[v13,20/25] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder

Commit Message

Casey Schaufler Dec. 24, 2019, 11:59 p.m. UTC

Verify that the tasks on the ends of a binder transaction
use the same "display" security module. This prevents confusion
of security "contexts".

Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[e-mail]>
---
 security/security.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)

Patch

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index affd53f04805..1dc3d2f71a63 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -738,9 +738,38 @@  int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
 	return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr);
 }
 
+/**
+ * security_binder_transaction - Binder driver transaction check
+ * @from: source of the transaction
+ * @to: destination of the transaction
+ *
+ * Verify that the tasks have the same LSM "display", then
+ * call the security module hooks.
+ *
+ * Returns -EINVAL if the displays don't match, or the
+ * result of the security module checks.
+ */
 int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
 				struct task_struct *to)
 {
+	int from_display = lsm_task_display(from);
+	int to_display = lsm_task_display(to);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the display is LSMBLOB_INVALID the first module that has
+	 * an entry is used. This will be in the 0 slot.
+	 *
+	 * This is currently only required if the server has requested
+	 * peer contexts, but it would be unwieldly to have too much of
+	 * the binder driver detail here.
+	 */
+	if (from_display == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+		from_display = 0;
+	if (to_display == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
+		to_display = 0;
+	if (from_display != to_display)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to);
 }