| Message ID | 163241206546.71956.16494958077958683533.stgit@olly (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | selinux,smack: fix subjective/objective credential use mixups | expand |
On 9/23/2021 8:47 AM, Paul Moore wrote: > Jann Horn reported a problem with commit eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: > clarify task subjective and objective credentials") where some LSM > hooks were attempting to access the subjective credentials of a task > other than the current task. Generally speaking, it is not safe to > access another task's subjective credentials and doing so can cause > a number of problems. > > Further, while looking into the problem, I realized that Smack was > suffering from a similar problem brought about by a similar commit > 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective > task credentials"). > > This patch addresses this problem by restoring the use of the task's > objective credentials in those cases where the task is other than the > current executing task. Not only does this resolve the problem > reported by Jann, it is arguably the correct thing to do in these > cases. > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Fixes: eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials") > Fixes: 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials") > Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> > Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> > Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > --- > security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++-- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++-- > 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index 6517f221d52c..e7ebd45ca345 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -2157,7 +2157,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, > static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) > { > return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, > - task_sid_subj(parent), task_sid_obj(current), > + task_sid_obj(parent), task_sid_obj(current), > SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); > } > > @@ -6222,7 +6222,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *m > struct ipc_security_struct *isec; > struct msg_security_struct *msec; > struct common_audit_data ad; > - u32 sid = task_sid_subj(target); > + u32 sid = task_sid_obj(target); > int rc; > > isec = selinux_ipc(msq); > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index cacbe7518519..21a0e7c3b8de 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -2016,7 +2016,7 @@ static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access, > const char *caller) > { > struct smk_audit_info ad; > - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_subj(p); > + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p); > int rc; > > smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); > @@ -3480,7 +3480,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) > */ > static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) > { > - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_subj(p); > + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p); > char *cp; > int slen; > >
On Thu, Sep 23, 2021 at 12:20 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: > > On 9/23/2021 8:47 AM, Paul Moore wrote: > > Jann Horn reported a problem with commit eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: > > clarify task subjective and objective credentials") where some LSM > > hooks were attempting to access the subjective credentials of a task > > other than the current task. Generally speaking, it is not safe to > > access another task's subjective credentials and doing so can cause > > a number of problems. > > > > Further, while looking into the problem, I realized that Smack was > > suffering from a similar problem brought about by a similar commit > > 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective > > task credentials"). > > > > This patch addresses this problem by restoring the use of the task's > > objective credentials in those cases where the task is other than the > > current executing task. Not only does this resolve the problem > > reported by Jann, it is arguably the correct thing to do in these > > cases. > > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > > Fixes: eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials") > > Fixes: 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials") > > Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> > > Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> > > Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> > > Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Thanks Casey.
On Thu, Sep 23, 2021 at 11:47 AM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote: > > Jann Horn reported a problem with commit eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: > clarify task subjective and objective credentials") where some LSM > hooks were attempting to access the subjective credentials of a task > other than the current task. Generally speaking, it is not safe to > access another task's subjective credentials and doing so can cause > a number of problems. > > Further, while looking into the problem, I realized that Smack was > suffering from a similar problem brought about by a similar commit > 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective > task credentials"). > > This patch addresses this problem by restoring the use of the task's > objective credentials in those cases where the task is other than the > current executing task. Not only does this resolve the problem > reported by Jann, it is arguably the correct thing to do in these > cases. > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Fixes: eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials") > Fixes: 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials") > Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> > Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> > Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> > --- > security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++-- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++-- > 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) FYI, I just merged this into selinux/stable-5.15.
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 6517f221d52c..e7ebd45ca345 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2157,7 +2157,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - task_sid_subj(parent), task_sid_obj(current), + task_sid_obj(parent), task_sid_obj(current), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); } @@ -6222,7 +6222,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *m struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct msg_security_struct *msec; struct common_audit_data ad; - u32 sid = task_sid_subj(target); + u32 sid = task_sid_obj(target); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(msq); diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index cacbe7518519..21a0e7c3b8de 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2016,7 +2016,7 @@ static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access, const char *caller) { struct smk_audit_info ad; - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_subj(p); + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p); int rc; smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); @@ -3480,7 +3480,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) */ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) { - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_subj(p); + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p); char *cp; int slen;
Jann Horn reported a problem with commit eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials") where some LSM hooks were attempting to access the subjective credentials of a task other than the current task. Generally speaking, it is not safe to access another task's subjective credentials and doing so can cause a number of problems. Further, while looking into the problem, I realized that Smack was suffering from a similar problem brought about by a similar commit 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials"). This patch addresses this problem by restoring the use of the task's objective credentials in those cases where the task is other than the current executing task. Not only does this resolve the problem reported by Jann, it is arguably the correct thing to do in these cases. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials") Fixes: 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++-- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)