pid namespace options, it will only affect the new procfs instance. * Changing "hidepid" value during a remount of a *private* procfs instance will only affect that procfs instance and not the pid namespace or the other shared procfs mounts. * "pids=ptraceable" makes /proc/ show only pids that the caller can ptrace. Together with NO_NEW_PRIVS set, it makes a good privacy measure. "pids=ptraceable" is also for *LSM* so we guarantee that there is a ptrace security hook there for LSMs and that there are no relations or exceptions between "pids=ptraceable" and "hidepid" / "gid" mount options. This will benefit Yama LSM later. * "pids=ptraceable" will take precedence over "hidepid" I assume defaulting later to new instances should continue to work, comments ? Thanks!
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 3351275..2e0f661 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -685,13 +685,22 @@ static bool has_pid_permissions(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, struct task_struct *task, int hide_pid_min) { - int hide_pid = proc_fs_hide_pid(fs_info); - kgid_t gid = proc_fs_pid_gid(fs_info); + int limit_pids = proc_fs_limit_pids(fs_info); - if (hide_pid < hide_pid_min) - return true; - if (in_group_p(gid)) - return true; + /* + * If 'limit_pids' mount is set force a ptrace check, + * we indicate that we are using a filesystem syscall + * by passing PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS + */ + if (limit_pids == PROC_LIMIT_PIDS_OFF) { + int hide_pid = proc_fs_hide_pid(fs_info); + kgid_t gid = proc_fs_pid_gid(fs_info); + + if (hide_pid < hide_pid_min) + return true; + if (in_group_p(gid)) + return true; + } return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); } diff --git a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c index 7c0e122..b4ee4a1 100644 --- a/fs/proc/inode.c +++ b/fs/proc/inode.c @@ -105,12 +105,16 @@ static int proc_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root) struct super_block *sb = root->d_sb; struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb(sb); struct pid_namespace *pid = fs_info->pid_ns; + int limit_pids = proc_fs_limit_pids(fs_info); if (!gid_eq(pid->pid_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID)) seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%u", from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, pid->pid_gid)); if (pid->hide_pid != HIDEPID_OFF) seq_printf(seq, ",hidepid=%u", pid->hide_pid); + if (limit_pids > PROC_LIMIT_PIDS_OFF) + seq_printf(seq, ",limit_pids=%u", limit_pids); + return 0; } diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c index a76ceb0..f398c14 100644 --- a/fs/proc/root.c +++ b/fs/proc/root.c @@ -27,15 +27,66 @@ #include "internal.h" enum { - Opt_gid, Opt_hidepid, Opt_err, + Opt_gid, Opt_hidepid, Opt_limit_pids, Opt_err, }; static const match_table_t tokens = { {Opt_hidepid, "hidepid=%u"}, {Opt_gid, "gid=%u"}, + {Opt_limit_pids, "limit_pids=%u"}, {Opt_err, NULL}, }; +/* We only parse 'limit_pids' option here */ +int proc_parse_early_options(char *options, struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) +{ + char *p, *opts, *orig; + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + int option, ret; + + if (!options) + return 0; + + opts = kstrdup(options, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!opts) + return -ENOMEM; + + orig = opts; + + while ((p = strsep(&opts, ",")) != NULL) { + int token; + + if (!*p) + continue; + + token = match_token(p, tokens, args); + switch (token) { + case Opt_limit_pids: + if (match_int(&args[0], &option)) + return -EINVAL; + ret = proc_fs_set_limit_pids(fs_info, option); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_err("proc: faild to parse mount option " + "\"%s\" \n", p); + return ret; + } + proc_fs_set_newinstance(fs_info, true); + pr_info("proc: mounting a new procfs instance "); + break; + case Opt_gid: + case Opt_hidepid: + break; + default: + pr_err("proc: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" " + "or missing value\n", p); + return -EINVAL; + } + } + + kfree(orig); + return 0; +} + int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) { char *p; @@ -74,6 +125,8 @@ int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) } proc_fs_set_hide_pid(fs_info, option); break; + case Opt_limit_pids: + break; default: pr_err("proc: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" " "or missing value\n", p); @@ -86,18 +139,34 @@ int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) int proc_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) { + int error; struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb(sb); sync_filesystem(sb); + + /* + * If this is a new instance, then parse again the proc mount + * options. + */ + if (proc_fs_newinstance(fs_info)) { + error = proc_parse_early_options(data, fs_info); + if (error < 0) + return error; + } + return !proc_parse_options(data, fs_info); } -static int proc_test_super(struct super_block *s, void *data) +static int proc_test_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data) { struct proc_fs_info *p = data; - struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb(s); + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb(sb); - return p->pid_ns == fs_info->pid_ns; + if (!proc_fs_newinstance(p) && !proc_fs_newinstance(fs_info) && + p->pid_ns == fs_info->pid_ns) + return 1; + + return 0; } static int proc_set_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data) @@ -109,7 +178,7 @@ static int proc_set_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data) static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data) { - int error; + int error = 0; struct super_block *sb; struct pid_namespace *ns; struct proc_fs_info *fs_info; @@ -125,10 +194,19 @@ static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, if (!fs_info) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + /* Set it as early as possible */ + proc_fs_set_newinstance(fs_info, false); + proc_fs_set_limit_pids(fs_info, PROC_LIMIT_PIDS_OFF); + if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT) { ns = data; data = NULL; } else { + /* Parse early mount options if not a MS_KERNMOUNT */ + error = proc_parse_early_options(data, fs_info); + if (error < 0) + goto error_fs_info; + ns = task_active_pid_ns(current); } diff --git a/include/linux/proc_fs.h b/include/linux/proc_fs.h index 7a8d641..0fddb84 100644 --- a/include/linux/proc_fs.h +++ b/include/linux/proc_fs.h @@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ struct proc_dir_entry; struct pid_namespace; +enum { /* definitions for proc mount option limit_pids */ + PROC_LIMIT_PIDS_OFF = 0, /* Limit pids is off */ + PROC_LIMIT_PIDS_PTRACE = 1, /* Limit pids to only ptracable pids */ +}; + struct proc_fs_info { struct pid_namespace *pid_ns; struct dentry *proc_self; /* For /proc/self */ struct dentry *proc_thread_self; /* For /proc/thread-self/ */ + bool newinstance; /* Private flag for new separated instances */ + int limit_pids:1; }; #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS @@ -35,6 +42,21 @@ static inline void proc_fs_set_pid_gid(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, kgid_t gid) fs_info->pid_ns->pid_gid = gid; } +static inline void proc_fs_set_newinstance(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, bool value) +{ + fs_info->newinstance = value; +} + +static inline int proc_fs_set_limit_pids(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, int value) +{ + if (value < PROC_LIMIT_PIDS_OFF || value > PROC_LIMIT_PIDS_PTRACE) + return -EINVAL; + + fs_info->limit_pids = value; + + return 0; +} + static inline int proc_fs_hide_pid(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) { return fs_info->pid_ns->hide_pid; @@ -45,6 +67,16 @@ static inline kgid_t proc_fs_pid_gid(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) return fs_info->pid_ns->pid_gid; } +static inline bool proc_fs_newinstance(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) +{ + return fs_info->newinstance; +} + +static inline int proc_fs_limit_pids(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) +{ + return fs_info->limit_pids; +} + extern void proc_root_init(void); extern void proc_flush_task(struct task_struct *); @@ -95,6 +127,15 @@ static inline void proc_fs_set_pid_gid(struct proc_info_fs *fs_info, kgid_t gid) { } +static inline void proc_fs_set_newinstance(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, bool value) +{ +} + +static inline int proc_fs_set_limit_pids(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, int value) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int proc_fs_hide_pid(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) { return 0; @@ -105,6 +146,16 @@ extern kgid_t proc_fs_pid_gid(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) return GLOBAL_ROOT_GID; } +static inline bool proc_fs_newinstance(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) +{ + return false; +} + +static inline int proc_fs_limit_pids(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info) +{ + return 0; +} + extern inline struct proc_fs_info *proc_sb(struct super_block *sb) { return NULL;} static inline struct proc_dir_entry *proc_symlink(const char *name, struct proc_dir_entry *parent,const char *dest) { return NULL;}
This patch allows to have multiple private procfs instances inside the same pid namespace. Lot of other areas in the kernel and filesystems have been updated to be able to support private instances, devpts is one major example. The aim here is lightweight sandboxes, and to allow that we have to modernize procfs internals. 1) The main aim of this work is to have on embedded systems one supervisor for apps. Right now we have some lightweight sandbox support, however if we create pid namespacess we have to manages all the processes inside too, where our goal is to be able to run a bunch of apps each one inside its own mount namespace without being able to notice each other. We only want to use mount namespaces, and we want procfs to behave more like a real mount point. 2) Linux Security Modules have multiple ptrace paths inside some subsystems, however inside procfs, the implementation does not guarantee that the ptrace() check which triggers the security_ptrace_check() hook will always run. We have the 'hidepid' mount option that can be used to force the ptrace_may_access() check inside has_pid_permissions() to run. The problem is that 'hidepid' is per pid namespace and not attached to the mount point, any remount or modification of 'hidepid' will propagate to all other procfs mounts. This also does not allow to support Yama LSM easily in desktop and user sessions. Yama ptrace scope which restricts ptrace and some other syscalls to be allowed only on inferiors, can be updated to have a per-task context, where the context will be inherited during fork(), clone() and preserved across execve(). If we support multiple private procfs instances, then we may force the ptrace_may_access() on /proc/<pids>/ to always run inside that new procfs instances. This will allow to specifiy on user sessions if we should populate procfs with pids that the user can ptrace or not. By using Yama ptrace scope, some restricted users will only be able to see inferiors inside /proc, they won't even be able to see their other processes. Some software like Chromium, Firefox's crash handler, Wine and others are already using Yama to restrict which processes can be ptracable. With this change this will give the possibility to restrict /proc/<pids>/ but more importantly this will give desktop users a generic and usuable way to specifiy which users should see all processes and which users can not. Side notes: * This covers the lack of seccomp where it is not able to parse arguments, it is easy to install a seccomp filter on direct syscalls that operate on pids, however /proc/<pid>/ is a Linux ABI using filesystem syscalls. With this change LSMs should be able to analyze open/read/write/close... 3) This will modernize procfs and align it with all other filesystems and subsystems that have been updated recently to be able to work in a flexible way. This is the same as devpts where each mount now is a distinct filesystem such that ptys and their indicies allocated in one mount are independent from ptys and their indicies in all other mounts. We have to align procfs and modernize it to have a per mount context where at least the mount option do not propagate to all other mounts, then maybe we can continue to implement new features. One example is to require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the init user namespace on some /proc/* which are not pids and which are are not virtualized by design, or CAP_NET_ADMIN inside userns on the net bits that are virtualized, etc. These mount options won't propagate to previous mounts, and the system will continue to be usable. Ths patch introduces the new 'limit_pids' mount option as it was also suggesed by Andy Lutomirski [1]. When this option is passed we automatically create a private procfs instance. This is not the default behaviour since we do not want to break userspace and we do not want to provide different devices IDs by default, please see [1] for why. * If 'limit_pids=0' this will create a private procfs instance without any restrictions. * If 'limit_pids=1' this will create a private procfs instance where processes will only be able to see pids that they can ptrace inside /proc/ This allows to have a stable LSM path later inside has_pid_permissions() to make sure that processes are not using filesystem syscall on /proc/pid to inspect or write to pid where other mechanisms are supposed to prevent this. This allows to align filesystem syscalls that go through procfs on pids with the other syscalls that can be blocked by seccomp filters. Later Yama LSM can be updated to check that processes are able only able to see their children inside /proc/. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/3/31/324 Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> --- fs/proc/base.c | 21 ++++++++---- fs/proc/inode.c | 4 +++ fs/proc/root.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- include/linux/proc_fs.h | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)