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[32/97] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding

Message ID 20190228221933.2551-33-casey@schaufler-ca.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series LSM: Complete module stacking | expand

Commit Message

Casey Schaufler Feb. 28, 2019, 10:18 p.m. UTC
Clean out the scaffolding used in the lsm_export transition.
This requires changing some of the IMA internal interfaces
from u32 to struct lsm_export pointers.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          | 10 ++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      |  9 +++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  4 +---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     | 25 ++++++++-----------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 14 +++++++-------
 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index cc12f3449a72..2edaf4c41300 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -191,8 +191,9 @@  enum ima_hooks {
 };
 
 /* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
-		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr);
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+		   struct lsm_export *l, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+		   int *pcr);
 int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -212,8 +213,9 @@  void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
 const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
-		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr);
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+		     struct lsm_export *l, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+		     int flags, int *pcr);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c7505fb122d4..7e493af96134 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@  void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
  * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
  * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
- * @secid: secid of the task being validated
+ * @l: LAM data of the task being validated
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
  *        MAY_APPEND)
  * @func: caller identifier
@@ -175,14 +175,15 @@  void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
  *
  */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
-		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr)
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+		   struct lsm_export *l, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+		   int *pcr)
 {
 	int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
 
 	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
 
-	return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr);
+	return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, l, func, mask, flags, pcr);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index d0580a1f157e..b2203ff2bef5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -50,15 +50,13 @@  bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
  */
 int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
-	u32 secid;
 	struct lsm_export le;
 
 	if (!ima_appraise)
 		return 0;
 
 	security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
-	lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
-	return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
+	return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), &le, func, mask,
 				IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 7efc806eb5ab..c3186ae42371 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@  void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 }
 
 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
-			       u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
-			       enum ima_hooks func)
+			       struct lsm_export *l, char *buf, loff_t size,
+			       int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@  static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
 	 * Included is the appraise submask.
 	 */
-	action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr);
+	action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, l, mask, func, &pcr);
 	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
 			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
 	if (!action && !violation_check)
@@ -335,13 +335,11 @@  static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
  */
 int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 {
-	u32 secid;
 	struct lsm_export le;
 
 	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
 		security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
-		lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
-		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &le, NULL,
 					   0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
 	}
 
@@ -364,19 +362,16 @@  int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	int ret;
-	u32 secid;
 	struct lsm_export le;
 
 	security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
-	lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
-	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), &le, NULL, 0,
 				  MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
 	security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &le);
-	lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
-	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
+	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &le, NULL, 0,
 				   MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
 }
 
@@ -392,12 +387,10 @@  int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  */
 int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
-	u32 secid;
 	struct lsm_export le;
 
 	security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
-	lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &le, NULL, 0,
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
 					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
 }
@@ -475,7 +468,6 @@  int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 		       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
-	u32 secid;
 	struct lsm_export le;
 
 	if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
@@ -499,8 +491,7 @@  int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 
 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
 	security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
-	lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &le, buf, size,
 				   MAY_READ, func);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 6f05e96e5db0..b5d12db3cfb3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@  static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
  * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
  */
 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
-			    const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
+			    const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_export *l,
 			    enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -346,8 +346,7 @@  static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
-			lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
-			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le,
+			rc = security_filter_rule_match(l,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
 							Audit_equal,
 							rule->lsm[i].rule,
@@ -396,7 +395,7 @@  static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
  * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
  *        being made
- * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
+ * @l: LSM data of the task to be validated
  * @func: IMA hook identifier
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
@@ -408,8 +407,9 @@  static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * list when walking it.  Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
  * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
  */
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
-		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr)
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+		     struct lsm_export *l, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+		     int flags, int *pcr)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
 	int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@  int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
 		if (!(entry->action & actmask))
 			continue;
 
-		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask))
+		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, l, func, mask))
 			continue;
 
 		action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;