diff mbox series

[27/34] apparmor: handle idmapped mounts

Message ID 20201029003252.2128653-28-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
State New
Headers show
Series fs: idmapped mounts | expand

Commit Message

Christian Brauner Oct. 29, 2020, 12:32 a.m. UTC
The i_uid and i_gid are only ever used when logging for AppArmor. This is
already broken in a bunch of places where the global root id is reported
instead of the i_uid or i_gid of the file. Nonetheless, be kind and log the
mapped inode if we're coming from an idmapped mount.

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
---
 security/apparmor/domain.c |  9 ++++++---
 security/apparmor/file.c   |  5 ++++-
 security/apparmor/lsm.c    | 12 ++++++++----
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index f919ebd042fd..91b132961b67 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -10,12 +10,14 @@ 
 
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
@@ -858,8 +860,10 @@  int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	const char *info = NULL;
 	int error = 0;
 	bool unsafe = false;
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = mnt_user_ns(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
+	kuid_t i_uid = i_uid_into_mnt(user_ns, file_inode(bprm->file));
 	struct path_cond cond = {
-		file_inode(bprm->file)->i_uid,
+		i_uid,
 		file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode
 	};
 
@@ -967,8 +971,7 @@  int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
 			aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
 				      bprm->filename, NULL, new,
-				      file_inode(bprm->file)->i_uid, info,
-				      error));
+				      i_uid, info, error));
 	aa_put_label(new);
 	goto done;
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index 92acf9a49405..d6d9e71f1900 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ 
 #include <linux/tty.h>
 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
@@ -508,8 +510,9 @@  static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	struct aa_perms perms = {};
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = mnt_user_ns(file->f_path.mnt);
 	struct path_cond cond = {
-		.uid = file_inode(file)->i_uid,
+		.uid = i_uid_into_mnt(user_ns, file_inode(file)),
 		.mode = file_inode(file)->i_mode
 	};
 	char *buffer;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index ffeaee5ed968..ece9afc3994f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -224,7 +224,8 @@  static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
  */
 static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask)
 {
-	struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid,
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = mnt_user_ns(path->mnt);
+	struct path_cond cond = { i_uid_into_mnt(user_ns, d_backing_inode(path->dentry)),
 				  d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
 	};
 
@@ -266,12 +267,13 @@  static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
 			  struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = mnt_user_ns(dir->mnt);
 	struct path_cond cond = { };
 
 	if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry))
 		return 0;
 
-	cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
+	cond.uid = i_uid_into_mnt(user_ns, inode);
 	cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
 
 	return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
@@ -361,11 +363,12 @@  static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_d
 
 	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
 	if (!unconfined(label)) {
+		struct user_namespace *user_ns = mnt_user_ns(old_dir->mnt);
 		struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt,
 					 .dentry = old_dentry };
 		struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt,
 					 .dentry = new_dentry };
-		struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid,
+		struct path_cond cond = { i_uid_into_mnt(user_ns, d_backing_inode(old_dentry)),
 					  d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
 		};
 
@@ -420,8 +423,9 @@  static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file)
 
 	label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(file->f_cred);
 	if (!unconfined(label)) {
+		struct user_namespace *user_ns = mnt_user_ns(file->f_path.mnt);
 		struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
-		struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
+		struct path_cond cond = { i_uid_into_mnt(user_ns, inode), inode->i_mode };
 
 		error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, label, &file->f_path, 0,
 				     aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);