diff mbox

PATCH V5 4/4] selinux: Add SCTP support

Message ID 20180111113106.6746-1-richard_c_haines@btinternet.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show

Commit Message

Richard Haines Jan. 11, 2018, 11:31 a.m. UTC
The SELinux SCTP implementation is explained in:
Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst

Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
---
V5 Change: Rework selinux_netlbl_socket_connect() and
selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked as requested by Paul.

 Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst | 157 ++++++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/hooks.c                | 280 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h     |   2 +-
 security/selinux/include/netlabel.h     |  21 ++-
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h       |   4 +
 security/selinux/netlabel.c             | 133 +++++++++++++--
 6 files changed, 565 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst

Comments

Paul Moore Jan. 11, 2018, 8:41 p.m. UTC | #1
On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 6:31 AM, Richard Haines
<richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> wrote:
> The SELinux SCTP implementation is explained in:
> Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
> ---
> V5 Change: Rework selinux_netlbl_socket_connect() and
> selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked as requested by Paul.
>
>  Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst | 157 ++++++++++++++++++
>  security/selinux/hooks.c                | 280 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>  security/selinux/include/classmap.h     |   2 +-
>  security/selinux/include/netlabel.h     |  21 ++-
>  security/selinux/include/objsec.h       |   4 +
>  security/selinux/netlabel.c             | 133 +++++++++++++--
>  6 files changed, 565 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst

Thanks for the tweak.  Assuming no objections from the SCTP folks, or
anyone else for that matter, I'll merge this after the upcoming merge
window closes.

> diff --git a/Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst b/Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..2f66bf3
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
> @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
> +SCTP SELinux Support
> +=====================
> +
> +Security Hooks
> +===============
> +
> +``Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst`` describes the following SCTP security
> +hooks with the SELinux specifics expanded below::
> +
> +    security_sctp_assoc_request()
> +    security_sctp_bind_connect()
> +    security_sctp_sk_clone()
> +    security_inet_conn_established()
> +
> +
> +security_sctp_assoc_request()
> +-----------------------------
> +Passes the ``@ep`` and ``@chunk->skb`` of the association INIT packet to the
> +security module. Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
> +::
> +
> +    @ep - pointer to sctp endpoint structure.
> +    @skb - pointer to skbuff of association packet.
> +
> +The security module performs the following operations:
> +     IF this is the first association on ``@ep->base.sk``, then set the peer
> +     sid to that in ``@skb``. This will ensure there is only one peer sid
> +     assigned to ``@ep->base.sk`` that may support multiple associations.
> +
> +     ELSE validate the ``@ep->base.sk peer_sid`` against the ``@skb peer sid``
> +     to determine whether the association should be allowed or denied.
> +
> +     Set the sctp ``@ep sid`` to socket's sid (from ``ep->base.sk``) with
> +     MLS portion taken from ``@skb peer sid``. This will be used by SCTP
> +     TCP style sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new socket
> +     to be generated.
> +
> +     If IP security options are configured (CIPSO/CALIPSO), then the ip
> +     options are set on the socket.
> +
> +
> +security_sctp_bind_connect()
> +-----------------------------
> +Checks permissions required for ipv4/ipv6 addresses based on the ``@optname``
> +as follows::
> +
> +  ------------------------------------------------------------------
> +  |                   BIND Permission Checks                       |
> +  |       @optname             |         @address contains         |
> +  |----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
> +  | SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD     | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
> +  | SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR          | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
> +  | SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
> +  ------------------------------------------------------------------
> +
> +  ------------------------------------------------------------------
> +  |                 CONNECT Permission Checks                      |
> +  |       @optname             |         @address contains         |
> +  |----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
> +  | SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX      | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
> +  | SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP          | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
> +  | SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT       | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
> +  | SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY     | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
> +  ------------------------------------------------------------------
> +
> +
> +``Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst`` gives a summary of the ``@optname``
> +entries and also describes ASCONF chunk processing when Dynamic Address
> +Reconfiguration is enabled.
> +
> +
> +security_sctp_sk_clone()
> +-------------------------
> +Called whenever a new socket is created by **accept**\(2) (i.e. a TCP style
> +socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace calls
> +**sctp_peeloff**\(3). ``security_sctp_sk_clone()`` will set the new
> +sockets sid and peer sid to that contained in the ``@ep sid`` and
> +``@ep peer sid`` respectively.
> +::
> +
> +    @ep - pointer to current sctp endpoint structure.
> +    @sk - pointer to current sock structure.
> +    @sk - pointer to new sock structure.
> +
> +
> +security_inet_conn_established()
> +---------------------------------
> +Called when a COOKIE ACK is received where it sets the connection's peer sid
> +to that in ``@skb``::
> +
> +    @sk  - pointer to sock structure.
> +    @skb - pointer to skbuff of the COOKIE ACK packet.
> +
> +
> +Policy Statements
> +==================
> +The following class and permissions to support SCTP are available within the
> +kernel::
> +
> +    class sctp_socket inherits socket { node_bind }
> +
> +whenever the following policy capability is enabled::
> +
> +    policycap extended_socket_class;
> +
> +SELinux SCTP support adds the ``name_connect`` permission for connecting
> +to a specific port type and the ``association`` permission that is explained
> +in the section below.
> +
> +If userspace tools have been updated, SCTP will support the ``portcon``
> +statement as shown in the following example::
> +
> +    portcon sctp 1024-1036 system_u:object_r:sctp_ports_t:s0
> +
> +
> +SCTP Peer Labeling
> +===================
> +An SCTP socket will only have one peer label assigned to it. This will be
> +assigned during the establishment of the first association. Once the peer
> +label has been assigned, any new associations will have the ``association``
> +permission validated by checking the socket peer sid against the received
> +packets peer sid to determine whether the association should be allowed or
> +denied.
> +
> +NOTES:
> +   1) If peer labeling is not enabled, then the peer context will always be
> +      ``SECINITSID_UNLABELED`` (``unlabeled_t`` in Reference Policy).
> +
> +   2) As SCTP can support more than one transport address per endpoint
> +      (multi-homing) on a single socket, it is possible to configure policy
> +      and NetLabel to provide different peer labels for each of these. As the
> +      socket peer label is determined by the first associations transport
> +      address, it is recommended that all peer labels are consistent.
> +
> +   3) **getpeercon**\(3) may be used by userspace to retrieve the sockets peer
> +      context.
> +
> +   4) While not SCTP specific, be aware when using NetLabel that if a label
> +      is assigned to a specific interface, and that interface 'goes down',
> +      then the NetLabel service will remove the entry. Therefore ensure that
> +      the network startup scripts call **netlabelctl**\(8) to set the required
> +      label (see **netlabel-config**\(8) helper script for details).
> +
> +   5) The NetLabel SCTP peer labeling rules apply as discussed in the following
> +      set of posts tagged "netlabel" at: http://www.paul-moore.com/blog/t.
> +
> +   6) CIPSO is only supported for IPv4 addressing: ``socket(AF_INET, ...)``
> +      CALIPSO is only supported for IPv6 addressing: ``socket(AF_INET6, ...)``
> +
> +      Note the following when testing CIPSO/CALIPSO:
> +         a) CIPSO will send an ICMP packet if an SCTP packet cannot be
> +            delivered because of an invalid label.
> +         b) CALIPSO does not send an ICMP packet, just silently discards it.
> +
> +   7) IPSEC is not supported as RFC 3554 - sctp/ipsec support has not been
> +      implemented in userspace (**racoon**\(8) or **ipsec_pluto**\(8)),
> +      although the kernel supports SCTP/IPSEC.
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index f5d3047..24d6f39 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -67,6 +67,8 @@
>  #include <linux/tcp.h>
>  #include <linux/udp.h>
>  #include <linux/dccp.h>
> +#include <linux/sctp.h>
> +#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
>  #include <linux/quota.h>
>  #include <linux/un.h>          /* for Unix socket types */
>  #include <net/af_unix.h>       /* for Unix socket types */
> @@ -4126,6 +4128,23 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
>                 break;
>         }
>
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
> +       case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
> +               struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
> +
> +               if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
> +                       break;
> +
> +               offset += ihlen;
> +               sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
> +               if (sh == NULL)
> +                       break;
> +
> +               ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
> +               ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
> +               break;
> +       }
> +#endif
>         default:
>                 break;
>         }
> @@ -4199,6 +4218,19 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
>                 break;
>         }
>
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
> +       case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
> +               struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
> +
> +               sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
> +               if (sh == NULL)
> +                       break;
> +
> +               ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
> +               ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
> +               break;
> +       }
> +#endif
>         /* includes fragments */
>         default:
>                 break;
> @@ -4388,6 +4420,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
>                 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
>                 sksec->sclass = sclass;
>                 sksec->sid = sid;
> +               /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
> +               if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
> +                       sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
> +
>                 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
>         }
>
> @@ -4408,11 +4444,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
>         if (err)
>                 goto out;
>
> -       /*
> -        * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
> -        * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
> -        * check the first address now.
> -        */
> +       /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
>         family = sk->sk_family;
>         if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
>                 char *addrp;
> @@ -4424,7 +4456,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
>                 unsigned short snum;
>                 u32 sid, node_perm;
>
> -               if (family == PF_INET) {
> +               /*
> +                * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
> +                * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
> +                * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
> +                * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
> +                */
> +               if (address->sa_family == AF_INET) {
>                         if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) {
>                                 err = -EINVAL;
>                                 goto out;
> @@ -4478,6 +4516,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
>                         node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
>                         break;
>
> +               case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
> +                       node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
> +                       break;
> +
>                 default:
>                         node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
>                         break;
> @@ -4492,7 +4534,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
>                 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
>                 ad.u.net->family = family;
>
> -               if (family == PF_INET)
> +               if (address->sa_family == AF_INET)
>                         ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
>                 else
>                         ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
> @@ -4506,7 +4548,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
>         return err;
>  }
>
> -static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
> +/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
> + * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.txt
> + */
> +static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
> +                                        struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
>  {
>         struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
>         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> @@ -4517,10 +4563,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>                 return err;
>
>         /*
> -        * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
> +        * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
> +        * for the port.
>          */
>         if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
> -           sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
> +           sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
> +           sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
>                 struct common_audit_data ad;
>                 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
>                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
> @@ -4528,7 +4576,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>                 unsigned short snum;
>                 u32 sid, perm;
>
> -               if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
> +               /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
> +                * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
> +                * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
> +                * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
> +                */
> +               if (address->sa_family == AF_INET) {
>                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>                         if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
>                                 return -EINVAL;
> @@ -4542,10 +4595,19 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>
>                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
>                 if (err)
> -                       goto out;
> +                       return err;
>
> -               perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
> -                      TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
> +               switch (sksec->sclass) {
> +               case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
> +                       perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
> +                       break;
> +               case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
> +                       perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
> +                       break;
> +               case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
> +                       perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
> +                       break;
> +               }
>
>                 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
>                 ad.u.net = &net;
> @@ -4553,13 +4615,24 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>                 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
>                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
>                 if (err)
> -                       goto out;
> +                       return err;
>         }
>
> -       err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
> +       return 0;
> +}
>
> -out:
> -       return err;
> +/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
> +static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
> +                                 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
> +{
> +       int err;
> +       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> +
> +       err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
> +       if (err)
> +               return err;
> +
> +       return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
>  }
>
>  static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
> @@ -4822,7 +4895,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op
>         u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
>
>         if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
> -           sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
> +           sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
> +           sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
>                 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
>         if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
>                 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> @@ -4935,6 +5009,171 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
>         sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
>  }
>
> +/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
> + * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
> + * already present).
> + */
> +static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
> +                                     struct sk_buff *skb)
> +{
> +       struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
> +       struct common_audit_data ad;
> +       struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
> +       u8 peerlbl_active;
> +       u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
> +       u32 conn_sid;
> +       int err = 0;
> +
> +       if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
> +               return 0;
> +
> +       peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
> +
> +       if (peerlbl_active) {
> +               /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
> +                * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
> +                */
> +               err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
> +                                             &peer_sid);
> +               if (err)
> +                       return err;
> +
> +               if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
> +                       peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
> +       }
> +
> +       if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
> +               sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
> +
> +               /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
> +                * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
> +                * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
> +                * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
> +                */
> +               sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
> +       } else if  (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
> +               /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
> +                * consistency among the peer SIDs.
> +                */
> +               ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
> +               ad.u.net = &net;
> +               ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
> +               err = avc_has_perm(sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
> +                                  SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
> +               if (err)
> +                       return err;
> +       }
> +
> +       /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
> +        * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
> +        * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
> +        * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
> +        * plug this into the new socket.
> +        */
> +       err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
> +       if (err)
> +               return err;
> +
> +       ep->secid = conn_sid;
> +       ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
> +
> +       /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
> +       return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
> +}
> +
> +/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
> + * based on their @optname.
> + */
> +static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
> +                                    struct sockaddr *address,
> +                                    int addrlen)
> +{
> +       int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
> +       void *addr_buf;
> +       struct sockaddr *addr;
> +       struct socket *sock;
> +
> +       if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
> +               return 0;
> +
> +       /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
> +       sock = sk->sk_socket;
> +       addr_buf = address;
> +
> +       while (walk_size < addrlen) {
> +               addr = addr_buf;
> +               switch (addr->sa_family) {
> +               case AF_INET:
> +                       len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
> +                       break;
> +               case AF_INET6:
> +                       len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
> +                       break;
> +               default:
> +                       return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
> +               }
> +
> +               err = -EINVAL;
> +               switch (optname) {
> +               /* Bind checks */
> +               case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
> +               case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
> +               case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
> +                       err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
> +                       break;
> +               /* Connect checks */
> +               case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
> +               case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
> +               case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
> +               case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
> +                       err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
> +                       if (err)
> +                               return err;
> +
> +                       /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
> +                        * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
> +                        * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked() is
> +                        * is called here. The situations handled are:
> +                        * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
> +                        * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
> +                        * primary address is selected.
> +                        * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
> +                        * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
> +                        * selinux_socket_connect().
> +                        */
> +                       err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
> +                       break;
> +               }
> +
> +               if (err)
> +                       return err;
> +
> +               addr_buf += len;
> +               walk_size += len;
> +       }
> +
> +       return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
> +static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
> +                                 struct sock *newsk)
> +{
> +       struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> +       struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
> +
> +       /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
> +        * the non-sctp clone version.
> +        */
> +       if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
> +               return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
> +
> +       newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
> +       newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
> +       newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
> +       selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
> +}
> +
>  static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
>                                      struct request_sock *req)
>  {
> @@ -6422,6 +6661,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
>         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
>         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
> +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
> +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
> +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
>         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
>         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
>         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> index cc35695..167c20a 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
>           { COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
>         { "sctp_socket",
>           { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
> -           "node_bind", NULL } },
> +           "node_bind", "name_connect", "association", NULL } },
>         { "icmp_socket",
>           { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
>             "node_bind", NULL } },
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
> index 75686d5..0fae720 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
> @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
>  #include <linux/skbuff.h>
>  #include <net/sock.h>
>  #include <net/request_sock.h>
> +#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
>
>  #include "avc.h"
>  #include "objsec.h"
> @@ -53,9 +54,11 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
>                                  u16 family,
>                                  u32 sid);
> -
> +int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
> +                                    struct sk_buff *skb);
>  int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family);
>  void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
> +void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
>  int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
>  int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
>                                 struct sk_buff *skb,
> @@ -65,6 +68,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
>                                      int level,
>                                      int optname);
>  int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr);
> +int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
> +                                        struct sockaddr *addr);
>
>  #else
>  static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
> @@ -114,6 +119,11 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_conn_setsid(struct sock *sk,
>         return 0;
>  }
>
> +static inline int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
> +                                                   struct sk_buff *skb)
> +{
> +       return 0;
> +}
>  static inline int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req,
>                                                    u16 family)
>  {
> @@ -123,6 +133,10 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
>  {
>         return;
>  }
> +static inline void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, sock *newsk)
> +{
> +       return;
> +}
>  static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk,
>                                                     u16 family)
>  {
> @@ -146,6 +160,11 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk,
>  {
>         return 0;
>  }
> +static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
> +                                                      struct sockaddr *addr)
> +{
> +       return 0;
> +}
>  #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
>
>  #endif
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> index 1649cd1..be145cf 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> @@ -130,6 +130,10 @@ struct sk_security_struct {
>         u32 sid;                        /* SID of this object */
>         u32 peer_sid;                   /* SID of peer */
>         u16 sclass;                     /* sock security class */
> +       enum {                          /* SCTP association state */
> +               SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET = 0,
> +               SCTP_ASSOC_SET,
> +       } sctp_assoc_state;
>  };
>
>  struct tun_security_struct {
> diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> index aaba667..0863c56 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> @@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
>         sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
>         if (sk != NULL) {
>                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> +
>                 if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
>                         return 0;
>                 secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, sid);
> @@ -270,6 +271,61 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
>         return rc;
>  }
>
> +/**
> + * selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request - Label an incoming sctp association.
> + * @ep: incoming association endpoint.
> + * @skb: the packet.
> + *
> + * Description:
> + * A new incoming connection is represented by @ep, ......
> + * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
> + *
> + */
> +int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
> +                                    struct sk_buff *skb)
> +{
> +       int rc;
> +       struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
> +       struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
> +       struct sockaddr *addr;
> +       struct sockaddr_in addr4;
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
> +       struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
> +#endif
> +
> +       if (ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
> +                               ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
> +               return 0;
> +
> +       netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
> +       rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(ep->secid, &secattr);
> +       if (rc != 0)
> +               goto assoc_request_return;
> +
> +       /* Move skb hdr address info to a struct sockaddr and then call
> +        * netlbl_conn_setattr().
> +        */
> +       if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
> +               addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
> +               addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
> +               addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr4;
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
> +       } else {
> +               addr6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
> +               addr6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
> +               addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr6;
> +#endif
> +       }
> +
> +       rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, addr, &secattr);
> +       if (rc == 0)
> +               sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
> +
> +assoc_request_return:
> +       netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
> +       return rc;
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Label an incoming stream connection
>   * @req: incoming connection request socket
> @@ -319,6 +375,22 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
>                 sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
>  }
>
> +/**
> + * selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone - Copy state to the newly created sock
> + * @sk: current sock
> + * @newsk: the new sock
> + *
> + * Description:
> + * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3).
> + */
> +void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
> +{
> +       struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> +       struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
> +
> +       newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create - Label a socket using NetLabel
>   * @sock: the socket to label
> @@ -470,7 +542,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
>  }
>
>  /**
> - * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect
> + * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper - Help label a client-side socket on
> + * connect
>   * @sk: the socket to label
>   * @addr: the destination address
>   *
> @@ -479,18 +552,13 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
>   * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
>   *
>   */
> -int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
> +static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
> +                                               struct sockaddr *addr)
>  {
>         int rc;
>         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
>         struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
>
> -       if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
> -           sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
> -               return 0;
> -
> -       lock_sock(sk);
> -
>         /* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
>          * is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we want to reset
>          * the socket */
> @@ -498,18 +566,61 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
>                 netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
>                 sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
>                 rc = 0;
> -               goto socket_connect_return;
> +               return rc;
>         }
>         secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
>         if (secattr == NULL) {
>                 rc = -ENOMEM;
> -               goto socket_connect_return;
> +               return rc;
>         }
>         rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(sk, addr, secattr);
>         if (rc == 0)
>                 sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED;
>
> -socket_connect_return:
> +       return rc;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked - Label a client-side socket on
> + * connect
> + * @sk: the socket to label
> + * @addr: the destination address
> + *
> + * Description:
> + * Attempt to label a connected socket that already has the socket locked
> + * with NetLabel using the given address.
> + * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
> + *
> + */
> +int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
> +                                        struct sockaddr *addr)
> +{
> +       struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> +
> +       if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
> +           sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
> +               return 0;
> +
> +       return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(sk, addr);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect
> + * @sk: the socket to label
> + * @addr: the destination address
> + *
> + * Description:
> + * Attempt to label a connected socket with NetLabel using the given address.
> + * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
> + *
> + */
> +int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
> +{
> +       int rc;
> +
> +       lock_sock(sk);
> +       rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
>         release_sock(sk);
> +
>         return rc;
>  }
> --
> 2.14.3
>
Neil Horman Jan. 12, 2018, 2:59 p.m. UTC | #2
On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 11:31:06AM +0000, Richard Haines wrote:
> The SELinux SCTP implementation is explained in:
> Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
> 
> Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
> ---
> V5 Change: Rework selinux_netlbl_socket_connect() and
> selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked as requested by Paul.
> 
>  Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst | 157 ++++++++++++++++++
>  security/selinux/hooks.c                | 280 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>  security/selinux/include/classmap.h     |   2 +-
>  security/selinux/include/netlabel.h     |  21 ++-
>  security/selinux/include/objsec.h       |   4 +
>  security/selinux/netlabel.c             | 133 +++++++++++++--
>  6 files changed, 565 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst b/Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..2f66bf3
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
> @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
> +SCTP SELinux Support
> +=====================
> +
> +Security Hooks
> +===============
> +
> +``Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst`` describes the following SCTP security
> +hooks with the SELinux specifics expanded below::
> +
> +    security_sctp_assoc_request()
> +    security_sctp_bind_connect()
> +    security_sctp_sk_clone()
> +    security_inet_conn_established()
> +
> +
> +security_sctp_assoc_request()
> +-----------------------------
> +Passes the ``@ep`` and ``@chunk->skb`` of the association INIT packet to the
> +security module. Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
> +::
> +
> +    @ep - pointer to sctp endpoint structure.
> +    @skb - pointer to skbuff of association packet.
> +
> +The security module performs the following operations:
> +     IF this is the first association on ``@ep->base.sk``, then set the peer
> +     sid to that in ``@skb``. This will ensure there is only one peer sid
> +     assigned to ``@ep->base.sk`` that may support multiple associations.
> +
> +     ELSE validate the ``@ep->base.sk peer_sid`` against the ``@skb peer sid``
> +     to determine whether the association should be allowed or denied.
> +
> +     Set the sctp ``@ep sid`` to socket's sid (from ``ep->base.sk``) with
> +     MLS portion taken from ``@skb peer sid``. This will be used by SCTP
> +     TCP style sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new socket
> +     to be generated.
> +
> +     If IP security options are configured (CIPSO/CALIPSO), then the ip
> +     options are set on the socket.
> +
> +
> +security_sctp_bind_connect()
> +-----------------------------
> +Checks permissions required for ipv4/ipv6 addresses based on the ``@optname``
> +as follows::
> +
> +  ------------------------------------------------------------------
> +  |                   BIND Permission Checks                       |
> +  |       @optname             |         @address contains         |
> +  |----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
> +  | SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD     | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
> +  | SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR          | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
> +  | SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
> +  ------------------------------------------------------------------
> +
> +  ------------------------------------------------------------------
> +  |                 CONNECT Permission Checks                      |
> +  |       @optname             |         @address contains         |
> +  |----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
> +  | SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX      | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
> +  | SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP          | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
> +  | SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT       | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
> +  | SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY     | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
> +  ------------------------------------------------------------------
> +
> +
> +``Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst`` gives a summary of the ``@optname``
> +entries and also describes ASCONF chunk processing when Dynamic Address
> +Reconfiguration is enabled.
> +
> +
> +security_sctp_sk_clone()
> +-------------------------
> +Called whenever a new socket is created by **accept**\(2) (i.e. a TCP style
> +socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace calls
> +**sctp_peeloff**\(3). ``security_sctp_sk_clone()`` will set the new
> +sockets sid and peer sid to that contained in the ``@ep sid`` and
> +``@ep peer sid`` respectively.
> +::
> +
> +    @ep - pointer to current sctp endpoint structure.
> +    @sk - pointer to current sock structure.
> +    @sk - pointer to new sock structure.
> +
> +
> +security_inet_conn_established()
> +---------------------------------
> +Called when a COOKIE ACK is received where it sets the connection's peer sid
> +to that in ``@skb``::
> +
> +    @sk  - pointer to sock structure.
> +    @skb - pointer to skbuff of the COOKIE ACK packet.
> +
> +
> +Policy Statements
> +==================
> +The following class and permissions to support SCTP are available within the
> +kernel::
> +
> +    class sctp_socket inherits socket { node_bind }
> +
> +whenever the following policy capability is enabled::
> +
> +    policycap extended_socket_class;
> +
> +SELinux SCTP support adds the ``name_connect`` permission for connecting
> +to a specific port type and the ``association`` permission that is explained
> +in the section below.
> +
> +If userspace tools have been updated, SCTP will support the ``portcon``
> +statement as shown in the following example::
> +
> +    portcon sctp 1024-1036 system_u:object_r:sctp_ports_t:s0
> +
> +
> +SCTP Peer Labeling
> +===================
> +An SCTP socket will only have one peer label assigned to it. This will be
> +assigned during the establishment of the first association. Once the peer
> +label has been assigned, any new associations will have the ``association``
> +permission validated by checking the socket peer sid against the received
> +packets peer sid to determine whether the association should be allowed or
> +denied.
> +
> +NOTES:
> +   1) If peer labeling is not enabled, then the peer context will always be
> +      ``SECINITSID_UNLABELED`` (``unlabeled_t`` in Reference Policy).
> +
> +   2) As SCTP can support more than one transport address per endpoint
> +      (multi-homing) on a single socket, it is possible to configure policy
> +      and NetLabel to provide different peer labels for each of these. As the
> +      socket peer label is determined by the first associations transport
> +      address, it is recommended that all peer labels are consistent.
> +
> +   3) **getpeercon**\(3) may be used by userspace to retrieve the sockets peer
> +      context.
> +
> +   4) While not SCTP specific, be aware when using NetLabel that if a label
> +      is assigned to a specific interface, and that interface 'goes down',
> +      then the NetLabel service will remove the entry. Therefore ensure that
> +      the network startup scripts call **netlabelctl**\(8) to set the required
> +      label (see **netlabel-config**\(8) helper script for details).
> +
> +   5) The NetLabel SCTP peer labeling rules apply as discussed in the following
> +      set of posts tagged "netlabel" at: http://www.paul-moore.com/blog/t.
> +
> +   6) CIPSO is only supported for IPv4 addressing: ``socket(AF_INET, ...)``
> +      CALIPSO is only supported for IPv6 addressing: ``socket(AF_INET6, ...)``
> +
> +      Note the following when testing CIPSO/CALIPSO:
> +         a) CIPSO will send an ICMP packet if an SCTP packet cannot be
> +            delivered because of an invalid label.
> +         b) CALIPSO does not send an ICMP packet, just silently discards it.
> +
> +   7) IPSEC is not supported as RFC 3554 - sctp/ipsec support has not been
> +      implemented in userspace (**racoon**\(8) or **ipsec_pluto**\(8)),
> +      although the kernel supports SCTP/IPSEC.
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index f5d3047..24d6f39 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -67,6 +67,8 @@
>  #include <linux/tcp.h>
>  #include <linux/udp.h>
>  #include <linux/dccp.h>
> +#include <linux/sctp.h>
> +#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
>  #include <linux/quota.h>
>  #include <linux/un.h>		/* for Unix socket types */
>  #include <net/af_unix.h>	/* for Unix socket types */
> @@ -4126,6 +4128,23 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  		break;
>  	}
>  
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
> +	case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
> +		struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
> +
> +		if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
> +			break;
> +
> +		offset += ihlen;
> +		sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
> +		if (sh == NULL)
> +			break;
> +
> +		ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
> +		ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
> +		break;
> +	}
> +#endif
>  	default:
>  		break;
>  	}
> @@ -4199,6 +4218,19 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  		break;
>  	}
>  
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
> +	case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
> +		struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
> +
> +		sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
> +		if (sh == NULL)
> +			break;
> +
> +		ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
> +		ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
> +		break;
> +	}
> +#endif
>  	/* includes fragments */
>  	default:
>  		break;
> @@ -4388,6 +4420,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
>  		sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
>  		sksec->sclass = sclass;
>  		sksec->sid = sid;
> +		/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
> +		if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
> +			sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
> +
>  		err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
>  	}
>  
> @@ -4408,11 +4444,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
>  	if (err)
>  		goto out;
>  
> -	/*
> -	 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
> -	 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
> -	 * check the first address now.
> -	 */
> +	/* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
>  	family = sk->sk_family;
>  	if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
>  		char *addrp;
> @@ -4424,7 +4456,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
>  		unsigned short snum;
>  		u32 sid, node_perm;
>  
> -		if (family == PF_INET) {
> +		/*
> +		 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
> +		 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
> +		 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
> +		 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
> +		 */
> +		if (address->sa_family == AF_INET) {
>  			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) {
>  				err = -EINVAL;
>  				goto out;
> @@ -4478,6 +4516,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
>  			node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
>  			break;
>  
> +		case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
> +			node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
> +			break;
> +
>  		default:
>  			node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
>  			break;
> @@ -4492,7 +4534,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
>  		ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
>  		ad.u.net->family = family;
>  
> -		if (family == PF_INET)
> +		if (address->sa_family == AF_INET)
>  			ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
>  		else
>  			ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
> @@ -4506,7 +4548,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
>  	return err;
>  }
>  
> -static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
> +/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
> + * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.txt
> + */
> +static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
> +					 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
>  {
>  	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
>  	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> @@ -4517,10 +4563,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>  		return err;
>  
>  	/*
> -	 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
> +	 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
> +	 * for the port.
>  	 */
>  	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
> -	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
> +	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
> +	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
>  		struct common_audit_data ad;
>  		struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
>  		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
> @@ -4528,7 +4576,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>  		unsigned short snum;
>  		u32 sid, perm;
>  
> -		if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
> +		/* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
> +		 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
> +		 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
> +		 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
> +		 */
> +		if (address->sa_family == AF_INET) {
>  			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>  			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
>  				return -EINVAL;
> @@ -4542,10 +4595,19 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>  
>  		err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
>  		if (err)
> -			goto out;
> +			return err;
>  
> -		perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
> -		       TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
> +		switch (sksec->sclass) {
> +		case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
> +			perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
> +			break;
> +		case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
> +			perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
> +			break;
> +		case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
> +			perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
> +			break;
> +		}
>  
>  		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
>  		ad.u.net = &net;
> @@ -4553,13 +4615,24 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>  		ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
>  		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
>  		if (err)
> -			goto out;
> +			return err;
>  	}
>  
> -	err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
> +	return 0;
> +}
>  
> -out:
> -	return err;
> +/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
> +static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
> +				  struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
> +{
> +	int err;
> +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> +
> +	err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
> +	if (err)
> +		return err;
> +
> +	return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
>  }
>  
>  static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
> @@ -4822,7 +4895,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op
>  	u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
>  
>  	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
> -	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
> +	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
> +	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
>  		peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
>  	if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
>  		return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> @@ -4935,6 +5009,171 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
>  	sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
>  }
>  
> +/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
> + * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
> + * already present).
> + */
> +static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
> +				      struct sk_buff *skb)
> +{
> +	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
> +	struct common_audit_data ad;
> +	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
> +	u8 peerlbl_active;
> +	u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
> +	u32 conn_sid;
> +	int err = 0;
> +
> +	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
> +
> +	if (peerlbl_active) {
> +		/* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
> +		 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
> +		 */
> +		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
> +					      &peer_sid);
> +		if (err)
> +			return err;
> +
> +		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
> +			peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
> +		sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
> +
> +		/* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
> +		 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
> +		 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
> +		 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
> +		 */
> +		sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
> +	} else if  (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
> +		/* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
> +		 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
> +		 */
> +		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
> +		ad.u.net = &net;
> +		ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
> +		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
> +				   SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
> +		if (err)
> +			return err;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
> +	 * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
> +	 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
> +	 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
> +	 * plug this into the new socket.
> +	 */
> +	err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
> +	if (err)
> +		return err;
> +
> +	ep->secid = conn_sid;
> +	ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
> +
> +	/* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
> +	return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
> +}
> +
> +/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
> + * based on their @optname.
> + */
> +static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
> +				     struct sockaddr *address,
> +				     int addrlen)
> +{
> +	int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
> +	void *addr_buf;
> +	struct sockaddr *addr;
> +	struct socket *sock;
> +
> +	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	/* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
> +	sock = sk->sk_socket;
> +	addr_buf = address;
> +
> +	while (walk_size < addrlen) {
> +		addr = addr_buf;
> +		switch (addr->sa_family) {
> +		case AF_INET:
> +			len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
> +			break;
> +		case AF_INET6:
> +			len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
> +			break;
> +		default:
> +			return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
> +		}
> +
> +		err = -EINVAL;
> +		switch (optname) {
> +		/* Bind checks */
> +		case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
> +		case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
> +		case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
> +			err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
> +			break;
> +		/* Connect checks */
> +		case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
> +		case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
> +		case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
> +		case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
> +			err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
> +			if (err)
> +				return err;
> +
> +			/* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
> +			 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
> +			 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked() is
> +			 * is called here. The situations handled are:
> +			 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
> +			 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
> +			 * primary address is selected.
> +			 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
> +			 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
> +			 * selinux_socket_connect().
> +			 */
> +			err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
> +			break;
> +		}
> +
> +		if (err)
> +			return err;
> +
> +		addr_buf += len;
> +		walk_size += len;
> +	}
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
> +static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
> +				  struct sock *newsk)
> +{
> +	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> +	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
> +
> +	/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
> +	 * the non-sctp clone version.
> +	 */
> +	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
> +		return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
> +
> +	newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
> +	newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
> +	newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
> +	selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
> +}
> +
>  static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
>  				     struct request_sock *req)
>  {
> @@ -6422,6 +6661,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> index cc35695..167c20a 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
>  	  { COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
>  	{ "sctp_socket",
>  	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
> -	    "node_bind", NULL } },
> +	    "node_bind", "name_connect", "association", NULL } },
>  	{ "icmp_socket",
>  	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
>  	    "node_bind", NULL } },
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
> index 75686d5..0fae720 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
> @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
>  #include <linux/skbuff.h>
>  #include <net/sock.h>
>  #include <net/request_sock.h>
> +#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
>  
>  #include "avc.h"
>  #include "objsec.h"
> @@ -53,9 +54,11 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  				 u16 family,
>  				 u32 sid);
> -
> +int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
> +				     struct sk_buff *skb);
>  int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family);
>  void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
> +void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
>  int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
>  int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
>  				struct sk_buff *skb,
> @@ -65,6 +68,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
>  				     int level,
>  				     int optname);
>  int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr);
> +int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
> +					 struct sockaddr *addr);
>  
>  #else
>  static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
> @@ -114,6 +119,11 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_conn_setsid(struct sock *sk,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static inline int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
> +						    struct sk_buff *skb)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
>  static inline int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req,
>  						   u16 family)
>  {
> @@ -123,6 +133,10 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
>  {
>  	return;
>  }
> +static inline void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, sock *newsk)
> +{
> +	return;
> +}
>  static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk,
>  						    u16 family)
>  {
> @@ -146,6 +160,11 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk,
>  {
>  	return 0;
>  }
> +static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
> +						       struct sockaddr *addr)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
>  #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
>  
>  #endif
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> index 1649cd1..be145cf 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> @@ -130,6 +130,10 @@ struct sk_security_struct {
>  	u32 sid;			/* SID of this object */
>  	u32 peer_sid;			/* SID of peer */
>  	u16 sclass;			/* sock security class */
> +	enum {				/* SCTP association state */
> +		SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET = 0,
> +		SCTP_ASSOC_SET,
> +	} sctp_assoc_state;
>  };
>  
>  struct tun_security_struct {
> diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> index aaba667..0863c56 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> @@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  	sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
>  	if (sk != NULL) {
>  		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> +
>  		if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
>  			return 0;
>  		secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, sid);
> @@ -270,6 +271,61 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  	return rc;
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request - Label an incoming sctp association.
> + * @ep: incoming association endpoint.
> + * @skb: the packet.
> + *
> + * Description:
> + * A new incoming connection is represented by @ep, ......
> + * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
> + *
> + */
> +int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
> +				     struct sk_buff *skb)
> +{
> +	int rc;
> +	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
> +	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
> +	struct sockaddr *addr;
> +	struct sockaddr_in addr4;
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
> +	struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
> +#endif
> +
> +	if (ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
> +				ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
> +	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(ep->secid, &secattr);
> +	if (rc != 0)
> +		goto assoc_request_return;
> +
> +	/* Move skb hdr address info to a struct sockaddr and then call
> +	 * netlbl_conn_setattr().
> +	 */
> +	if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
> +		addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
> +		addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
> +		addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr4;
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
> +	} else {
> +		addr6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
> +		addr6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
> +		addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr6;
> +#endif
> +	}
> +
> +	rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, addr, &secattr);
> +	if (rc == 0)
> +		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
> +
> +assoc_request_return:
> +	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Label an incoming stream connection
>   * @req: incoming connection request socket
> @@ -319,6 +375,22 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
>  		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone - Copy state to the newly created sock
> + * @sk: current sock
> + * @newsk: the new sock
> + *
> + * Description:
> + * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3).
> + */
> +void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
> +{
> +	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> +	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
> +
> +	newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create - Label a socket using NetLabel
>   * @sock: the socket to label
> @@ -470,7 +542,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
>  }
>  
>  /**
> - * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect
> + * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper - Help label a client-side socket on
> + * connect
>   * @sk: the socket to label
>   * @addr: the destination address
>   *
> @@ -479,18 +552,13 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
>   * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
>   *
>   */
> -int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
> +static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
> +						struct sockaddr *addr)
>  {
>  	int rc;
>  	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
>  	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
>  
> -	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
> -	    sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
> -		return 0;
> -
> -	lock_sock(sk);
> -
>  	/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
>  	 * is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we want to reset
>  	 * the socket */
> @@ -498,18 +566,61 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
>  		netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
>  		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
>  		rc = 0;
> -		goto socket_connect_return;
> +		return rc;
>  	}
>  	secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
>  	if (secattr == NULL) {
>  		rc = -ENOMEM;
> -		goto socket_connect_return;
> +		return rc;
>  	}
>  	rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(sk, addr, secattr);
>  	if (rc == 0)
>  		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED;
>  
> -socket_connect_return:
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked - Label a client-side socket on
> + * connect
> + * @sk: the socket to label
> + * @addr: the destination address
> + *
> + * Description:
> + * Attempt to label a connected socket that already has the socket locked
> + * with NetLabel using the given address.
> + * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
> + *
> + */
> +int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
> +					 struct sockaddr *addr)
> +{
> +	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> +
> +	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
> +	    sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(sk, addr);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect
> + * @sk: the socket to label
> + * @addr: the destination address
> + *
> + * Description:
> + * Attempt to label a connected socket with NetLabel using the given address.
> + * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
> + *
> + */
> +int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
> +{
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	lock_sock(sk);
> +	rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
>  	release_sock(sk);
> +
>  	return rc;
>  }
> -- 
> 2.14.3
> 
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-sctp" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> 
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst b/Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f66bf3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ 
+SCTP SELinux Support
+=====================
+
+Security Hooks
+===============
+
+``Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst`` describes the following SCTP security
+hooks with the SELinux specifics expanded below::
+
+    security_sctp_assoc_request()
+    security_sctp_bind_connect()
+    security_sctp_sk_clone()
+    security_inet_conn_established()
+
+
+security_sctp_assoc_request()
+-----------------------------
+Passes the ``@ep`` and ``@chunk->skb`` of the association INIT packet to the
+security module. Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+::
+
+    @ep - pointer to sctp endpoint structure.
+    @skb - pointer to skbuff of association packet.
+
+The security module performs the following operations:
+     IF this is the first association on ``@ep->base.sk``, then set the peer
+     sid to that in ``@skb``. This will ensure there is only one peer sid
+     assigned to ``@ep->base.sk`` that may support multiple associations.
+
+     ELSE validate the ``@ep->base.sk peer_sid`` against the ``@skb peer sid``
+     to determine whether the association should be allowed or denied.
+
+     Set the sctp ``@ep sid`` to socket's sid (from ``ep->base.sk``) with
+     MLS portion taken from ``@skb peer sid``. This will be used by SCTP
+     TCP style sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new socket
+     to be generated.
+
+     If IP security options are configured (CIPSO/CALIPSO), then the ip
+     options are set on the socket.
+
+
+security_sctp_bind_connect()
+-----------------------------
+Checks permissions required for ipv4/ipv6 addresses based on the ``@optname``
+as follows::
+
+  ------------------------------------------------------------------
+  |                   BIND Permission Checks                       |
+  |       @optname             |         @address contains         |
+  |----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
+  | SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD     | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
+  | SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR          | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
+  | SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
+  ------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+  ------------------------------------------------------------------
+  |                 CONNECT Permission Checks                      |
+  |       @optname             |         @address contains         |
+  |----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
+  | SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX      | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
+  | SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP          | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
+  | SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT       | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
+  | SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY     | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
+  ------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+``Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst`` gives a summary of the ``@optname``
+entries and also describes ASCONF chunk processing when Dynamic Address
+Reconfiguration is enabled.
+
+
+security_sctp_sk_clone()
+-------------------------
+Called whenever a new socket is created by **accept**\(2) (i.e. a TCP style
+socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace calls
+**sctp_peeloff**\(3). ``security_sctp_sk_clone()`` will set the new
+sockets sid and peer sid to that contained in the ``@ep sid`` and
+``@ep peer sid`` respectively.
+::
+
+    @ep - pointer to current sctp endpoint structure.
+    @sk - pointer to current sock structure.
+    @sk - pointer to new sock structure.
+
+
+security_inet_conn_established()
+---------------------------------
+Called when a COOKIE ACK is received where it sets the connection's peer sid
+to that in ``@skb``::
+
+    @sk  - pointer to sock structure.
+    @skb - pointer to skbuff of the COOKIE ACK packet.
+
+
+Policy Statements
+==================
+The following class and permissions to support SCTP are available within the
+kernel::
+
+    class sctp_socket inherits socket { node_bind }
+
+whenever the following policy capability is enabled::
+
+    policycap extended_socket_class;
+
+SELinux SCTP support adds the ``name_connect`` permission for connecting
+to a specific port type and the ``association`` permission that is explained
+in the section below.
+
+If userspace tools have been updated, SCTP will support the ``portcon``
+statement as shown in the following example::
+
+    portcon sctp 1024-1036 system_u:object_r:sctp_ports_t:s0
+
+
+SCTP Peer Labeling
+===================
+An SCTP socket will only have one peer label assigned to it. This will be
+assigned during the establishment of the first association. Once the peer
+label has been assigned, any new associations will have the ``association``
+permission validated by checking the socket peer sid against the received
+packets peer sid to determine whether the association should be allowed or
+denied.
+
+NOTES:
+   1) If peer labeling is not enabled, then the peer context will always be
+      ``SECINITSID_UNLABELED`` (``unlabeled_t`` in Reference Policy).
+
+   2) As SCTP can support more than one transport address per endpoint
+      (multi-homing) on a single socket, it is possible to configure policy
+      and NetLabel to provide different peer labels for each of these. As the
+      socket peer label is determined by the first associations transport
+      address, it is recommended that all peer labels are consistent.
+
+   3) **getpeercon**\(3) may be used by userspace to retrieve the sockets peer
+      context.
+
+   4) While not SCTP specific, be aware when using NetLabel that if a label
+      is assigned to a specific interface, and that interface 'goes down',
+      then the NetLabel service will remove the entry. Therefore ensure that
+      the network startup scripts call **netlabelctl**\(8) to set the required
+      label (see **netlabel-config**\(8) helper script for details).
+
+   5) The NetLabel SCTP peer labeling rules apply as discussed in the following
+      set of posts tagged "netlabel" at: http://www.paul-moore.com/blog/t.
+
+   6) CIPSO is only supported for IPv4 addressing: ``socket(AF_INET, ...)``
+      CALIPSO is only supported for IPv6 addressing: ``socket(AF_INET6, ...)``
+
+      Note the following when testing CIPSO/CALIPSO:
+         a) CIPSO will send an ICMP packet if an SCTP packet cannot be
+            delivered because of an invalid label.
+         b) CALIPSO does not send an ICMP packet, just silently discards it.
+
+   7) IPSEC is not supported as RFC 3554 - sctp/ipsec support has not been
+      implemented in userspace (**racoon**\(8) or **ipsec_pluto**\(8)),
+      although the kernel supports SCTP/IPSEC.
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f5d3047..24d6f39 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ 
 #include <linux/tcp.h>
 #include <linux/udp.h>
 #include <linux/dccp.h>
+#include <linux/sctp.h>
+#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
 #include <linux/quota.h>
 #include <linux/un.h>		/* for Unix socket types */
 #include <net/af_unix.h>	/* for Unix socket types */
@@ -4126,6 +4128,23 @@  static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		break;
 	}
 
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
+	case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+		struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
+
+		if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+			break;
+
+		offset += ihlen;
+		sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
+		if (sh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -4199,6 +4218,19 @@  static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		break;
 	}
 
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
+	case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+		struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
+
+		sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
+		if (sh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
 	/* includes fragments */
 	default:
 		break;
@@ -4388,6 +4420,10 @@  static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 		sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
 		sksec->sclass = sclass;
 		sksec->sid = sid;
+		/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
+		if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+			sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
+
 		err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
 	}
 
@@ -4408,11 +4444,7 @@  static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
-	/*
-	 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
-	 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
-	 * check the first address now.
-	 */
+	/* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
 	family = sk->sk_family;
 	if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
 		char *addrp;
@@ -4424,7 +4456,13 @@  static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		unsigned short snum;
 		u32 sid, node_perm;
 
-		if (family == PF_INET) {
+		/*
+		 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
+		 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
+		 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
+		 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
+		 */
+		if (address->sa_family == AF_INET) {
 			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) {
 				err = -EINVAL;
 				goto out;
@@ -4478,6 +4516,10 @@  static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 			node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
 			break;
 
+		case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
+			node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+
 		default:
 			node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
 			break;
@@ -4492,7 +4534,7 @@  static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
 		ad.u.net->family = family;
 
-		if (family == PF_INET)
+		if (address->sa_family == AF_INET)
 			ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
 		else
 			ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
@@ -4506,7 +4548,11 @@  static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
+ * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.txt
+ */
+static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
+					 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
@@ -4517,10 +4563,12 @@  static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 		return err;
 
 	/*
-	 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
+	 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
+	 * for the port.
 	 */
 	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
-	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
 		struct common_audit_data ad;
 		struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
@@ -4528,7 +4576,12 @@  static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 		unsigned short snum;
 		u32 sid, perm;
 
-		if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
+		/* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
+		 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
+		 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
+		 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
+		 */
+		if (address->sa_family == AF_INET) {
 			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
 			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
 				return -EINVAL;
@@ -4542,10 +4595,19 @@  static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 
 		err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
 		if (err)
-			goto out;
+			return err;
 
-		perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
-		       TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+		switch (sksec->sclass) {
+		case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
+			perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+			break;
+		case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
+			perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+			break;
+		case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
+			perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+			break;
+		}
 
 		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 		ad.u.net = &net;
@@ -4553,13 +4615,24 @@  static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 		ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
 		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
 		if (err)
-			goto out;
+			return err;
 	}
 
-	err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
+	return 0;
+}
 
-out:
-	return err;
+/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
+static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+				  struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+	err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
@@ -4822,7 +4895,8 @@  static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op
 	u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
 
 	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
-	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
 		peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
 	if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
 		return -ENOPROTOOPT;
@@ -4935,6 +5009,171 @@  static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 	sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
 }
 
+/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
+ * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
+ * already present).
+ */
+static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+				      struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	u8 peerlbl_active;
+	u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	u32 conn_sid;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
+		return 0;
+
+	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+
+	if (peerlbl_active) {
+		/* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
+		 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
+		 */
+		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
+					      &peer_sid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+			peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	}
+
+	if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
+		sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
+
+		/* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
+		 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
+		 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
+		 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
+		 */
+		sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
+	} else if  (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
+		/* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
+		 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
+		 */
+		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+		ad.u.net = &net;
+		ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
+		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
+				   SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	/* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
+	 * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
+	 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
+	 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
+	 * plug this into the new socket.
+	 */
+	err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	ep->secid = conn_sid;
+	ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
+
+	/* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
+	return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
+}
+
+/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
+ * based on their @optname.
+ */
+static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
+				     struct sockaddr *address,
+				     int addrlen)
+{
+	int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
+	void *addr_buf;
+	struct sockaddr *addr;
+	struct socket *sock;
+
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
+	sock = sk->sk_socket;
+	addr_buf = address;
+
+	while (walk_size < addrlen) {
+		addr = addr_buf;
+		switch (addr->sa_family) {
+		case AF_INET:
+			len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+		}
+
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		switch (optname) {
+		/* Bind checks */
+		case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
+		case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
+		case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
+			err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
+			break;
+		/* Connect checks */
+		case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
+		case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
+		case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
+		case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
+			err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+
+			/* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
+			 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
+			 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked() is
+			 * is called here. The situations handled are:
+			 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
+			 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
+			 * primary address is selected.
+			 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
+			 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
+			 * selinux_socket_connect().
+			 */
+			err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		addr_buf += len;
+		walk_size += len;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
+static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
+				  struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+	/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
+	 * the non-sctp clone version.
+	 */
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
+		return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
+
+	newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
+	newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
+	newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
+	selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
+}
+
 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				     struct request_sock *req)
 {
@@ -6422,6 +6661,9 @@  static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index cc35695..167c20a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@  struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	  { COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "sctp_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
-	    "node_bind", NULL } },
+	    "node_bind", "name_connect", "association", NULL } },
 	{ "icmp_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
 	    "node_bind", NULL } },
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index 75686d5..0fae720 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ 
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
 #include <net/request_sock.h>
+#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
 
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "objsec.h"
@@ -53,9 +54,11 @@  int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 u16 family,
 				 u32 sid);
-
+int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+				     struct sk_buff *skb);
 int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family);
 void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
+void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
 int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
 int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -65,6 +68,8 @@  int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
 				     int level,
 				     int optname);
 int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr);
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
+					 struct sockaddr *addr);
 
 #else
 static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
@@ -114,6 +119,11 @@  static inline int selinux_netlbl_conn_setsid(struct sock *sk,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+						    struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 static inline int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req,
 						   u16 family)
 {
@@ -123,6 +133,10 @@  static inline void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 {
 	return;
 }
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, sock *newsk)
+{
+	return;
+}
 static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk,
 						    u16 family)
 {
@@ -146,6 +160,11 @@  static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk,
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
+						       struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
 
 #endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 1649cd1..be145cf 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -130,6 +130,10 @@  struct sk_security_struct {
 	u32 sid;			/* SID of this object */
 	u32 peer_sid;			/* SID of peer */
 	u16 sclass;			/* sock security class */
+	enum {				/* SCTP association state */
+		SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET = 0,
+		SCTP_ASSOC_SET,
+	} sctp_assoc_state;
 };
 
 struct tun_security_struct {
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index aaba667..0863c56 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -250,6 +250,7 @@  int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
 	if (sk != NULL) {
 		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
 		if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
 			return 0;
 		secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, sid);
@@ -270,6 +271,61 @@  int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	return rc;
 }
 
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request - Label an incoming sctp association.
+ * @ep: incoming association endpoint.
+ * @skb: the packet.
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * A new incoming connection is represented by @ep, ......
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+				     struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+	struct sockaddr *addr;
+	struct sockaddr_in addr4;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
+#endif
+
+	if (ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
+				ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
+		return 0;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(ep->secid, &secattr);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		goto assoc_request_return;
+
+	/* Move skb hdr address info to a struct sockaddr and then call
+	 * netlbl_conn_setattr().
+	 */
+	if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
+		addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
+		addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
+		addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr4;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	} else {
+		addr6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+		addr6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
+		addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr6;
+#endif
+	}
+
+	rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, addr, &secattr);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
+
+assoc_request_return:
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	return rc;
+}
+
 /**
  * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Label an incoming stream connection
  * @req: incoming connection request socket
@@ -319,6 +375,22 @@  void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
 }
 
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone - Copy state to the newly created sock
+ * @sk: current sock
+ * @newsk: the new sock
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3).
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+	newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
+}
+
 /**
  * selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create - Label a socket using NetLabel
  * @sock: the socket to label
@@ -470,7 +542,8 @@  int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
 }
 
 /**
- * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper - Help label a client-side socket on
+ * connect
  * @sk: the socket to label
  * @addr: the destination address
  *
@@ -479,18 +552,13 @@  int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
  * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
+static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
+						struct sockaddr *addr)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
 
-	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
-	    sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
-		return 0;
-
-	lock_sock(sk);
-
 	/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
 	 * is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we want to reset
 	 * the socket */
@@ -498,18 +566,61 @@  int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
 		netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
 		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
 		rc = 0;
-		goto socket_connect_return;
+		return rc;
 	}
 	secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
 	if (secattr == NULL) {
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
-		goto socket_connect_return;
+		return rc;
 	}
 	rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(sk, addr, secattr);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED;
 
-socket_connect_return:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked - Label a client-side socket on
+ * connect
+ * @sk: the socket to label
+ * @addr: the destination address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a connected socket that already has the socket locked
+ * with NetLabel using the given address.
+ * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
+					 struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
+	    sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
+		return 0;
+
+	return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(sk, addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect
+ * @sk: the socket to label
+ * @addr: the destination address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a connected socket with NetLabel using the given address.
+ * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	lock_sock(sk);
+	rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
 	release_sock(sk);
+
 	return rc;
 }