From patchwork Tue Jun 25 21:52:37 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= X-Patchwork-Id: 11016453 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 55CC614E5 for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 439C826253 for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 374F32675C; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:07 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 041DB284AF for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726432AbfFYVzF (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:55:05 -0400 Received: from smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch ([128.65.195.4]:54876 "EHLO smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726037AbfFYVzF (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:55:05 -0400 Received: from smtp5.infomaniak.ch (smtp5.infomaniak.ch [83.166.132.18]) by smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrPqj019890 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:25 +0200 Received: from localhost (ns3096276.ip-94-23-54.eu [94.23.54.103]) (authenticated bits=0) by smtp5.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrO5b038876; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:24 +0200 From: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , Aleksa Sarai , Alexander Viro , Alexei Starovoitov , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , "Eric W . Biederman" , James Morris , Jann Horn , John Johansen , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Michael Kerrisk , =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BC?= =?utf-8?q?n?= , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Stephen Smalley , Tejun Heo , Tetsuo Handa , Thomas Graf , Tycho Andersen , Will Drewry , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 08/10] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:52:37 +0200 Message-Id: <20190625215239.11136-9-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> References: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Antivirus: Dr.Web (R) for Unix mail servers drweb plugin ver.6.0.2.8 X-Antivirus-Code: 0x100000 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Add a basic sandbox tool to launch a command which is denied access to a list of files and directories. Add to the bpf_load library the ability to handle a BPF program subtype. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Daniel Borkmann Cc: David S. Miller Cc: James Morris Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Serge E. Hallyn --- Changes since v8: * rewrite the landlock1 sample which deny access to a set of files or directories (i.e. simple blacklist) to fit with the previous patches * add "landlock1" to .gitignore * in bpf_load.c, pass the subtype with a call to bpf_load_program_xattr() Changes since v7: * rewrite the example using an inode map * add to bpf_load the ability to handle subtypes per program type Changes since v6: * check return value of load_and_attach() * allow to write on pipes * rename BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK to BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_RULE * rename Landlock version to ABI to better reflect its purpose * use const variable (suggested by Kees Cook) * remove useless definitions (suggested by Kees Cook) * add detailed explanations (suggested by Kees Cook) Changes since v5: * cosmetic fixes * rebase Changes since v4: * write Landlock rule in C and compiled it with LLVM * remove cgroup handling * remove path handling: only handle a read-only environment * remove errno return codes Changes since v3: * remove seccomp and origin field: completely free from seccomp programs * handle more FS-related hooks * handle inode hooks and directory traversal * add faked but consistent view thanks to ENOENT * add /lib64 in the example * fix spelling * rename some types and definitions (e.g. SECCOMP_ADD_LANDLOCK_RULE) Changes since v2: * use BPF_PROG_ATTACH for cgroup handling --- samples/bpf/.gitignore | 1 + samples/bpf/Makefile | 3 + samples/bpf/bpf_load.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++- samples/bpf/bpf_load.h | 7 ++ samples/bpf/landlock1.h | 8 ++ samples/bpf/landlock1_kern.c | 104 +++++++++++++++++++++++ samples/bpf/landlock1_user.c | 157 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 352 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 samples/bpf/landlock1.h create mode 100644 samples/bpf/landlock1_kern.c create mode 100644 samples/bpf/landlock1_user.c diff --git a/samples/bpf/.gitignore b/samples/bpf/.gitignore index 74d31fd3c99c..a4c9c806f739 100644 --- a/samples/bpf/.gitignore +++ b/samples/bpf/.gitignore @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ cpustat fds_example hbm ibumad +landlock1 lathist lwt_len_hist map_perf_test diff --git a/samples/bpf/Makefile b/samples/bpf/Makefile index 0917f8cf4fab..da246eaa8bf8 100644 --- a/samples/bpf/Makefile +++ b/samples/bpf/Makefile @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ hostprogs-y += task_fd_query hostprogs-y += xdp_sample_pkts hostprogs-y += ibumad hostprogs-y += hbm +hostprogs-y += landlock1 # Libbpf dependencies LIBBPF = $(TOOLS_PATH)/lib/bpf/libbpf.a @@ -109,6 +110,7 @@ task_fd_query-objs := bpf_load.o task_fd_query_user.o $(TRACE_HELPERS) xdp_sample_pkts-objs := xdp_sample_pkts_user.o $(TRACE_HELPERS) ibumad-objs := bpf_load.o ibumad_user.o $(TRACE_HELPERS) hbm-objs := bpf_load.o hbm.o $(CGROUP_HELPERS) +landlock1-objs := bpf_load.o landlock1_user.o # Tell kbuild to always build the programs always := $(hostprogs-y) @@ -168,6 +170,7 @@ always += task_fd_query_kern.o always += xdp_sample_pkts_kern.o always += ibumad_kern.o always += hbm_out_kern.o +always += landlock1_kern.o KBUILD_HOSTCFLAGS += -I$(objtree)/usr/include KBUILD_HOSTCFLAGS += -I$(srctree)/tools/lib/bpf/ diff --git a/samples/bpf/bpf_load.c b/samples/bpf/bpf_load.c index 4574b1939e49..bf62d965f606 100644 --- a/samples/bpf/bpf_load.c +++ b/samples/bpf/bpf_load.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -42,6 +43,9 @@ int prog_array_fd = -1; struct bpf_map_data map_data[MAX_MAPS]; int map_data_count; +struct bpf_subtype_data subtype_data[MAX_PROGS]; +int subtype_data_count; + static int populate_prog_array(const char *event, int prog_fd) { int ind = atoi(event), err; @@ -87,11 +91,15 @@ static int load_and_attach(const char *event, struct bpf_insn *prog, int size) bool is_sockops = strncmp(event, "sockops", 7) == 0; bool is_sk_skb = strncmp(event, "sk_skb", 6) == 0; bool is_sk_msg = strncmp(event, "sk_msg", 6) == 0; + bool is_landlock = strncmp(event, "landlock", 8) == 0; size_t insns_cnt = size / sizeof(struct bpf_insn); enum bpf_prog_type prog_type; char buf[256]; int fd, efd, err, id; struct perf_event_attr attr = {}; + union bpf_prog_subtype *st = NULL; + struct bpf_subtype_data *sd = NULL; + struct bpf_load_program_attr load_attr; attr.type = PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT; attr.sample_type = PERF_SAMPLE_RAW; @@ -120,6 +128,32 @@ static int load_and_attach(const char *event, struct bpf_insn *prog, int size) prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB; } else if (is_sk_msg) { prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG; + } else if (is_landlock) { + int i, prog_id; + const char *event_id = (event + 8); + + if (!isdigit(*event_id)) { + printf("invalid prog number\n"); + return -1; + } + prog_id = atoi(event_id); + for (i = 0; i < subtype_data_count; i++) { + if (subtype_data[i].name && strcmp(event, + subtype_data[i].name) == 0) { + /* save the prog_id for a next program */ + sd = &subtype_data[i]; + sd->prog_id = prog_id; + st = &sd->subtype; + free(sd->name); + sd->name = NULL; + break; + } + } + if (!st) { + printf("missing subtype\n"); + return -1; + } + prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK; } else { printf("Unknown event '%s'\n", event); return -1; @@ -128,16 +162,25 @@ static int load_and_attach(const char *event, struct bpf_insn *prog, int size) if (prog_cnt == MAX_PROGS) return -1; - fd = bpf_load_program(prog_type, prog, insns_cnt, license, kern_version, - bpf_log_buf, BPF_LOG_BUF_SIZE); + memset(&load_attr, 0, sizeof(struct bpf_load_program_attr)); + load_attr.prog_type = prog_type; + load_attr.prog_subtype = st; + load_attr.insns = prog; + load_attr.insns_cnt = insns_cnt; + load_attr.license = license; + load_attr.kern_version = kern_version; + fd = bpf_load_program_xattr(&load_attr, bpf_log_buf, BPF_LOG_BUF_SIZE); if (fd < 0) { printf("bpf_load_program() err=%d\n%s", errno, bpf_log_buf); return -1; } + if (sd) + sd->prog_fd = fd; prog_fd[prog_cnt++] = fd; - if (is_xdp || is_perf_event || is_cgroup_skb || is_cgroup_sk) + if (is_xdp || is_perf_event || is_cgroup_skb || is_cgroup_sk || + is_landlock) return 0; if (is_socket || is_sockops || is_sk_skb || is_sk_msg) { @@ -519,6 +562,7 @@ static int do_load_bpf_file(const char *path, fixup_map_cb fixup_map) kern_version = 0; memset(license, 0, sizeof(license)); memset(processed_sec, 0, sizeof(processed_sec)); + subtype_data_count = 0; if (elf_version(EV_CURRENT) == EV_NONE) return 1; @@ -567,6 +611,29 @@ static int do_load_bpf_file(const char *path, fixup_map_cb fixup_map) data_maps = data; for (j = 0; j < MAX_MAPS; j++) map_data[j].fd = -1; + } else if (strncmp(shname, "subtype", 7) == 0) { + processed_sec[i] = true; + if (*(shname + 7) != '/') { + printf("invalid name of subtype section"); + return 1; + } + if (data->d_size != sizeof(union bpf_prog_subtype)) { + printf("invalid size of subtype section: %zd\n", + data->d_size); + printf("ref: %zd\n", + sizeof(union bpf_prog_subtype)); + return 1; + } + if (subtype_data_count >= MAX_PROGS) { + printf("too many subtype sections"); + return 1; + } + memcpy(&subtype_data[subtype_data_count].subtype, + data->d_buf, + sizeof(union bpf_prog_subtype)); + subtype_data[subtype_data_count].name = + strdup((shname + 8)); + subtype_data_count++; } else if (shdr.sh_type == SHT_SYMTAB) { strtabidx = shdr.sh_link; symbols = data; @@ -643,7 +710,8 @@ static int do_load_bpf_file(const char *path, fixup_map_cb fixup_map) memcmp(shname, "cgroup/", 7) == 0 || memcmp(shname, "sockops", 7) == 0 || memcmp(shname, "sk_skb", 6) == 0 || - memcmp(shname, "sk_msg", 6) == 0) { + memcmp(shname, "sk_msg", 6) == 0 || + memcmp(shname, "landlock", 8) == 0) { ret = load_and_attach(shname, data->d_buf, data->d_size); if (ret != 0) diff --git a/samples/bpf/bpf_load.h b/samples/bpf/bpf_load.h index 814894a12974..e210b5fdf8ee 100644 --- a/samples/bpf/bpf_load.h +++ b/samples/bpf/bpf_load.h @@ -24,6 +24,13 @@ struct bpf_map_data { struct bpf_load_map_def def; }; +struct bpf_subtype_data { + char *name; + int prog_id; + int prog_fd; + union bpf_prog_subtype subtype; +}; + typedef void (*fixup_map_cb)(struct bpf_map_data *map, int idx); extern int prog_fd[MAX_PROGS]; diff --git a/samples/bpf/landlock1.h b/samples/bpf/landlock1.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..53b0a9447855 --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/bpf/landlock1.h @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Landlock sample 1 - common header + * + * Copyright © 2018-2019 Mickaël Salaün + */ + +#define MAP_FLAG_DENY (1ULL << 0) diff --git a/samples/bpf/landlock1_kern.c b/samples/bpf/landlock1_kern.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0298d98dd06a --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/bpf/landlock1_kern.c @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Landlock sample 1 - whitelist of read only or read-write file hierarchy + * + * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün + */ + +/* + * This file contains a function that will be compiled to eBPF bytecode thanks + * to LLVM/Clang. + * + * Each SEC() means that the following function or variable will be part of a + * custom ELF section. This sections are then processed by the userspace part + * (see landlock1_user.c) to extract eBPF bytecode and take into account + * variables describing the eBPF program subtype or its license. + */ + +#include +#include + +#include "bpf_helpers.h" +#include "landlock1.h" /* MAP_FLAG_DENY */ + +#define MAP_MAX_ENTRIES 20 + +SEC("maps") +struct bpf_map_def inode_map = { + .type = BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE, + .key_size = sizeof(u32), + .value_size = sizeof(u64), + .max_entries = MAP_MAX_ENTRIES, +}; + +static __always_inline __u64 get_access(void *inode) +{ + if (bpf_inode_map_lookup(&inode_map, inode) & MAP_FLAG_DENY) + return LANDLOCK_RET_DENY; + return LANDLOCK_RET_ALLOW; +} + +SEC("subtype/landlock1") +static union bpf_prog_subtype _subtype1 = { + .landlock_hook = { + .type = LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_WALK, + } +}; + +/* + * The function fs_walk() is a simple Landlock program enforced on a set of + * processes. This program will be run for each walk through a file path. + * + * The argument ctx contains the context of the program when it is run, which + * enable to evaluate the file path. This context can change for each run of + * the program. + */ +SEC("landlock1") +int fs_walk(struct landlock_ctx_fs_walk *ctx) +{ + return get_access((void *)ctx->inode); +} + +SEC("subtype/landlock2") +static union bpf_prog_subtype _subtype2 = { + .landlock_hook = { + .type = LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_PICK, + /* + * allowed: + * - LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LINK + * - LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LINKTO + * - LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RECEIVE + * - LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_MOUNTON + */ + .triggers = + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_APPEND | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CHDIR | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CHROOT | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CREATE | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_EXECUTE | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_FCNTL | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_GETATTR | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_IOCTL | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LOCK | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_MAP | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_OPEN | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READ | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READDIR | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RENAME | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RENAMETO | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RMDIR | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_SETATTR | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_TRANSFER | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_UNLINK | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_WRITE, + } +}; + +SEC("landlock2") +int fs_pick_ro(struct landlock_ctx_fs_pick *ctx) +{ + return get_access((void *)ctx->inode); +} + +SEC("license") +static const char _license[] = "GPL"; diff --git a/samples/bpf/landlock1_user.c b/samples/bpf/landlock1_user.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..aa45932d36a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/bpf/landlock1_user.c @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Landlock sample 1 - deny access to a set of directories (blacklisting) + * + * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün + */ + +#include "bpf/libbpf.h" +#include "bpf_load.h" +#include "landlock1.h" /* MAP_FLAG_DENY */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include +#include /* open() */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifndef seccomp +static int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args) +{ + errno = 0; + return syscall(__NR_seccomp, op, flags, args); +} +#endif + +static int apply_sandbox(int prog_fd) +{ + int ret = 0; + + /* set up the test sandbox */ + if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) { + perror("prctl(no_new_priv)"); + return 1; + } + if (seccomp(SECCOMP_PREPEND_LANDLOCK_PROG, 0, &prog_fd)) { + perror("seccomp(set_hook)"); + ret = 1; + } + close(prog_fd); + + return ret; +} + +#define ENV_FS_PATH_DENY_NAME "LL_PATH_DENY" +#define ENV_PATH_TOKEN ":" + +static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***path_list) +{ + int i, path_nb = 0; + + if (env_path) { + path_nb++; + for (i = 0; env_path[i]; i++) { + if (env_path[i] == ENV_PATH_TOKEN[0]) + path_nb++; + } + } + *path_list = malloc(path_nb * sizeof(**path_list)); + for (i = 0; i < path_nb; i++) + (*path_list)[i] = strsep(&env_path, ENV_PATH_TOKEN); + + return path_nb; +} + +static int populate_map(const char *env_var, unsigned long long value, + int map_fd) +{ + int path_nb, ref_fd, i; + char *env_path_name; + const char **path_list = NULL; + + env_path_name = getenv(env_var); + if (!env_path_name) + return 0; + env_path_name = strdup(env_path_name); + path_nb = parse_path(env_path_name, &path_list); + + for (i = 0; i < path_nb; i++) { + ref_fd = open(path_list[i], O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + if (ref_fd < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open \"%s\": %s\n", + path_list[i], + strerror(errno)); + return 1; + } + if (bpf_map_update_elem(map_fd, &ref_fd, &value, BPF_ANY)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to update the map with" + " \"%s\": %s\n", path_list[i], + strerror(errno)); + return 1; + } + close(ref_fd); + } + free(env_path_name); + return 0; +} + +int main(int argc, char * const argv[], char * const *envp) +{ + char filename[256]; + char *cmd_path; + char * const *cmd_argv; + int ll_prog_walk, ll_prog_pick; + + if (argc < 2) { + fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [args]...\n\n", argv[0]); + fprintf(stderr, "Launch a command in a restricted environment.\n\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "Environment variables containing paths, each separated by a colon:\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "* %s: list of files and directories which are denied\n", + ENV_FS_PATH_DENY_NAME); + fprintf(stderr, "\nexample:\n" + "%s=\"${HOME}/.ssh:${HOME}/Images\" " + "%s /bin/sh -i\n", + ENV_FS_PATH_DENY_NAME, argv[0]); + return 1; + } + + snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s_kern.o", argv[0]); + if (load_bpf_file(filename)) { + printf("%s", bpf_log_buf); + return 1; + } + ll_prog_walk = prog_fd[0]; /* fs_walk */ + ll_prog_pick = prog_fd[1]; /* fs_pick */ + if (!ll_prog_walk || !ll_prog_pick) { + if (errno) + printf("load_bpf_file: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + else + printf("load_bpf_file: Error\n"); + return 1; + } + + if (populate_map(ENV_FS_PATH_DENY_NAME, MAP_FLAG_DENY, map_fd[0])) + return 1; + close(map_fd[0]); + + fprintf(stderr, "Launching a new sandboxed process\n"); + if (apply_sandbox(ll_prog_walk)) + return 1; + if (apply_sandbox(ll_prog_pick)) + return 1; + cmd_path = argv[1]; + cmd_argv = argv + 1; + execve(cmd_path, cmd_argv, envp); + perror("Failed to call execve"); + return 1; +}