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[213.175.37.10]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id f137sm11186044wmg.29.2019.01.09.01.11.08 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Wed, 09 Jan 2019 01:11:08 -0800 (PST) From: Ondrej Mosnacek To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore Cc: Stephen Smalley , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Greg Kroah-Hartman , Tejun Heo , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org, Ondrej Mosnacek Subject: [PATCH 2/3] selinux: Implement the object_init_security hook Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2019 10:10:27 +0100 Message-Id: <20190109091028.24485-3-omosnace@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190109091028.24485-1-omosnace@redhat.com> References: <20190109091028.24485-1-omosnace@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP The hook applies the same logic as selinux_determine_inode_label(), with the exception of the super_block handling, which will be enforced on the actual inodes by other hooks. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 7ce012d9ec51..29c038513504 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3526,6 +3526,45 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) return -EOPNOTSUPP; } +/* file-like object operations */ + +/* Used e.g. for kernfs_node for newly created nodes */ +static int selinux_object_init_security(void *parent_ctx, u32 parent_ctxlen, + const struct qstr *qstr, u16 mode, + void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) +{ + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); + u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen; + int rc; + char *context; + + rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, parent_ctx, parent_ctxlen, + &parent_sid, GFP_KERNEL); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (tsec->create_sid) { + newsid = tsec->create_sid; + } else { + u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(mode); + + rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, + parent_sid, secclass, qstr, + &newsid); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid, + &context, &clen); + if (rc) + return rc; + + *ctx = context; + *ctxlen = clen; + return 0; +} + /* file security operations */ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) @@ -6965,6 +7004,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(object_init_security, selinux_object_init_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security),