diff mbox series

[v2,1/3] lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants

Message ID 161610014360.55424.10461367636187076938.stgit@olly (mailing list archive)
State New
Headers show
Series Split security_task_getsecid() into subj and obj variants | expand

Commit Message

Paul Moore March 18, 2021, 8:42 p.m. UTC
Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM
hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security
credentials.  This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's
callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although
a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective
credentials.

This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits
the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one
for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds.

  void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
				   u32 *secid);
  void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
				  u32 *secid);

While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct
variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to
ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for
both hooks.  The net effect is that this patch should not change
the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter
LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook
implementations and return the correct credentials.

Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA)
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 drivers/android/binder.c              |   11 ++++++++++-
 include/linux/cred.h                  |    2 +-
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h         |    5 ++++-
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h             |   12 +++++++++---
 include/linux/security.h              |   10 ++++++++--
 kernel/audit.c                        |    4 ++--
 kernel/auditfilter.c                  |    3 ++-
 kernel/auditsc.c                      |    8 ++++----
 kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c                  |    3 ++-
 net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c     |    2 +-
 net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h          |    2 +-
 security/apparmor/lsm.c               |    3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |    2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     |   14 +++++++-------
 security/security.c                   |   13 ++++++++++---
 security/selinux/hooks.c              |    3 ++-
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c            |    3 ++-
 17 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

Comments

Casey Schaufler March 18, 2021, 8:57 p.m. UTC | #1
On 3/18/2021 1:42 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM
> hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security
> credentials.  This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's
> callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although
> a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective
> credentials.
>
> This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits
> the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one
> for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds.
>
>   void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
> 				   u32 *secid);
>   void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
> 				  u32 *secid);
>
> While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct
> variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to
> ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for
> both hooks.  The net effect is that this patch should not change
> the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter
> LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook
> implementations and return the correct credentials.
>
> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA)
> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

> ---
>  drivers/android/binder.c              |   11 ++++++++++-
>  include/linux/cred.h                  |    2 +-
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h         |    5 ++++-
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h             |   12 +++++++++---
>  include/linux/security.h              |   10 ++++++++--
>  kernel/audit.c                        |    4 ++--
>  kernel/auditfilter.c                  |    3 ++-
>  kernel/auditsc.c                      |    8 ++++----
>  kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c                  |    3 ++-
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c     |    2 +-
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h          |    2 +-
>  security/apparmor/lsm.c               |    3 ++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |    2 +-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     |   14 +++++++-------
>  security/security.c                   |   13 ++++++++++---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c              |    3 ++-
>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c            |    3 ++-
>  17 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index c119736ca56a..61d235b6ccd8 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -2700,7 +2700,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  		u32 secid;
>  		size_t added_size;
>  
> -		security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
> +		/*
> +		 * Arguably this should be the task's subjective LSM secid but
> +		 * we can't reliably access the subjective creds of a task
> +		 * other than our own so we must use the objective creds, which
> +		 * are safe to access.  The downside is that if a task is
> +		 * temporarily overriding it's creds it will not be reflected
> +		 * here; however, it isn't clear that binder would handle that
> +		 * case well anyway.
> +		 */
> +		security_task_getsecid_obj(proc->tsk, &secid);
>  		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
>  		if (ret) {
>  			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
> diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
> index 4c6350503697..ac0e5f97d7d8 100644
> --- a/include/linux/cred.h
> +++ b/include/linux/cred.h
> @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ struct cred {
>  	struct key	*request_key_auth; /* assumed request_key authority */
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> -	void		*security;	/* subjective LSM security */
> +	void		*security;	/* LSM security */
>  #endif
>  	struct user_struct *user;	/* real user ID subscription */
>  	struct user_namespace *user_ns; /* user_ns the caps and keyrings are relative to. */
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index 477a597db013..3ad8085e85e1 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_fix_setgid, struct cred *new, const struct cred * old,
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setpgid, struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getpgid, struct task_struct *p)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getsid, struct task_struct *p)
> -LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid, struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_subj,
> +	 struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_obj,
> +	 struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setnice, struct task_struct *p, int nice)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setioprio, struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getioprio, struct task_struct *p)
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index fb7f3193753d..e25d31fe787e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -707,9 +707,15 @@
>   *	@p.
>   *	@p contains the task_struct for the process.
>   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
> - * @task_getsecid:
> - *	Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p.
> - *	@p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid.
> + * @task_getsecid_subj:
> + *	Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the task_struct in @p
> + *	and return it in @secid.  Special care must be taken to ensure that @p
> + *	is the either the "current" task, or the caller has exclusive access
> + *	to @p.
> + *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
> + * @task_getsecid_obj:
> + *	Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p
> + *	and return it in @secid.
>   *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
>   *
>   * @task_setnice:
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 8aeebd6646dc..9c490bc437f5 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -414,7 +414,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
>  int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
>  int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
>  int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
> -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
> +void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
> +void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
>  int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
>  int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
>  int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
> @@ -1098,7 +1099,12 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +static inline void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +{
> +	*secid = 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
>  {
>  	*secid = 0;
>  }
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 551a394bc8f4..121d37e700a6 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -2132,7 +2132,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>  	int error;
>  	u32 sid;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &sid);
>  	if (!sid)
>  		return 0;
>  
> @@ -2353,7 +2353,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  			audit_sig_uid = auid;
>  		else
>  			audit_sig_uid = uid;
> -		security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
> +		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_sig_sid);
>  	}
>  
>  	return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index 333b3bcfc545..db2c6b59dfc3 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -1359,7 +1359,8 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
>  			case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
>  			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
>  				if (f->lsm_rule) {
> -					security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> +					security_task_getsecid_subj(current,
> +								    &sid);
>  					result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
>  						   f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
>  				}
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 47fb48f42c93..9973865cbf13 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -667,7 +667,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  			   logged upon error */
>  			if (f->lsm_rule) {
>  				if (need_sid) {
> -					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
> +					security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &sid);
>  					need_sid = 0;
>  				}
>  				result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
> @@ -2400,7 +2400,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
>  	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
>  	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -	security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
>  	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  }
>  
> @@ -2427,7 +2427,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
>  		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
>  		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -		security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
> +		security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
>  		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  		return 0;
>  	}
> @@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
>  	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
>  	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -	security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
> +	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
>  	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  	axp->pid_count++;
>  
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> index 1622a44d1617..0ff58259ccf8 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> @@ -209,7 +209,8 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_socket_socketpair)
>  
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_syslog)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_alloc)
> -BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid)
> +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid_subj)
> +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid_obj)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_prctl)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_setscheduler)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_to_inode)
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index ccb491642811..3e6ac9b790b1 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -1539,7 +1539,7 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
>  	/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
>  	 * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
>  	 * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info.secid);
>  	audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
>  	audit_info.sessionid = 0;
>  
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
> index 3c67afce64f1..b9ba8112b3c5 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
> @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
>  static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  					    struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
>  {
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info->secid);
>  	audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
>  	audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
>  }
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 240a53387e6b..f72406fe1bf2 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -1252,7 +1252,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc),
> -	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, apparmor_task_getsecid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, apparmor_task_getsecid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
>  
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index 565e33ff19d0..4e5eb0236278 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
>  	if (!ima_appraise)
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  	return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, func,
>  				mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
>  }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 9ef748ea829f..b85d9e429426 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
>  	u32 secid;
>  
>  	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
> -		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
>  					   0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
>  	}
> @@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
>  	    !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  	inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
>  	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
>  				current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
> @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  	int ret;
>  	u32 secid;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
>  				  MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
>  	if (ret)
> @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
>  {
>  	u32 secid;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
>  				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
>  					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
> @@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
>  
>  	/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
>  	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
>  				   0, MAY_READ, func);
>  }
> @@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
>  	}
>  
>  	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
>  				   MAY_READ, func);
>  }
> @@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
>  	 * buffer measurements.
>  	 */
>  	if (func) {
> -		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  		action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
>  					secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
>  					func_data);
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 5ac96b16f8fa..ee76d6c2f852 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1762,12 +1762,19 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
>  	return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
>  }
>  
> -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
>  {
>  	*secid = 0;
> -	call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
> +	call_void_hook(task_getsecid_subj, p, secid);
>  }
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_subj);
> +
> +void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +{
> +	*secid = 0;
> +	call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
>  
>  int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
>  {
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index eca9fc0ba764..24ca545c6e1b 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -7149,7 +7149,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
> -	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, selinux_task_getsecid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 12a45e61c1a5..f546fb832f30 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -4759,7 +4759,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
> -	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, smack_task_getsecid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, smack_task_getsecid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
>
Paul Moore March 19, 2021, 3:44 a.m. UTC | #2
On Thu, Mar 18, 2021 at 4:57 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> On 3/18/2021 1:42 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM
> > hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security
> > credentials.  This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's
> > callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although
> > a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective
> > credentials.
> >
> > This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits
> > the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one
> > for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds.
> >
> >   void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
> >                                  u32 *secid);
> >   void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
> >                                 u32 *secid);
> >
> > While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct
> > variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to
> > ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for
> > both hooks.  The net effect is that this patch should not change
> > the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter
> > LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook
> > implementations and return the correct credentials.
> >
> > Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA)
> > Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>
> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Thanks Casey.
Richard Guy Briggs March 19, 2021, 1:35 p.m. UTC | #3
On 2021-03-18 16:42, Paul Moore wrote:
> Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM
> hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security
> credentials.  This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's
> callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although
> a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective
> credentials.
> 
> This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits
> the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one
> for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds.
> 
>   void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
> 				   u32 *secid);
>   void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
> 				  u32 *secid);
> 
> While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct
> variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to
> ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for
> both hooks.  The net effect is that this patch should not change
> the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter
> LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook
> implementations and return the correct credentials.
> 
> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA)
> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Audit: Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>

> ---
>  drivers/android/binder.c              |   11 ++++++++++-
>  include/linux/cred.h                  |    2 +-
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h         |    5 ++++-
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h             |   12 +++++++++---
>  include/linux/security.h              |   10 ++++++++--
>  kernel/audit.c                        |    4 ++--
>  kernel/auditfilter.c                  |    3 ++-
>  kernel/auditsc.c                      |    8 ++++----
>  kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c                  |    3 ++-
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c     |    2 +-
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h          |    2 +-
>  security/apparmor/lsm.c               |    3 ++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |    2 +-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     |   14 +++++++-------
>  security/security.c                   |   13 ++++++++++---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c              |    3 ++-
>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c            |    3 ++-
>  17 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index c119736ca56a..61d235b6ccd8 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -2700,7 +2700,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  		u32 secid;
>  		size_t added_size;
>  
> -		security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
> +		/*
> +		 * Arguably this should be the task's subjective LSM secid but
> +		 * we can't reliably access the subjective creds of a task
> +		 * other than our own so we must use the objective creds, which
> +		 * are safe to access.  The downside is that if a task is
> +		 * temporarily overriding it's creds it will not be reflected
> +		 * here; however, it isn't clear that binder would handle that
> +		 * case well anyway.
> +		 */
> +		security_task_getsecid_obj(proc->tsk, &secid);
>  		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
>  		if (ret) {
>  			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
> diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
> index 4c6350503697..ac0e5f97d7d8 100644
> --- a/include/linux/cred.h
> +++ b/include/linux/cred.h
> @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ struct cred {
>  	struct key	*request_key_auth; /* assumed request_key authority */
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> -	void		*security;	/* subjective LSM security */
> +	void		*security;	/* LSM security */
>  #endif
>  	struct user_struct *user;	/* real user ID subscription */
>  	struct user_namespace *user_ns; /* user_ns the caps and keyrings are relative to. */
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index 477a597db013..3ad8085e85e1 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_fix_setgid, struct cred *new, const struct cred * old,
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setpgid, struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getpgid, struct task_struct *p)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getsid, struct task_struct *p)
> -LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid, struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_subj,
> +	 struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_obj,
> +	 struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setnice, struct task_struct *p, int nice)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setioprio, struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getioprio, struct task_struct *p)
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index fb7f3193753d..e25d31fe787e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -707,9 +707,15 @@
>   *	@p.
>   *	@p contains the task_struct for the process.
>   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
> - * @task_getsecid:
> - *	Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p.
> - *	@p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid.
> + * @task_getsecid_subj:
> + *	Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the task_struct in @p
> + *	and return it in @secid.  Special care must be taken to ensure that @p
> + *	is the either the "current" task, or the caller has exclusive access
> + *	to @p.
> + *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
> + * @task_getsecid_obj:
> + *	Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p
> + *	and return it in @secid.
>   *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
>   *
>   * @task_setnice:
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 8aeebd6646dc..9c490bc437f5 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -414,7 +414,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
>  int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
>  int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
>  int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
> -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
> +void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
> +void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
>  int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
>  int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
>  int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
> @@ -1098,7 +1099,12 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +static inline void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +{
> +	*secid = 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
>  {
>  	*secid = 0;
>  }
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 551a394bc8f4..121d37e700a6 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -2132,7 +2132,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>  	int error;
>  	u32 sid;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &sid);
>  	if (!sid)
>  		return 0;
>  
> @@ -2353,7 +2353,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  			audit_sig_uid = auid;
>  		else
>  			audit_sig_uid = uid;
> -		security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
> +		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_sig_sid);
>  	}
>  
>  	return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index 333b3bcfc545..db2c6b59dfc3 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -1359,7 +1359,8 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
>  			case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
>  			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
>  				if (f->lsm_rule) {
> -					security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> +					security_task_getsecid_subj(current,
> +								    &sid);
>  					result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
>  						   f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
>  				}
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 47fb48f42c93..9973865cbf13 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -667,7 +667,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  			   logged upon error */
>  			if (f->lsm_rule) {
>  				if (need_sid) {
> -					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
> +					security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &sid);
>  					need_sid = 0;
>  				}
>  				result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
> @@ -2400,7 +2400,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
>  	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
>  	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -	security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
>  	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  }
>  
> @@ -2427,7 +2427,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
>  		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
>  		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -		security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
> +		security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
>  		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  		return 0;
>  	}
> @@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
>  	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
>  	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -	security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
> +	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
>  	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  	axp->pid_count++;
>  
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> index 1622a44d1617..0ff58259ccf8 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> @@ -209,7 +209,8 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_socket_socketpair)
>  
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_syslog)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_alloc)
> -BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid)
> +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid_subj)
> +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid_obj)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_prctl)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_setscheduler)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_to_inode)
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index ccb491642811..3e6ac9b790b1 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -1539,7 +1539,7 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
>  	/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
>  	 * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
>  	 * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info.secid);
>  	audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
>  	audit_info.sessionid = 0;
>  
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
> index 3c67afce64f1..b9ba8112b3c5 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
> @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
>  static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  					    struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
>  {
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info->secid);
>  	audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
>  	audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
>  }
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 240a53387e6b..f72406fe1bf2 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -1252,7 +1252,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc),
> -	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, apparmor_task_getsecid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, apparmor_task_getsecid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
>  
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index 565e33ff19d0..4e5eb0236278 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
>  	if (!ima_appraise)
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  	return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, func,
>  				mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
>  }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 9ef748ea829f..b85d9e429426 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
>  	u32 secid;
>  
>  	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
> -		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
>  					   0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
>  	}
> @@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
>  	    !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  	inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
>  	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
>  				current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
> @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  	int ret;
>  	u32 secid;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
>  				  MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
>  	if (ret)
> @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
>  {
>  	u32 secid;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
>  				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
>  					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
> @@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
>  
>  	/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
>  	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
>  				   0, MAY_READ, func);
>  }
> @@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
>  	}
>  
>  	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
>  				   MAY_READ, func);
>  }
> @@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
>  	 * buffer measurements.
>  	 */
>  	if (func) {
> -		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  		action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
>  					secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
>  					func_data);
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 5ac96b16f8fa..ee76d6c2f852 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1762,12 +1762,19 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
>  	return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
>  }
>  
> -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
>  {
>  	*secid = 0;
> -	call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
> +	call_void_hook(task_getsecid_subj, p, secid);
>  }
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_subj);
> +
> +void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +{
> +	*secid = 0;
> +	call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
>  
>  int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
>  {
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index eca9fc0ba764..24ca545c6e1b 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -7149,7 +7149,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
> -	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, selinux_task_getsecid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 12a45e61c1a5..f546fb832f30 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -4759,7 +4759,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
> -	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, smack_task_getsecid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, smack_task_getsecid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
> 
> --
> Linux-audit mailing list
> Linux-audit@redhat.com
> https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index c119736ca56a..61d235b6ccd8 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2700,7 +2700,16 @@  static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
 		u32 secid;
 		size_t added_size;
 
-		security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
+		/*
+		 * Arguably this should be the task's subjective LSM secid but
+		 * we can't reliably access the subjective creds of a task
+		 * other than our own so we must use the objective creds, which
+		 * are safe to access.  The downside is that if a task is
+		 * temporarily overriding it's creds it will not be reflected
+		 * here; however, it isn't clear that binder would handle that
+		 * case well anyway.
+		 */
+		security_task_getsecid_obj(proc->tsk, &secid);
 		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
 		if (ret) {
 			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 4c6350503697..ac0e5f97d7d8 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@  struct cred {
 	struct key	*request_key_auth; /* assumed request_key authority */
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
-	void		*security;	/* subjective LSM security */
+	void		*security;	/* LSM security */
 #endif
 	struct user_struct *user;	/* real user ID subscription */
 	struct user_namespace *user_ns; /* user_ns the caps and keyrings are relative to. */
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 477a597db013..3ad8085e85e1 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -203,7 +203,10 @@  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_fix_setgid, struct cred *new, const struct cred * old,
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setpgid, struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getpgid, struct task_struct *p)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getsid, struct task_struct *p)
-LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid, struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_subj,
+	 struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_obj,
+	 struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setnice, struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setioprio, struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getioprio, struct task_struct *p)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index fb7f3193753d..e25d31fe787e 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -707,9 +707,15 @@ 
  *	@p.
  *	@p contains the task_struct for the process.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_getsecid:
- *	Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p.
- *	@p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid.
+ * @task_getsecid_subj:
+ *	Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the task_struct in @p
+ *	and return it in @secid.  Special care must be taken to ensure that @p
+ *	is the either the "current" task, or the caller has exclusive access
+ *	to @p.
+ *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ * @task_getsecid_obj:
+ *	Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p
+ *	and return it in @secid.
  *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
  *
  * @task_setnice:
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 8aeebd6646dc..9c490bc437f5 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -414,7 +414,8 @@  int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1098,7 +1099,12 @@  static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+{
+	*secid = 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
 {
 	*secid = 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 551a394bc8f4..121d37e700a6 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2132,7 +2132,7 @@  int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 	int error;
 	u32 sid;
 
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
+	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &sid);
 	if (!sid)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -2353,7 +2353,7 @@  int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 			audit_sig_uid = auid;
 		else
 			audit_sig_uid = uid;
-		security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
+		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_sig_sid);
 	}
 
 	return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 333b3bcfc545..db2c6b59dfc3 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1359,7 +1359,8 @@  int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 				if (f->lsm_rule) {
-					security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
+					security_task_getsecid_subj(current,
+								    &sid);
 					result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
 						   f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
 				}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 47fb48f42c93..9973865cbf13 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -667,7 +667,7 @@  static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			   logged upon error */
 			if (f->lsm_rule) {
 				if (need_sid) {
-					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
+					security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &sid);
 					need_sid = 0;
 				}
 				result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
@@ -2400,7 +2400,7 @@  void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
 	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
 	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-	security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
+	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
 	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 }
 
@@ -2427,7 +2427,7 @@  int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
 		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
 		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-		security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+		security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
 		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@  int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
 	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
 	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-	security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
 	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 	axp->pid_count++;
 
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
index 1622a44d1617..0ff58259ccf8 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
@@ -209,7 +209,8 @@  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_socket_socketpair)
 
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_syslog)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_alloc)
-BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid_subj)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid_obj)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_prctl)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_setscheduler)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_to_inode)
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index ccb491642811..3e6ac9b790b1 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -1539,7 +1539,7 @@  int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
 	/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
 	 * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
 	 * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
+	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info.secid);
 	audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
 	audit_info.sessionid = 0;
 
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index 3c67afce64f1..b9ba8112b3c5 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ 
 static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
 					    struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid);
+	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info->secid);
 	audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
 	audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 240a53387e6b..f72406fe1bf2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1252,7 +1252,8 @@  static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, apparmor_task_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, apparmor_task_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 565e33ff19d0..4e5eb0236278 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@  int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
 	if (!ima_appraise)
 		return 0;
 
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
 	return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, func,
 				mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 9ef748ea829f..b85d9e429426 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@  int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 	u32 secid;
 
 	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
-		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
 		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
 					   0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
 	}
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@  int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
 	    !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
 		return 0;
 
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
 	inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
 	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
 				current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@  int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	int ret;
 	u32 secid;
 
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
 	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
 				  MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
 	if (ret)
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@  int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	u32 secid;
 
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
 	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
 					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@  int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
 
 	/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
 	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
 				   0, MAY_READ, func);
 }
@@ -729,7 +729,7 @@  int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 	}
 
 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
 	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
 				   MAY_READ, func);
 }
@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@  void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 	 * buffer measurements.
 	 */
 	if (func) {
-		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
 		action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
 					secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
 					func_data);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5ac96b16f8fa..ee76d6c2f852 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1762,12 +1762,19 @@  int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 	return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
 }
 
-void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
 {
 	*secid = 0;
-	call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
+	call_void_hook(task_getsecid_subj, p, secid);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_subj);
+
+void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+{
+	*secid = 0;
+	call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
 
 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index eca9fc0ba764..24ca545c6e1b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7149,7 +7149,8 @@  static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, selinux_task_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 12a45e61c1a5..f546fb832f30 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4759,7 +4759,8 @@  static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, smack_task_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, smack_task_getsecid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),