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Hallyn" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH v2 3/8] security/brute: Add sysctl attributes to allow detection fine tuning Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2020 14:45:35 +0100 Message-Id: <20201025134540.3770-4-john.wood@gmx.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20201025134540.3770-1-john.wood@gmx.com> References: <20201025134540.3770-1-john.wood@gmx.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Provags-ID: V03:K1:pofVpQawf3cGIOvUmDx1sWEL7cIqeQhbsAoJcoXuQe4Kmy96jmh QQgyBhhHJ1dcWAV19f31YFCvjT+ZDiMTFk6KC/FyoDKTKb1TVpbe9YmYKf+vuWiRjw2EJKz Lt+2qG/0k3LKn/qYawV5ON0lt3kbPTrzXSxp8NZOGnjerTVfFeCoJ0xx0cPQR0dBRQPwARp 2EyO1lU2t2fow+l2KKxWQ== X-Spam-Flag: NO X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V03:K0:fD2ezhdR8F4=:pnRSOwo+YDnupRmdVquV14 FI/Seu4PTrzkrG9v8P14awXBqqhv2GPSKRRNaUZpnKsqzCXqqZ40BDRYTsv4/CLZI1vAL81YC hTGvnbxYxL8JIfMjZJMkRzHlWP6Y2eTR4/uddYXePSglt2bwaoQcyh5S4rL8djtonosmD9iMU lLO3MvFWqOgAq9en5TjR+1oBaU3cAW0FU4rYGydB0QONwm93vE6Kz/2vn3BoAfqi1iIuHygmA muzA50Hxu3N1OOkQZtdwB423BwGaFJxdeOetjT4kBOLj9+I/5AmqB05Dte/uuA7EYkv3k46oz H6KhVBFRjAevye6SjlVXmggbvSzFqDMh2NpD/IXe+Ciw+lhq8zrHTYWqEA27cxVmm+sKdz9SF BMhh36UCDi2vndTYDAuEa/ANLeDKoS2J++5AZPELSpO3mFJHy1oHU93y/eU/SdstUkaVFzRbA h6UG+WGYWYNHWuxZqAo8j1ASnKgLdjOR3KQmVho6Rr0bDpbs7G3U4Xa9saFNJ5+me09gmSnu8 JS07TYteXtJtsWTjaV2DmOOS5CWjSsDN/PLwNoU2mAPmNcvA7XUC3tBaxEh/1+c0wUSje/t2I 1dV33FSSVyit/21xCbGi4xdBV/93Z6dZi80kgU5Shc2zAAhKmbIcOF0yGZw4Q6EaPLdNmPlAH JobMvvbp8Tnx2HAFxrE3rPQP+hqMBK/vG1VDMlIk3FOhblDYFy5tzSwYZ9cLXSQFm5KMznbUo SGzjjEtkFqEMPW/J7tQXXMrBVsVdk+hsZheFrSfARqt5As8ggyLER6jnO7mJoW8umSTz5m+ly BFST+YJSAykDMGpN2Z2kURl2d+fIKX0jz1z7j1aJSzWwfiMkKIQDLE92h/+mTUvWYKbgS7kHC R97vGMdtKJzy55FV+7sQ== Precedence: bulk List-ID: This is a previous step to add the detection feature. A fork brute force attack will be detected when an application crashes quickly. Since, the application crash period is the time between the execve system call and the first fault or the time between two consecutives faults add a new sysctl attribute to control the crash period threshold. But a detection method based only on this computation has a drawback. If an application crashes once quickly from the execve system call or crashes twice in a short period of time for some reason, a false positive attack will be triggered. To avoid this scenario use a list of the i last crashes timestamps and compute the application crash period as follows: crash_period = (n_last_timestamp - n_minus_i_timestamp) / i; So, also add a new sysctl attribute to control the size of this list. This way, each system can tune the detection's sensibility adjusting the application crash period threshold and the size of the last crashes timestamps list. Signed-off-by: John Wood --- security/brute/brute.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+) -- 2.25.1 diff --git a/security/brute/brute.c b/security/brute/brute.c index 307d07bf9d98..29835fe2f141 100644 --- a/security/brute/brute.c +++ b/security/brute/brute.c @@ -4,12 +4,14 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -17,6 +19,34 @@ #include #include #include +#include + +/** + * brute_timestamps_list_size - Last crashes timestamps list size. + * + * The application crash period is the time between the execve system call and + * the first fault or the time between two consecutives faults, but this has a + * drawback. If an application crashes once quickly from the execve system call + * or crashes twice in a short period of time for some reason, a false positive + * attack will be triggered. To avoid this scenario use a list of the i last + * crashes timestamps and compute the application crash period as follows: + * + * crash_period = (n_last_timestamp - n_minus_i_timestamp) / i; + * + * The brute_timestamps_list_size variable sets the size of this list. + */ +static unsigned int brute_timestamps_list_size __read_mostly = 5; + +/** + * brute_crash_period_threshold - Application crash period threshold. + * + * The units are expressed in milliseconds. + * + * A fork brute force attack will be detected if the application crash period + * falls under this threshold. So, the higher this value, the more sensitive the + * detection will be. + */ +static unsigned int brute_crash_period_threshold __read_mostly = 30000; /** * struct brute_stats - Fork brute force attack statistics. @@ -318,6 +348,58 @@ static struct security_hook_list brute_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, brute_task_free), }; +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +static unsigned int uint_one = 1; +static unsigned int uint_max = UINT_MAX; +static unsigned int max_brute_timestamps_list_size = 10; + +/** + * brute_sysctl_path - Sysctl attributes path. + */ +static struct ctl_path brute_sysctl_path[] = { + { .procname = "kernel", }, + { .procname = "brute", }, + { } +}; + +/** + * brute_sysctl_table - Sysctl attributes. + */ +static struct ctl_table brute_sysctl_table[] = { + { + .procname = "timestamps_list_size", + .data = &brute_timestamps_list_size, + .maxlen = sizeof(brute_timestamps_list_size), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &uint_one, + .extra2 = &max_brute_timestamps_list_size, + }, + { + .procname = "crash_period_threshold", + .data = &brute_crash_period_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(brute_crash_period_threshold), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &uint_one, + .extra2 = &uint_max, + }, + { } +}; + +/** + * brute_init_sysctl() - Initialize the sysctl interface. + */ +static void __init brute_init_sysctl(void) +{ + if (!register_sysctl_paths(brute_sysctl_path, brute_sysctl_table)) + panic("Cannot register the sysctl interface\n"); +} + +#else +static inline void brute_init_sysctl(void) { } +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ + /** * brute_init() - Initialize the brute LSM. * @@ -328,6 +410,7 @@ static int __init brute_init(void) pr_info("Brute initialized\n"); security_add_hooks(brute_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(brute_hooks), KBUILD_MODNAME); + brute_init_sysctl(); return 0; }