| Message ID | 20191024205228.6922-14-casey@schaufler-ca.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor | expand |
On 10/24/19 4:52 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote: > Create a new entry "display" in /proc/.../attr for controlling > which LSM security information is displayed for a process. > The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for human readable > data may be written to "display" to set the value. The name of the > LSM currently in use can be read from "display". At this point there > can only be one LSM capable of display active. A helper function > lsm_task_display() is provided to get the display slot for a task_struct. > > Setting the "display" requires that all security modules using > setprocattr hooks allow the action. Each security module is > responsible for defining its policy. > > AppArmor hook provided by John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> > SELinux hook provided by Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > --- > fs/proc/base.c | 1 + > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 15 +++ > security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +- > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 36 ++++++ > security/security.c | 159 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- > security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 ++ > security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++ > 8 files changed, 215 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c > index ddef482f1334..7bf70e041315 100644 > --- a/fs/proc/base.c > +++ b/fs/proc/base.c > @@ -2618,6 +2618,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { > ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666), > ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666), > ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666), > + ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666), > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK > DIR("smack", 0555, > proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops), > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > index 24b7d78a36b2..706fd6d3d46e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > @@ -2132,4 +2132,19 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, > > extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode); > > +/** > + * lsm_task_display - the "display" LSM for this task > + * @task: The task to report on > + * > + * Returns the task's display LSM slot. > + */ > +static inline int lsm_task_display(struct task_struct *task) > +{ > + int *display = task->security; > + > + if (display) > + return *display; > + return LSMBLOB_INVALID; > +} > + > #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */ > diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h > index 73d63b58d875..aaebfe979a68 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h > +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h > @@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ > #define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10 > #define AA_CLASS_NET 14 > #define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16 > +#define AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM 17 > > -#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_LABEL > +#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM > > /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */ > extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; > diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > index ec2e39aa9a84..c4835d05c5ea 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > @@ -603,6 +603,25 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, > return error; > } > > + > +static int profile_display_lsm(struct aa_profile *profile, > + struct common_audit_data *sa) > +{ > + struct aa_perms perms = { }; > + unsigned int state; > + > + state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM); > + if (state) { > + aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms); > + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); > + aad(sa)->label = &profile->label; > + > + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, AA_MAY_WRITE, sa, NULL); > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, > size_t size) > { > @@ -614,6 +633,23 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, > if (size == 0) > return -EINVAL; > > + /* ToDo: Decide on the AppArmor policy for switching the display */ > + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) > + return 0; Leftover from before jj's patch. > + > + /* LSM infrastructure does actual setting of display if allowed */ > + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) { > + struct aa_profile *profile; > + struct aa_label *label; > + > + aad(&sa)->info = "set display lsm"; > + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); > + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, > + profile_display_lsm(profile, &sa)); > + end_current_label_crit_section(label); > + return error; > + } > + > /* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */ > if (args[size - 1] != '\0') { > /* null terminate */ > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 8368d1e726a0..687a5e184e57 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ > #include <linux/backing-dev.h> > #include <linux/string.h> > #include <linux/msg.h> > +#include <linux/binfmts.h> > #include <net/flow.h> > #include <net/sock.h> > > @@ -46,7 +47,14 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; > static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; > > char *lsm_names; > -static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init; > + > +/* > + * The task blob includes the "display" slot used for > + * chosing which module presents contexts. > + */ > +static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { > + .lbs_task = sizeof(int), > +}; > > /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ > static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order; > @@ -415,8 +423,10 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result) > > /* > * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list. > + * Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use. > */ > static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init; > +static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES]; > > /** > * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. > @@ -436,6 +446,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, > if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) { > if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES) > panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__); > + lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid; > lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++; > init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm, > lsmid->slot); > @@ -556,6 +567,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) > */ > static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) > { > + int *display; > + > if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) { > task->security = NULL; > return 0; > @@ -564,6 +577,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) > task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL); > if (task->security == NULL) > return -ENOMEM; > + > + /* > + * The start of the task blob contains the "display" LSM slot number. > + * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the > + * default first registered LSM be displayed. > + */ > + display = task->security; > + *display = LSMBLOB_INVALID; > + > return 0; > } > > @@ -1502,14 +1524,26 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file) > > int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) > { > + int *odisplay = current->security; > + int *ndisplay; > int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); > > - if (rc) > + if (unlikely(rc)) > return rc; > + > rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags); > - if (unlikely(rc)) > + if (unlikely(rc)) { > security_task_free(task); > - return rc; > + return rc; > + } > + > + if (odisplay) { > + ndisplay = task->security; > + if (ndisplay) > + *ndisplay = *odisplay; > + } > + > + return 0; > } > > void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) > @@ -1906,23 +1940,100 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, > char **value) > { > struct security_hook_list *hp; > + int display = lsm_task_display(current); > + int slot = 0; > + > + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) { > + /* > + * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules. > + */ > + if (lsm_slot == 0) > + return -EINVAL; > + if (display != LSMBLOB_INVALID) > + slot = display; > + *value = kstrdup(lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (*value) > + return strlen(*value); > + return -ENOMEM; > + } > > hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { > if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm)) > continue; > + if (lsm == NULL && display != LSMBLOB_INVALID && > + display != hp->lsmid->slot) > + continue; > return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); > } > return -EINVAL; > } > > +/** > + * security_setprocattr - Set process attributes via /proc > + * @lsm: name of module involved, or NULL > + * @name: name of the attribute > + * @value: value to set the attribute to > + * @size: size of the value > + * > + * Set the process attribute for the specified security module > + * to the specified value. Note that this can only be used to set > + * the process attributes for the current, or "self" process. > + * The /proc code has already done this check. > + * > + * Returns 0 on success, an appropriate code otherwise. > + */ > int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, > size_t size) > { > struct security_hook_list *hp; > + char *term; > + char *cp; > + int *display = current->security; > + int rc = -EINVAL; > + int slot = 0; > + > + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) { > + /* > + * Change the "display" value only if all the security > + * modules that support setting a procattr allow it. > + * It is assumed that all such security modules will be > + * cooperative. > + */ > + if (size == 0) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, > + list) { > + rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); > + if (rc < 0) > + return rc; > + } > + > + rc = -EINVAL; > + > + term = kmemdup_nul(value, size, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (term == NULL) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + cp = strsep(&term, " \n"); > + > + for (slot = 0; slot < lsm_slot; slot++) > + if (!strcmp(cp, lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm)) { > + *display = lsm_slotlist[slot]->slot; > + rc = size; > + break; > + } > + > + kfree(cp); > + return rc; > + } > > hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { > if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm)) > continue; > + if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID && > + *display != hp->lsmid->slot) > + continue; > return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); > } > return -EINVAL; > @@ -1942,15 +2053,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); > int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) > { > struct security_hook_list *hp; > - int rc; > + int display = lsm_task_display(current); > > hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) { > if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) > continue; > - rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], > - secdata, seclen); > - if (rc != 0) > - return rc; > + if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) > + return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx( > + blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], > + secdata, seclen); > } > return 0; > } > @@ -1960,16 +2071,15 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, > struct lsmblob *blob) > { > struct security_hook_list *hp; > - int rc; > + int display = lsm_task_display(current); > > lsmblob_init(blob, 0); > hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) { > if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) > continue; > - rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen, > - &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); > - if (rc != 0) > - return rc; > + if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) > + return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen, > + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); > } > return 0; > } > @@ -1977,7 +2087,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid); > > void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) > { > - call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen); > + struct security_hook_list *hp; > + int *display = current->security; > + > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list) > + if (display == NULL || *display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || > + *display == hp->lsmid->slot) { > + hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen); > + return; > + } > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); > > @@ -2102,8 +2220,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb); > int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, > int __user *optlen, unsigned len) > { > - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, > - optval, optlen, len); > + int display = lsm_task_display(current); > + struct security_hook_list *hp; > + > + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream, > + list) > + if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) > + return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval, > + optlen, len); > + return -ENOPROTOOPT; > } > > int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index 7592b95b43c4..c9e377d13f0e 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -6170,6 +6170,17 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) > /* > * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all. > */ > + > + /* > + * For setting display, we only perform a permission check; > + * the actual update to the display value is handled by the > + * LSM framework. > + */ > + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) > + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, > + mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS2, > + PROCESS2__SETDISPLAY, NULL); > + > if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) > error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, > mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h > index bd5fe0d3204a..eda6f6a7a666 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h > +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h > @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { > "execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate", > "setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } }, > { "process2", > - { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } }, > + { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", "setdisplay", NULL } }, > { "system", > { "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod", > "syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } }, > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 61e05fe86013..1a3041463c46 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -3516,6 +3516,13 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) > struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep; > int rc; > > + /* > + * Allow the /proc/.../attr/current and SO_PEERSEC "display" > + * to be reset at will. > + */ > + if (strcmp(name, "display") == 0) > + return 0; > + > if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel)) > return -EPERM; > >
On Thu, 24 Oct 2019 at 13:52:16 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: > Create a new entry "display" in /proc/.../attr for controlling > which LSM security information is displayed for a process. It still isn't immediately obvious to me from the commit message whether the "..." stands for the pid of the process that will read LSM information, or the pid of the process whose LSM information will be read. I believe the intended meaning was the former? So perhaps Create a new entry "display" in /proc/$reader/attr that controls which LSM security information will be displayed when the process $reader reads LSM information. (Note that when $reader reads /proc/$subject/attr/current for $reader != $subject, it is /proc/$reader/attr/display that controls what is displayed there, not /proc/$subject/attr/display.) The commit that introduces /proc/.../attr/context could probably benefit from similar treatment - maybe it could be referred to as /proc/$subject/attr/context? smcv
On 10/29/2019 7:44 AM, Simon McVittie wrote: > On Thu, 24 Oct 2019 at 13:52:16 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: >> Create a new entry "display" in /proc/.../attr for controlling >> which LSM security information is displayed for a process. > It still isn't immediately obvious to me from the commit message whether > the "..." stands for the pid of the process that will read LSM information, > or the pid of the process whose LSM information will be read. For all practical purposes "..." will be "self". You can read the attr/display of another process, but I don't know where that would be useful. You can't write to the attr/display of an different process. > > I believe the intended meaning was the former? So perhaps > > Create a new entry "display" in /proc/$reader/attr that controls > which LSM security information will be displayed when the process > $reader reads LSM information. > > (Note that when $reader reads /proc/$subject/attr/current for > $reader != $subject, it is /proc/$reader/attr/display that controls > what is displayed there, not /proc/$subject/attr/display.) > > The commit that introduces /proc/.../attr/context could probably > benefit from similar treatment - maybe it could be referred to as > /proc/$subject/attr/context? Thanks. I'll work on making it clearer. > > smcv
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index ddef482f1334..7bf70e041315 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -2618,6 +2618,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666), ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666), ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666), + ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK DIR("smack", 0555, proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops), diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 24b7d78a36b2..706fd6d3d46e 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -2132,4 +2132,19 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode); +/** + * lsm_task_display - the "display" LSM for this task + * @task: The task to report on + * + * Returns the task's display LSM slot. + */ +static inline int lsm_task_display(struct task_struct *task) +{ + int *display = task->security; + + if (display) + return *display; + return LSMBLOB_INVALID; +} + #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h index 73d63b58d875..aaebfe979a68 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h @@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ #define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10 #define AA_CLASS_NET 14 #define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16 +#define AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM 17 -#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_LABEL +#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */ extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index ec2e39aa9a84..c4835d05c5ea 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -603,6 +603,25 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, return error; } + +static int profile_display_lsm(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct common_audit_data *sa) +{ + struct aa_perms perms = { }; + unsigned int state; + + state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM); + if (state) { + aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms); + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); + aad(sa)->label = &profile->label; + + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, AA_MAY_WRITE, sa, NULL); + } + + return 0; +} + static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) { @@ -614,6 +633,23 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, if (size == 0) return -EINVAL; + /* ToDo: Decide on the AppArmor policy for switching the display */ + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) + return 0; + + /* LSM infrastructure does actual setting of display if allowed */ + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) { + struct aa_profile *profile; + struct aa_label *label; + + aad(&sa)->info = "set display lsm"; + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + profile_display_lsm(profile, &sa)); + end_current_label_crit_section(label); + return error; + } + /* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */ if (args[size - 1] != '\0') { /* null terminate */ diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 8368d1e726a0..687a5e184e57 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include <linux/backing-dev.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/msg.h> +#include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <net/flow.h> #include <net/sock.h> @@ -46,7 +47,14 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; char *lsm_names; -static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init; + +/* + * The task blob includes the "display" slot used for + * chosing which module presents contexts. + */ +static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lbs_task = sizeof(int), +}; /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order; @@ -415,8 +423,10 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result) /* * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list. + * Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use. */ static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init; +static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES]; /** * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. @@ -436,6 +446,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) { if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES) panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__); + lsm_slotlist[lsm_slot] = lsmid; lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++; init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm, lsmid->slot); @@ -556,6 +567,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) */ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) { + int *display; + if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) { task->security = NULL; return 0; @@ -564,6 +577,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL); if (task->security == NULL) return -ENOMEM; + + /* + * The start of the task blob contains the "display" LSM slot number. + * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the + * default first registered LSM be displayed. + */ + display = task->security; + *display = LSMBLOB_INVALID; + return 0; } @@ -1502,14 +1524,26 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file) int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) { + int *odisplay = current->security; + int *ndisplay; int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); - if (rc) + if (unlikely(rc)) return rc; + rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags); - if (unlikely(rc)) + if (unlikely(rc)) { security_task_free(task); - return rc; + return rc; + } + + if (odisplay) { + ndisplay = task->security; + if (ndisplay) + *ndisplay = *odisplay; + } + + return 0; } void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) @@ -1906,23 +1940,100 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, char **value) { struct security_hook_list *hp; + int display = lsm_task_display(current); + int slot = 0; + + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) { + /* + * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules. + */ + if (lsm_slot == 0) + return -EINVAL; + if (display != LSMBLOB_INVALID) + slot = display; + *value = kstrdup(lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (*value) + return strlen(*value); + return -ENOMEM; + } hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm)) continue; + if (lsm == NULL && display != LSMBLOB_INVALID && + display != hp->lsmid->slot) + continue; return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); } return -EINVAL; } +/** + * security_setprocattr - Set process attributes via /proc + * @lsm: name of module involved, or NULL + * @name: name of the attribute + * @value: value to set the attribute to + * @size: size of the value + * + * Set the process attribute for the specified security module + * to the specified value. Note that this can only be used to set + * the process attributes for the current, or "self" process. + * The /proc code has already done this check. + * + * Returns 0 on success, an appropriate code otherwise. + */ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, size_t size) { struct security_hook_list *hp; + char *term; + char *cp; + int *display = current->security; + int rc = -EINVAL; + int slot = 0; + + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) { + /* + * Change the "display" value only if all the security + * modules that support setting a procattr allow it. + * It is assumed that all such security modules will be + * cooperative. + */ + if (size == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, + list) { + rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + } + + rc = -EINVAL; + + term = kmemdup_nul(value, size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (term == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + cp = strsep(&term, " \n"); + + for (slot = 0; slot < lsm_slot; slot++) + if (!strcmp(cp, lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm)) { + *display = lsm_slotlist[slot]->slot; + rc = size; + break; + } + + kfree(cp); + return rc; + } hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm)) continue; + if (lsm == NULL && *display != LSMBLOB_INVALID && + *display != hp->lsmid->slot) + continue; return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); } return -EINVAL; @@ -1942,15 +2053,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { struct security_hook_list *hp; - int rc; + int display = lsm_task_display(current); hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) { if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) continue; - rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], - secdata, seclen); - if (rc != 0) - return rc; + if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) + return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx( + blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], + secdata, seclen); } return 0; } @@ -1960,16 +2071,15 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, struct lsmblob *blob) { struct security_hook_list *hp; - int rc; + int display = lsm_task_display(current); lsmblob_init(blob, 0); hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) { if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) continue; - rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen, - &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); - if (rc != 0) - return rc; + if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) + return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen, + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); } return 0; } @@ -1977,7 +2087,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid); void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) { - call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + int *display = current->security; + + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list) + if (display == NULL || *display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || + *display == hp->lsmid->slot) { + hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen); + return; + } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); @@ -2102,8 +2220,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb); int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len) { - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, - optval, optlen, len); + int display = lsm_task_display(current); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream, + list) + if (display == LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) + return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval, + optlen, len); + return -ENOPROTOOPT; } int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 7592b95b43c4..c9e377d13f0e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -6170,6 +6170,17 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) /* * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all. */ + + /* + * For setting display, we only perform a permission check; + * the actual update to the display value is handled by the + * LSM framework. + */ + if (!strcmp(name, "display")) + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, + mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS2, + PROCESS2__SETDISPLAY, NULL); + if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index bd5fe0d3204a..eda6f6a7a666 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { "execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate", "setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } }, { "process2", - { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } }, + { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", "setdisplay", NULL } }, { "system", { "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod", "syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } }, diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 61e05fe86013..1a3041463c46 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -3516,6 +3516,13 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep; int rc; + /* + * Allow the /proc/.../attr/current and SO_PEERSEC "display" + * to be reset at will. + */ + if (strcmp(name, "display") == 0) + return 0; + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel)) return -EPERM;
Create a new entry "display" in /proc/.../attr for controlling which LSM security information is displayed for a process. The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for human readable data may be written to "display" to set the value. The name of the LSM currently in use can be read from "display". At this point there can only be one LSM capable of display active. A helper function lsm_task_display() is provided to get the display slot for a task_struct. Setting the "display" requires that all security modules using setprocattr hooks allow the action. Each security module is responsible for defining its policy. AppArmor hook provided by John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> SELinux hook provided by Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> --- fs/proc/base.c | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 15 +++ security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 36 ++++++ security/security.c | 159 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 ++ security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++ 8 files changed, 215 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)