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[198.145.64.163]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id b18sm1806653pju.10.2020.07.07.01.19.30 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 07 Jul 2020 01:19:30 -0700 (PDT) From: Kees Cook To: James Morris Cc: Kees Cook , Luis Chamberlain , Mimi Zohar , Scott Branden , Greg Kroah-Hartman , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Alexander Viro , Jessica Yu , Dmitry Kasatkin , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Casey Schaufler , "Eric W. Biederman" , Peter Zijlstra , Matthew Garrett , David Howells , Mauro Carvalho Chehab , Randy Dunlap , "Joel Fernandes (Google)" , KP Singh , Dave Olsthoorn , Hans de Goede , Peter Jones , Andrew Morton , Stephen Boyd , Paul Moore , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 2/4] fs: Remove FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER from kernel_read_file() enums Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2020 01:19:24 -0700 Message-Id: <20200707081926.3688096-3-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20200707081926.3688096-1-keescook@chromium.org> References: <20200707081926.3688096-1-keescook@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER is a "how", not a "what", and confuses the LSMs that are interested in filtering between types of things. The "how" should be an internal detail made uninteresting to the LSMs. Fixes: a098ecd2fa7d ("firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer") Fixes: fd90bc559bfb ("ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)") Fixes: 4f0496d8ffa3 ("ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 5 ++--- fs/exec.c | 7 ++++--- include/linux/fs.h | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 ++---- 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c index ca871b13524e..c2f57cedcd6f 100644 --- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c @@ -465,14 +465,12 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv, int i, len; int rc = -ENOENT; char *path; - enum kernel_read_file_id id = READING_FIRMWARE; size_t msize = INT_MAX; void *buffer = NULL; /* Already populated data member means we're loading into a buffer */ if (!decompress && fw_priv->data) { buffer = fw_priv->data; - id = READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER; msize = fw_priv->allocated_size; } @@ -496,7 +494,8 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv, /* load firmware files from the mount namespace of init */ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer, - &size, msize, id); + &size, msize, + READING_FIRMWARE); if (rc) { if (rc != -ENOENT) dev_warn(device, "loading %s failed with error %d\n", diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index e6e8a9a70327..2bf549757ce7 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -927,6 +927,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size, { loff_t i_size, pos; ssize_t bytes = 0; + void *allocated = NULL; int ret; if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0) @@ -950,8 +951,8 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size, goto out; } - if (id != READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER) - *buf = vmalloc(i_size); + if (!*buf) + *buf = allocated = vmalloc(i_size); if (!*buf) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; @@ -980,7 +981,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size, out_free: if (ret < 0) { - if (id != READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER) { + if (allocated) { vfree(*buf); *buf = NULL; } diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index 3f881a892ea7..95fc775ed937 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -2993,10 +2993,10 @@ static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode) #endif extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int); +/* This is a list of *what* is being read, not *how*. */ #define __kernel_read_file_id(id) \ id(UNKNOWN, unknown) \ id(FIRMWARE, firmware) \ - id(FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER, firmware) \ id(FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED, firmware) \ id(MODULE, kernel-module) \ id(KEXEC_IMAGE, kexec-image) \ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index c1583d98c5e5..f80ee4ce4669 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -611,19 +611,17 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { /* - * READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER - * * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the * firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion * of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two - * buffers? + * buffers? It may be desirable to include the buffer address + * in this API and walk all the dma_map_single() mappings to check. */ return 0; } const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { [READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK, - [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK, [READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK, [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,