diff mbox series

[v3,2/6] IMA: change process_buffer_measurement return type from void to int

Message ID 20200828015704.6629-3-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com
State New
Headers show
Series IMA: Infrastructure for measurement of critical kernel data | expand

Commit Message

Tushar Sugandhi Aug. 28, 2020, 1:57 a.m. UTC
process_buffer_measurement() does not return the result of the operation.
Therefore, the consumers of this function cannot act on it, if needed.

Update return type of process_buffer_measurement() from void to int.

Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h      |  6 +++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 14 +++++++-------
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

Comments

Mimi Zohar Aug. 31, 2020, 11:36 a.m. UTC | #1
On Thu, 2020-08-27 at 18:57 -0700, Tushar Sugandhi wrote:
> process_buffer_measurement() does not return the result of the operation.
> Therefore, the consumers of this function cannot act on it, if needed.
> 
> Update return type of process_buffer_measurement() from void to int.

Failure to measure may be audited, but should never fail.  This is one
of the main differences between secure and trusted boot concepts. 
Notice in process_measurement() that -EACCES is only returned for
appraisal.

Returning a failure from process_buffer_measurement() in itself isn't a
problem, as long as the failure isn't returned to the LSM/IMA hook. 
However,  just as the callers of  process_measurement() originally
processed the result, that processing was moved into
process_measurement() [1].

Mimi

[1] 750943a30714 ima: remove enforce checking duplication

> 
> Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
> ---
>  security/integrity/ima/ima.h      |  6 +++---
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 14 +++++++-------
>  2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index 8875085db689..83ed57147e68 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -265,9 +265,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
>  			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
>  			   int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
>  			   struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
> -void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
> -				const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
> -				int pcr, const char *func_data);
> +int process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
> +			       const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
> +			       int pcr, const char *func_data);
>  void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>  			   const unsigned char *filename);
>  int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index c870fd6d2f83..0979a62a9257 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -736,9 +736,9 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
>   *
>   * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log.
>   */
> -void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
> -				const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
> -				int pcr, const char *func_data)
> +int process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
> +			       const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
> +			       int pcr, const char *func_data)
>  {
>  	int ret = 0;
>  	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
> @@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
>  	u32 secid;
>  
>  	if (!ima_policy_flag)
> -		return;
> +		return 0;
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * Both LSM hooks and auxilary based buffer measurements are
> @@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
>  		action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
>  					&pcr, &template, func_data);
>  		if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
> -			return;
> +			return 0;
>  	}
>  
>  	if (!pcr)
> @@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
>  			pr_err("template %s init failed, result: %d\n",
>  			       (strlen(template->name) ?
>  				template->name : template->fmt), ret);
> -			return;
> +			return ret;
>  		}
>  	}
>  
> @@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
>  					func_measure_str(func),
>  					audit_cause, ret, 0, ret);
>  
> -	return;
> +	return ret;
>  }
>  
>  /**
Tushar Sugandhi Sept. 11, 2020, 4:22 p.m. UTC | #2
On 2020-08-31 4:36 a.m., Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2020-08-27 at 18:57 -0700, Tushar Sugandhi wrote:
>> process_buffer_measurement() does not return the result of the operation.
>> Therefore, the consumers of this function cannot act on it, if needed.
>>
>> Update return type of process_buffer_measurement() from void to int.
> 
> Failure to measure may be audited, but should never fail.  This is one
> of the main differences between secure and trusted boot concepts.
> Notice in process_measurement() that -EACCES is only returned for
> appraisal.
> 
> Returning a failure from process_buffer_measurement() in itself isn't a
> problem, as long as the failure isn't returned to the LSM/IMA hook.
> However,  just as the callers of  process_measurement() originally
> processed the result, that processing was moved into
> process_measurement() [1].
> 
> Mimi
> 
> [1] 750943a30714 ima: remove enforce checking duplication
> 
I can ignore the result of process_buffer_measurement() in
ima_measure_critical_data(), and make  ima_measure_critical_data()
return type "void".

But currently ima_measure_critical_data() is the only place where the
results of p_b_m() are being used.
So I might as well just revert back the return type of p_b_m() to
the original "void".
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 8875085db689..83ed57147e68 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -265,9 +265,9 @@  void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			   int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
 			   struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
-void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
-				const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
-				int pcr, const char *func_data);
+int process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
+			       const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
+			       int pcr, const char *func_data);
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
 int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index c870fd6d2f83..0979a62a9257 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -736,9 +736,9 @@  int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
  *
  * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log.
  */
-void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
-				const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
-				int pcr, const char *func_data)
+int process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
+			       const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
+			       int pcr, const char *func_data)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
@@ -758,7 +758,7 @@  void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
 	u32 secid;
 
 	if (!ima_policy_flag)
-		return;
+		return 0;
 
 	/*
 	 * Both LSM hooks and auxilary based buffer measurements are
@@ -772,7 +772,7 @@  void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
 		action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
 					&pcr, &template, func_data);
 		if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
-			return;
+			return 0;
 	}
 
 	if (!pcr)
@@ -787,7 +787,7 @@  void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
 			pr_err("template %s init failed, result: %d\n",
 			       (strlen(template->name) ?
 				template->name : template->fmt), ret);
-			return;
+			return ret;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -819,7 +819,7 @@  void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
 					func_measure_str(func),
 					audit_cause, ret, 0, ret);
 
-	return;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /**