From patchwork Tue Mar 5 15:49:22 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Micah Morton X-Patchwork-Id: 10839613 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 70C45180E for ; Tue, 5 Mar 2019 15:49:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5BE232C384 for ; Tue, 5 Mar 2019 15:49:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 4FC0C2C5F1; Tue, 5 Mar 2019 15:49:30 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 33AF62C384 for ; Tue, 5 Mar 2019 15:49:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727722AbfCEPt2 (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Mar 2019 10:49:28 -0500 Received: from mail-qt1-f197.google.com ([209.85.160.197]:51657 "EHLO mail-qt1-f197.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728491AbfCEPt2 (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Mar 2019 10:49:28 -0500 Received: by mail-qt1-f197.google.com with SMTP id s8so8431011qth.18 for ; Tue, 05 Mar 2019 07:49:26 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=date:message-id:mime-version:subject:from:to:cc; bh=a8KvlTm2qToizifS+5ymLbeHsnyCcVmB8Y52LG3Kh4Y=; b=KSF+Av5rzX1L5crVEbiK85ncs49OzEAvKzeDQmjUZLKJM5HzAcrS1uzvnu96xeUdlA r94AMD25v6eq5y3YeV8jMECfdBbz9KpltcDbYGZORLr9hAVixj1DlV05gIuV2NbslLzw GtTFfnpVvHpRQLwEK2KRZUDdA3lPKGflHwgbo= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:message-id:mime-version:subject:from:to:cc; bh=a8KvlTm2qToizifS+5ymLbeHsnyCcVmB8Y52LG3Kh4Y=; b=U5R8CB/Yo0dGfV9gQucrXR89rQYZVx3qtFFQrICzZB6njLYnm4nUKlS8rDc4R/rz7Y 3G6mS1uApPqv1kArIxv/KAnp9lwjz9GGdco71z1D3+ScwW2JaMpjk3fxyXRtZk9sC71g BpZfZK3yG2dkCH9S2IPzaOxaOAE0aqaILJwKRg0qiLtmbmTRbOG2bsA4loSxjPgwKpSc U3bdz94F11IcRHQxv/HiGPQMB6Z7NFZMEkJd859hv4lBv2wBEWn/9JPIXLfZ9GQnYJVn omguI/WvthfGz8pipWp5mlQMQmqPaR4HVEgg98leeaOAIoIS7lKFvn4rMnzKXcPWU+jZ E4bg== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVFHEXsNweid8cKr8VPIB6YtyeeSPhNVa/u9t6UuvGKcx04vsPN cTaLbhuqsaMi7nrnoUqwol5zZhSGXfcyPnlM X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqyhJURTIYmLHPGS0W7f/b8h/iWl4Rbv7YFI26Klyx5GMKi2G53gstCWdosE0XSr984V9Xl1nscOgVJ/dlTG X-Received: by 2002:ac8:1973:: with SMTP id g48mr1447062qtk.58.1551800966417; Tue, 05 Mar 2019 07:49:26 -0800 (PST) Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 07:49:22 -0800 Message-Id: <20190305154922.61040-1-mortonm@chromium.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0.352.gf09ad66450-goog Subject: [PATCH v5 1/2] LSM: SafeSetID: gate setgid transitions From: mortonm@chromium.org To: jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, keescook@chromium.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: Micah Morton Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Micah Morton This patch generalizes the 'task_fix_setuid' LSM hook to enable hooking setgid transitions as well as setuid transitions. The hook is renamed to 'task_fix_setid'. The patch introduces calls to this hook from the setgid functions in kernel/sys.c. This will allow the SafeSetID LSM to govern setgid transitions in addition to setuid transitions. This patch also makes sure the setgid functions in kernel/sys.c call security_capable_setid rather than the ordinary security_capable function, so that the security_capable hook in the SafeSetID LSM knows it is being invoked from a setid function. Signed-off-by: Micah Morton --- Changes since the last patch: Only one break is needed for the four LSM_SETGID_* cases in security/commoncap.c. Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst | 2 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 8 ++--- include/linux/security.h | 36 ++++++++++++++------- kernel/sys.c | 35 ++++++++++++++------ security/commoncap.c | 22 ++++++++----- security/safesetid/lsm.c | 12 +++---- security/security.c | 4 +-- 7 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst index 212434ef65ad..670a6544fd39 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ other system interactions, including use of pid namespaces and device creation. Use an existing LSM ------------------- None of the other in-tree LSMs have the capability to gate setid transitions, or -even employ the security_task_fix_setuid hook at all. SELinux says of that hook: +even employ the security_task_fix_setid hook at all. SELinux says of that hook: "Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control this operation." diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 22fc786d723a..47fd04410fde 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -594,14 +594,14 @@ * @size length of the file contents. * @id kernel read file identifier * Return 0 if permission is granted. - * @task_fix_setuid: + * @task_fix_setid: * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user * identity attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter * indicates which of the set*uid system calls invoked this hook. If * @new is the set of credentials that will be installed. Modifications * should be made to this rather than to @current->cred. * @old is the set of credentials that are being replaces - * @flags contains one of the LSM_SETID_* values. + * @flags contains one of the LSM_SET*ID_* values. * Return 0 on success. * @task_setpgid: * Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the @@ -1594,7 +1594,7 @@ union security_list_options { int (*kernel_read_file)(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id); int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id); - int (*task_fix_setuid)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, + int (*task_fix_setid)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags); int (*task_setpgid)(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); int (*task_getpgid)(struct task_struct *p); @@ -1886,7 +1886,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads { struct hlist_head kernel_read_file; struct hlist_head kernel_post_read_file; struct hlist_head kernel_module_request; - struct hlist_head task_fix_setuid; + struct hlist_head task_fix_setid; struct hlist_head task_setpgid; struct hlist_head task_getpgid; struct hlist_head task_getsid; diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 13537a49ae97..76df3e22fed1 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ extern int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, extern int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr); extern int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags); -extern int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags); +extern int cap_task_fix_setid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags); extern int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); extern int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p); @@ -128,17 +128,29 @@ extern unsigned long dac_mmap_min_addr; /* * Values used in the task_security_ops calls */ -/* setuid or setgid, id0 == uid or gid */ -#define LSM_SETID_ID 1 +/* setuid, id0 == uid */ +#define LSM_SETUID_ID 1 -/* setreuid or setregid, id0 == real, id1 == eff */ -#define LSM_SETID_RE 2 +/* setreuid, id0 == real, id1 == eff */ +#define LSM_SETUID_RE 2 -/* setresuid or setresgid, id0 == real, id1 == eff, uid2 == saved */ -#define LSM_SETID_RES 4 +/* setresuid, id0 == real, id1 == eff, uid2 == saved */ +#define LSM_SETUID_RES 4 -/* setfsuid or setfsgid, id0 == fsuid or fsgid */ -#define LSM_SETID_FS 8 +/* setfsuid, id0 == fsgid */ +#define LSM_SETUID_FS 8 + +/* setgid, id0 == gid */ +#define LSM_SETGID_ID 16 + +/* setregid, id0 == real, id1 == eff */ +#define LSM_SETGID_RE 32 + +/* setresgid, id0 == real, id1 == eff, uid2 == saved */ +#define LSM_SETGID_RES 64 + +/* setfsgid, id0 == fsgid */ +#define LSM_SETGID_FS 128 /* Flags for security_task_prlimit(). */ #define LSM_PRLIMIT_READ 1 @@ -324,7 +336,7 @@ int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id); int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id); int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id); -int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, +int security_task_fix_setid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags); int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p); @@ -923,11 +935,11 @@ static inline int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, return 0; } -static inline int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, +static inline int security_task_fix_setid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) { - return cap_task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags); + return cap_task_fix_setid(new, old, flags); } static inline int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index c5f875048aef..615b44939238 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ long __sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) { if (gid_eq(old->gid, krgid) || gid_eq(old->egid, krgid) || - ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) + ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) new->gid = krgid; else goto error; @@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ long __sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) if (gid_eq(old->gid, kegid) || gid_eq(old->egid, kegid) || gid_eq(old->sgid, kegid) || - ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) + ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) new->egid = kegid; else goto error; @@ -392,6 +392,10 @@ long __sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) new->sgid = new->egid; new->fsgid = new->egid; + retval = security_task_fix_setid(new, old, LSM_SETGID_RE); + if (retval < 0) + goto error; + return commit_creds(new); error: @@ -427,13 +431,17 @@ long __sys_setgid(gid_t gid) old = current_cred(); retval = -EPERM; - if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) + if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid; else if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid)) new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid; else goto error; + retval = security_task_fix_setid(new, old, LSM_SETGID_ID); + if (retval < 0) + goto error; + return commit_creds(new); error: @@ -539,7 +547,7 @@ long __sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid) new->suid = new->euid; new->fsuid = new->euid; - retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE); + retval = security_task_fix_setid(new, old, LSM_SETUID_RE); if (retval < 0) goto error; @@ -597,7 +605,7 @@ long __sys_setuid(uid_t uid) new->fsuid = new->euid = kuid; - retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID); + retval = security_task_fix_setid(new, old, LSM_SETUID_ID); if (retval < 0) goto error; @@ -672,7 +680,7 @@ long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid) new->suid = ksuid; new->fsuid = new->euid; - retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES); + retval = security_task_fix_setid(new, old, LSM_SETUID_RES); if (retval < 0) goto error; @@ -735,7 +743,7 @@ long __sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid) old = current_cred(); retval = -EPERM; - if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { + if (!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid)) goto error; @@ -755,6 +763,10 @@ long __sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid) new->sgid = ksgid; new->fsgid = new->egid; + retval = security_task_fix_setid(new, old, LSM_SETGID_RES); + if (retval < 0) + goto error; + return commit_creds(new); error: @@ -817,7 +829,7 @@ long __sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid) ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) { new->fsuid = kuid; - if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) + if (security_task_fix_setid(new, old, LSM_SETUID_FS) == 0) goto change_okay; } } @@ -858,10 +870,13 @@ long __sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid) if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->egid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid) || - ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { + ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { if (!gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid)) { new->fsgid = kgid; - goto change_okay; + if (security_task_fix_setid(new, + old, + LSM_SETGID_FS) == 0) + goto change_okay; } } diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index f1d117c3d8ae..4a038d3c7196 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -1026,27 +1026,27 @@ static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) } /** - * cap_task_fix_setuid - Fix up the results of setuid() call + * cap_task_fix_setid - Fix up the results of setid() call * @new: The proposed credentials * @old: The current task's current credentials * @flags: Indications of what has changed * - * Fix up the results of setuid() call before the credential changes are + * Fix up the results of setid() call before the credential changes are * actually applied, returning 0 to grant the changes, -ve to deny them. */ -int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) +int cap_task_fix_setid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) { switch (flags) { - case LSM_SETID_RE: - case LSM_SETID_ID: - case LSM_SETID_RES: + case LSM_SETUID_RE: + case LSM_SETUID_ID: + case LSM_SETUID_RES: /* juggle the capabilities to follow [RES]UID changes unless * otherwise suppressed */ if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) cap_emulate_setxuid(new, old); break; - case LSM_SETID_FS: + case LSM_SETUID_FS: /* juggle the capabilties to follow FSUID changes, unless * otherwise suppressed * @@ -1066,6 +1066,12 @@ int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) } break; + case LSM_SETGID_RE: + case LSM_SETGID_ID: + case LSM_SETGID_RES: + case LSM_SETGID_FS: + break; + default: return -EINVAL; } @@ -1355,7 +1361,7 @@ struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, cap_inode_getsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, cap_mmap_file), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, cap_task_fix_setuid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setid, cap_task_fix_setid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, cap_task_prctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, cap_task_setscheduler), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, cap_task_setioprio), diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c index cecd38e2ac80..5deffa92f25f 100644 --- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c +++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ static int check_uid_transition(kuid_t parent, kuid_t child) * set*uid to user under new cred struct, or the UID transition is allowed (by * Linux set*uid rules) even without CAP_SETUID. */ -static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, +static int safesetid_task_fix_setid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) { @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, return 0; switch (flags) { - case LSM_SETID_RE: + case LSM_SETUID_RE: /* * Users for which setuid restrictions exist can only set the * real UID to the real UID or the effective UID, unless an @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, return check_uid_transition(old->euid, new->euid); } break; - case LSM_SETID_ID: + case LSM_SETUID_ID: /* * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the * real UID or saved set-UID unless an explicit whitelist @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, if (!uid_eq(old->suid, new->suid)) return check_uid_transition(old->suid, new->suid); break; - case LSM_SETID_RES: + case LSM_SETUID_RES: /* * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the * real UID, effective UID, or saved set-UID to anything but @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, return check_uid_transition(old->suid, new->suid); } break; - case LSM_SETID_FS: + case LSM_SETUID_FS: /* * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the * filesystem UID to anything but one of: the current real UID, @@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ void flush_safesetid_whitelist_entries(void) } static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = { - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setid, safesetid_task_fix_setid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable) }; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index ed9b8cbf21cf..450784fd1d2b 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1568,10 +1568,10 @@ int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data); -int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, +int security_task_fix_setid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) { - return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags); + return call_int_hook(task_fix_setid, 0, new, old, flags); } int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)