diff mbox series

[RFC,v5,06/11] dm-verity: move signature check after tree validation

Message ID 20200728213614.586312-7-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) | expand

Commit Message

Deven Bowers July 28, 2020, 9:36 p.m. UTC
The CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG introduced by Jaskaran was
intended to be used to allow an LSM to enforce verifications for all
dm-verity volumes.

However, with it's current implementation, this signature verification
occurs after the merkel-tree is validated, as a result the signature can
pass initial verification by passing a matching root-hash and signature.
This results in an unreadable block_device, but that has passed signature
validation (and subsequently, would be marked as verified).

This change moves the signature verification to after the merkel-tree has
finished validation.

Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c     |  44 ++++------
 drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c | 140 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h |  24 +++--
 drivers/md/dm-verity.h            |   2 +-
 4 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)

Comments

Eric Biggers July 28, 2020, 9:50 p.m. UTC | #1
On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 02:36:06PM -0700, Deven Bowers wrote:
> The CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG introduced by Jaskaran was
> intended to be used to allow an LSM to enforce verifications for all
> dm-verity volumes.
> 
> However, with it's current implementation, this signature verification
> occurs after the merkel-tree is validated, as a result the signature can
> pass initial verification by passing a matching root-hash and signature.
> This results in an unreadable block_device, but that has passed signature
> validation (and subsequently, would be marked as verified).
> 
> This change moves the signature verification to after the merkel-tree has
> finished validation.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
> ---
>  drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c     |  44 ++++------
>  drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c | 140 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>  drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h |  24 +++--
>  drivers/md/dm-verity.h            |   2 +-
>  4 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
> index eec9f252e935..fabc173aa7b3 100644
> --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
> +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
> @@ -471,9 +471,9 @@ static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
>  	struct bvec_iter start;
>  	unsigned b;
>  	struct crypto_wait wait;
> +	int r;
>  
>  	for (b = 0; b < io->n_blocks; b++) {
> -		int r;
>  		sector_t cur_block = io->block + b;
>  		struct ahash_request *req = verity_io_hash_req(v, io);
>  
> @@ -530,6 +530,16 @@ static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
>  			return -EIO;
>  	}
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * At this point, the merkel tree has finished validating.
> +	 * if signature was specified, validate the signature here.
> +	 */
> +	r = verity_verify_root_hash(v);
> +	if (r < 0) {
> +		DMERR_LIMIT("signature mismatch");
> +		return r;
> +	}
> +
>  	return 0;
>  }

This doesn't make any sense.

This just moves the signature verification to some random I/O.

The whole point of dm-verity is that data is verified on demand.  You can't know
whether any particular data or hash block is consistent with the root hash or
not until it is read and verified.

When the first I/O completes it might have just checked one block of a billion.

Not to mention that you didn't consider locking at all.

- Eric
Deven Bowers July 28, 2020, 11:55 p.m. UTC | #2
On 7/28/2020 2:50 PM, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 02:36:06PM -0700, Deven Bowers wrote:
>> The CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG introduced by Jaskaran was
>> intended to be used to allow an LSM to enforce verifications for all
>> dm-verity volumes.
>>
>> However, with it's current implementation, this signature verification
>> occurs after the merkel-tree is validated, as a result the signature can
>> pass initial verification by passing a matching root-hash and signature.
>> This results in an unreadable block_device, but that has passed signature
>> validation (and subsequently, would be marked as verified).
>>
>> This change moves the signature verification to after the merkel-tree has
>> finished validation.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
>> ---
>>   drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c     |  44 ++++------
>>   drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c | 140 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>>   drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h |  24 +++--
>>   drivers/md/dm-verity.h            |   2 +-
>>   4 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
>> index eec9f252e935..fabc173aa7b3 100644
>> --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
>> +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
>> @@ -471,9 +471,9 @@ static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
>>   	struct bvec_iter start;
>>   	unsigned b;
>>   	struct crypto_wait wait;
>> +	int r;
>>   
>>   	for (b = 0; b < io->n_blocks; b++) {
>> -		int r;
>>   		sector_t cur_block = io->block + b;
>>   		struct ahash_request *req = verity_io_hash_req(v, io);
>>   
>> @@ -530,6 +530,16 @@ static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
>>   			return -EIO;
>>   	}
>>   
>> +	/*
>> +	 * At this point, the merkel tree has finished validating.
>> +	 * if signature was specified, validate the signature here.
>> +	 */
>> +	r = verity_verify_root_hash(v);
>> +	if (r < 0) {
>> +		DMERR_LIMIT("signature mismatch");
>> +		return r;
>> +	}
>> +
>>   	return 0;
>>   }
> 
> This doesn't make any sense.
> 
> This just moves the signature verification to some random I/O.
> 
> The whole point of dm-verity is that data is verified on demand.  You can't know
> whether any particular data or hash block is consistent with the root hash or
> not until it is read and verified.
> 
> When the first I/O completes it might have just checked one block of a billion.
> 
> Not to mention that you didn't consider locking at all.
> 
> - Eric
> 

I appear to have dangerously misunderstood how dm-verity works under the
covers. What I thought was happening here was that *this* would be where
the first I/O that completes validation and has been verified - the root
hash signature could then be checked against the root hash, and then
no-op for remaining blocks, provided the signature validates.

The reason why I was proposing moving the signature check, is that I was 
afraid of the block_device being created in dm-verity with a root-hash 
that belongs to a different device + a signature that verifies that
root-hash, would get past verity_ctr, as despite the root hash not
matching the hash tree, the signature and the root hash will be 
verified. At this point, a block_device structure would be resident in
the kernel with the security attributes I propose in the next patch in 
the series. This device would never be read successfully, but the
structure with the attribute would exist.

This felt odd because there would be a structure in the kernel with an
attribute that says it passed a security check, but the block_device is
effectively invalid.

I realize now that that's a pretty ridiculous situation because the 
theoretical attack with access to manipulate the kernel memory in such a 
way to make it viable could just override whatever is needed to make the 
exploit work, and isn't unique to dm-verity.

I'm going to drop this patch in the next iteration of this series.
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
index eec9f252e935..fabc173aa7b3 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
@@ -471,9 +471,9 @@  static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
 	struct bvec_iter start;
 	unsigned b;
 	struct crypto_wait wait;
+	int r;
 
 	for (b = 0; b < io->n_blocks; b++) {
-		int r;
 		sector_t cur_block = io->block + b;
 		struct ahash_request *req = verity_io_hash_req(v, io);
 
@@ -530,6 +530,16 @@  static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
 			return -EIO;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * At this point, the merkel tree has finished validating.
+	 * if signature was specified, validate the signature here.
+	 */
+	r = verity_verify_root_hash(v);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		DMERR_LIMIT("signature mismatch");
+		return r;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -728,7 +738,7 @@  static void verity_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type,
 			args++;
 		if (v->validated_blocks)
 			args++;
-		if (v->signature_key_desc)
+		if (v->sig)
 			args += DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPTS;
 		if (!args)
 			return;
@@ -751,9 +761,9 @@  static void verity_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type,
 		if (v->validated_blocks)
 			DMEMIT(" " DM_VERITY_OPT_AT_MOST_ONCE);
 		sz = verity_fec_status_table(v, sz, result, maxlen);
-		if (v->signature_key_desc)
+		if (v->sig)
 			DMEMIT(" " DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPT_SIG_KEY
-				" %s", v->signature_key_desc);
+				" %s", v->sig->signature_key_desc);
 		break;
 	}
 }
@@ -819,7 +829,7 @@  static void verity_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
 
 	verity_fec_dtr(v);
 
-	kfree(v->signature_key_desc);
+	verity_verify_dtr(v);
 
 	kfree(v);
 }
@@ -876,8 +886,7 @@  static int verity_alloc_zero_digest(struct dm_verity *v)
 	return r;
 }
 
-static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v,
-				 struct dm_verity_sig_opts *verify_args)
+static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v)
 {
 	int r;
 	unsigned argc;
@@ -927,9 +936,7 @@  static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v,
 				return r;
 			continue;
 		} else if (verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg(arg_name)) {
-			r = verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(as, v,
-							     verify_args,
-							     &argc, arg_name);
+			r = verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(as, v, &argc);
 			if (r)
 				return r;
 			continue;
@@ -960,7 +967,6 @@  static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v,
 static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv)
 {
 	struct dm_verity *v;
-	struct dm_verity_sig_opts verify_args = {0};
 	struct dm_arg_set as;
 	unsigned int num;
 	unsigned long long num_ll;
@@ -968,7 +974,6 @@  static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv)
 	int i;
 	sector_t hash_position;
 	char dummy;
-	char *root_hash_digest_to_validate;
 
 	v = kzalloc(sizeof(struct dm_verity), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!v) {
@@ -1102,7 +1107,6 @@  static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv)
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto bad;
 	}
-	root_hash_digest_to_validate = argv[8];
 
 	if (strcmp(argv[9], "-")) {
 		v->salt_size = strlen(argv[9]) / 2;
@@ -1128,20 +1132,11 @@  static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv)
 		as.argc = argc;
 		as.argv = argv;
 
-		r = verity_parse_opt_args(&as, v, &verify_args);
+		r = verity_parse_opt_args(&as, v);
 		if (r < 0)
 			goto bad;
 	}
 
-	/* Root hash signature is  a optional parameter*/
-	r = verity_verify_root_hash(root_hash_digest_to_validate,
-				    strlen(root_hash_digest_to_validate),
-				    verify_args.sig,
-				    verify_args.sig_size);
-	if (r < 0) {
-		ti->error = "Root hash verification failed";
-		goto bad;
-	}
 	v->hash_per_block_bits =
 		__fls((1 << v->hash_dev_block_bits) / v->digest_size);
 
@@ -1207,13 +1202,10 @@  static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv)
 	ti->per_io_data_size = roundup(ti->per_io_data_size,
 				       __alignof__(struct dm_verity_io));
 
-	verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(&verify_args);
-
 	return 0;
 
 bad:
 
-	verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(&verify_args);
 	verity_dtr(ti);
 
 	return r;
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c
index 614e43db93aa..27dac8aa2e5a 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c
@@ -22,6 +22,16 @@  MODULE_PARM_DESC(require_signatures,
 #define DM_VERITY_IS_SIG_FORCE_ENABLED() \
 	(require_signatures != false)
 
+static void destroy_verity_sig(struct dm_verity_sig *sig_info)
+{
+	if (!sig_info)
+		return;
+
+	kfree(sig_info->sig);
+	kfree(sig_info->signature_key_desc);
+	kfree(sig_info);
+}
+
 bool verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg(const char *arg_name)
 {
 	return (!strcasecmp(arg_name,
@@ -29,7 +39,7 @@  bool verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg(const char *arg_name)
 }
 
 static int verity_verify_get_sig_from_key(const char *key_desc,
-					struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts)
+					  struct dm_verity_sig  *sig_info)
 {
 	struct key *key;
 	const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
@@ -48,14 +58,14 @@  static int verity_verify_get_sig_from_key(const char *key_desc,
 		goto end;
 	}
 
-	sig_opts->sig = kmalloc(ukp->datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!sig_opts->sig) {
+	sig_info->sig = kmalloc(ukp->datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sig_info->sig) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto end;
 	}
-	sig_opts->sig_size = ukp->datalen;
+	sig_info->sig_size = ukp->datalen;
 
-	memcpy(sig_opts->sig, ukp->data, sig_opts->sig_size);
+	memcpy(sig_info->sig, ukp->data, sig_info->sig_size);
 
 end:
 	up_read(&key->sem);
@@ -64,70 +74,128 @@  static int verity_verify_get_sig_from_key(const char *key_desc,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Parse any signature verification arguments.
+ *	This function will populate v->sig, it is the caller's
+ *	responsibility to free this structure via verity_verify_dtr
+ *
+ * @as: argument set passed in to parse
+ * @v: verity context structure. Should have a NULL v->sig member.
+ * @argc: current argument number
+ */
 int verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as,
 				     struct dm_verity *v,
-				     struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts,
-				     unsigned int *argc,
-				     const char *arg_name)
+				     unsigned int *argc)
 {
 	struct dm_target *ti = v->ti;
+	struct dm_verity_sig *sig_info = NULL;
 	int ret = 0;
 	const char *sig_key = NULL;
 
 	if (!*argc) {
 		ti->error = DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR("Signature key not specified");
-		return -EINVAL;
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	sig_info = kzalloc(sizeof(*sig_info), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sig_info) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto cleanup;
 	}
 
 	sig_key = dm_shift_arg(as);
 	(*argc)--;
 
-	ret = verity_verify_get_sig_from_key(sig_key, sig_opts);
-	if (ret < 0)
+	ret = verity_verify_get_sig_from_key(sig_key, sig_info);
+	if (ret < 0) {
 		ti->error = DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR("Invalid key specified");
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
 
-	v->signature_key_desc = kstrdup(sig_key, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!v->signature_key_desc)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	sig_info->signature_key_desc = kstrdup(sig_key, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sig_info->signature_key_desc) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
 
+	v->sig = sig_info;
+	sig_info = NULL;
+cleanup:
+	if (sig_info)
+		destroy_verity_sig(sig_info);
 	return ret;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * verify_verify_roothash - Verify the root hash of the verity hash device
  *			     using builtin trusted keys.
  *
- * @root_hash: For verity, the roothash/data to be verified.
- * @root_hash_len: Size of the roothash/data to be verified.
- * @sig_data: The trusted signature that verifies the roothash/data.
- * @sig_len: Size of the signature.
+ * @v: dm_verity structure containing all context for the dm_verity
+ *	operation.
  *
  */
-int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *root_hash, size_t root_hash_len,
-			    const void *sig_data, size_t sig_len)
+int verity_verify_root_hash(const struct dm_verity *v)
 {
-	int ret;
+	int ret = 0;
+	char *root_hash = NULL;
+	size_t root_hash_size = 0;
+	struct dm_verity_sig *sig_target = NULL;
+
+	if (!v || !v->ti || !v->root_digest || v->digest_size == 0) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	sig_target = v->sig;
+
+	if (!sig_target || !sig_target->sig || sig_target->sig_size == 0) {
+		if (DM_VERITY_IS_SIG_FORCE_ENABLED()) {
+			ret = -ENOKEY;
+			goto cleanup;
+		} else {
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+	}
 
-	if (!root_hash || root_hash_len == 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	/*
+	 * If signature has passed validation once, assume
+	 * that future signatures will pass.
+	 */
+	if (sig_target->passed)
+		goto cleanup;
 
-	if (!sig_data  || sig_len == 0) {
-		if (DM_VERITY_IS_SIG_FORCE_ENABLED())
-			return -ENOKEY;
-		else
-			return 0;
+	root_hash_size = v->digest_size * 2;
+	root_hash = kzalloc(root_hash_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!root_hash) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto cleanup;
 	}
 
-	ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(root_hash, root_hash_len, sig_data,
-				sig_len, NULL, VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
-				NULL, NULL);
+	bin2hex(root_hash, v->root_digest, v->digest_size);
+
+	ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(root_hash, root_hash_size, v->sig->sig,
+				     v->sig->sig_size, NULL,
+				     VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL,
+				     NULL);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		goto cleanup;
 
+	sig_target->passed = true;
+cleanup:
+	kfree(root_hash);
 	return ret;
 }
 
-void verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts)
+/**
+ * Performs destruction / cleanup of a valid dm_verity_sig struct
+ *
+ * @v: dm_verity structure containing the dm_verity_sig struct to
+ *	be freed.
+ */
+
+void verity_verify_dtr(struct dm_verity *v)
 {
-	kfree(sig_opts->sig);
-	sig_opts->sig = NULL;
-	sig_opts->sig_size = 0;
+	destroy_verity_sig(v->sig);
+	v->sig = NULL;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h b/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h
index 19b1547aa741..7de8409fa9fa 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h
@@ -11,48 +11,46 @@ 
 #define DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION "DM Verity Sig Verification"
 #define DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPT_SIG_KEY "root_hash_sig_key_desc"
 
-struct dm_verity_sig_opts {
+struct dm_verity_sig {
+	char *signature_key_desc;
 	unsigned int sig_size;
 	u8 *sig;
+	bool passed;
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG
 
 #define DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPTS 2
 
-int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *data, size_t data_len,
-			    const void *sig_data, size_t sig_len);
+int verity_verify_root_hash(const struct dm_verity *v);
 bool verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg(const char *arg_name);
 
 int verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v,
-				    struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts,
-				    unsigned int *argc, const char *arg_name);
+				    unsigned int *argc);
 
-void verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts);
+void verity_verify_dtr(struct dm_verity *v);
 
 #else
 
 #define DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPTS 0
 
-int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *data, size_t data_len,
-			    const void *sig_data, size_t sig_len)
+inline int verity_verify_root_hash(const struct dm_verity *v)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-bool verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg(const char *arg_name)
+inline bool verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg(const char *arg_name)
 {
 	return false;
 }
 
-int verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v,
-				    struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts,
-				    unsigned int *argc, const char *arg_name)
+inline int verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v,
+					    unsigned int *argc)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-void verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts)
+inline void verity_verify_dtr(struct dm_verity *v)
 {
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity.h b/drivers/md/dm-verity.h
index 641b9e3a399b..995c495decad 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-verity.h
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity.h
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@  struct dm_verity {
 	struct dm_verity_fec *fec;	/* forward error correction */
 	unsigned long *validated_blocks; /* bitset blocks validated */
 
-	char *signature_key_desc; /* signature keyring reference */
+	struct dm_verity_sig *sig; /* signature verification */
 };
 
 struct dm_verity_io {