diff mbox series

xfrm: redact SA secret with lockdown confidentiality

Message ID 20201016133352.GA2338@moon.secunet.de
State New
Headers show
Series xfrm: redact SA secret with lockdown confidentiality | expand

Commit Message

Antony Antony Oct. 16, 2020, 1:36 p.m. UTC
redact XFRM SA secret in the netlink response to xfrm_get_sa()
or dumpall sa.
Enable this at build time and set kernel lockdown to confidentiality.

e.g.
cat /sys/kernel/security/lockdown
none integrity [confidentiality]

ip xfrm state
src 172.16.1.200 dst 172.16.1.100
	proto esp spi 0x00000002 reqid 2 mode tunnel
	replay-window 0
	aead rfc4106(gcm(aes)) 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 96

note: the aead secret is redacted.
Redacting secret is also a FIPS 140-2 requirement.

v1->v2
 - add size checks before memset calls
v2->v3
 - replace spaces with tabs for consistency
v3->v4
 - use kernel lockdown instead of a /proc setting

Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
---
 include/linux/security.h |  1 +
 net/xfrm/Kconfig         |  9 +++++
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c     | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 security/security.c      |  1 +
 4 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

Comments

Steffen Klassert Oct. 31, 2020, 10:49 a.m. UTC | #1
On Fri, Oct 16, 2020 at 03:36:12PM +0200, Antony Antony wrote:
> redact XFRM SA secret in the netlink response to xfrm_get_sa()
> or dumpall sa.
> Enable this at build time and set kernel lockdown to confidentiality.

Wouldn't it be better to enable is at boot or runtime? This defaults
to 'No' at build time, so distibutions will not compile it in. That
means that noone who uses a kernel that comes with a Linux distribution
can use that.
Antony Antony Nov. 17, 2020, 4:46 p.m. UTC | #2
On Sat, Oct 31, 2020 at 11:49:11 +0100, Steffen Klassert wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 16, 2020 at 03:36:12PM +0200, Antony Antony wrote:
> > redact XFRM SA secret in the netlink response to xfrm_get_sa()
> > or dumpall sa.
> > Enable this at build time and set kernel lockdown to confidentiality.
> 
> Wouldn't it be better to enable is at boot or runtime? This defaults
> to 'No' at build time, so distibutions will not compile it in. That
> means that noone who uses a kernel that comes with a Linux distribution
> can use that.

It is a good idea. I will send new version soon.

thanks,
-antony
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 0a0a03b36a3b..8438970473b1 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@  enum lockdown_reason {
 	LOCKDOWN_PERF,
 	LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS,
 	LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW,
+	LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET,
 	LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
 };
 
diff --git a/net/xfrm/Kconfig b/net/xfrm/Kconfig
index 5b9a5ab48111..cb592524701d 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/Kconfig
+++ b/net/xfrm/Kconfig
@@ -91,6 +91,15 @@  config XFRM_ESP
 	select CRYPTO_SEQIV
 	select CRYPTO_SHA256
 
+config XFRM_REDACT_SECRET
+	bool "Redact xfrm SA secret"
+	depends on XFRM && SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM
+	default n
+	help
+	  Redats XFRM SA secret in the netlink message to user space.
+	  Redacting secret is also a FIPS 140-2 requirement.
+	  e.g. ip xfrm state; will show redacted the SA secret.
+
 config XFRM_IPCOMP
 	tristate
 	select XFRM_ALGO
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index fbb7d9d06478..b57599d050dc 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ 
  *
  */
 
+#include <linux/fips.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -848,21 +849,85 @@  static int copy_user_offload(struct xfrm_state_offload *xso, struct sk_buff *skb
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool xfrm_redact(void)
+{
+	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY) &&
+		IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XFRM_REDACT_SECRET) &&
+		security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET);
+}
+
 static int copy_to_user_auth(struct xfrm_algo_auth *auth, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct xfrm_algo *algo;
+	struct xfrm_algo_auth *ap;
 	struct nlattr *nla;
+	bool redact_secret = xfrm_redact();
 
 	nla = nla_reserve(skb, XFRMA_ALG_AUTH,
 			  sizeof(*algo) + (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
 	if (!nla)
 		return -EMSGSIZE;
-
 	algo = nla_data(nla);
 	strncpy(algo->alg_name, auth->alg_name, sizeof(algo->alg_name));
-	memcpy(algo->alg_key, auth->alg_key, (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
+
+	if (redact_secret && auth->alg_key_len)
+		memset(algo->alg_key, 0, (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
+	else
+		memcpy(algo->alg_key, auth->alg_key,
+		       (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
 	algo->alg_key_len = auth->alg_key_len;
 
+	nla = nla_reserve(skb, XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC, xfrm_alg_auth_len(auth));
+	if (!nla)
+		return -EMSGSIZE;
+	ap = nla_data(nla);
+	memcpy(ap, auth, sizeof(struct xfrm_algo_auth));
+	if (redact_secret && auth->alg_key_len)
+		memset(ap->alg_key, 0, (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
+	else
+		memcpy(ap->alg_key, auth->alg_key,
+		       (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int copy_to_user_aead(struct xfrm_algo_aead *aead, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct nlattr *nla = nla_reserve(skb, XFRMA_ALG_AEAD, aead_len(aead));
+	struct xfrm_algo_aead *ap;
+	bool redact_secret = xfrm_redact();
+
+	if (!nla)
+		return -EMSGSIZE;
+
+	ap = nla_data(nla);
+	memcpy(ap, aead, sizeof(*aead));
+
+	if (redact_secret && aead->alg_key_len)
+		memset(ap->alg_key, 0, (aead->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
+	else
+		memcpy(ap->alg_key, aead->alg_key,
+		       (aead->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int copy_to_user_ealg(struct xfrm_algo *ealg, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct xfrm_algo *ap;
+	bool redact_secret = xfrm_redact();
+	struct nlattr *nla = nla_reserve(skb, XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT,
+					 xfrm_alg_len(ealg));
+	if (!nla)
+		return -EMSGSIZE;
+
+	ap = nla_data(nla);
+	memcpy(ap, ealg, sizeof(*ealg));
+
+	if (redact_secret && ealg->alg_key_len)
+		memset(ap->alg_key, 0, (ealg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
+	else
+		memcpy(ap->alg_key, ealg->alg_key,
+		       (ealg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -906,20 +971,17 @@  static int copy_to_user_state_extra(struct xfrm_state *x,
 			goto out;
 	}
 	if (x->aead) {
-		ret = nla_put(skb, XFRMA_ALG_AEAD, aead_len(x->aead), x->aead);
+		ret = copy_to_user_aead(x->aead, skb);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out;
 	}
 	if (x->aalg) {
 		ret = copy_to_user_auth(x->aalg, skb);
-		if (!ret)
-			ret = nla_put(skb, XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC,
-				      xfrm_alg_auth_len(x->aalg), x->aalg);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out;
 	}
 	if (x->ealg) {
-		ret = nla_put(skb, XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT, xfrm_alg_len(x->ealg), x->ealg);
+		ret = copy_to_user_ealg(x->ealg, skb);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out;
 	}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 70a7ad357bc6..72d9aac7178a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@  const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
 	[LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
 	[LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
 	[LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",
+	[LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET] = "xfrm SA secret",
 	[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
 };